Richard J. Reynolds v. Muriel M. Reynolds

Fifth Circuit

Richard J. Reynolds v. Muriel M. Reynolds

309 F.2d 395

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedNovember 29, 1962

Docket19607

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 309 F.2d 395 (Richard J. Reynolds v. Muriel M. Reynolds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Richard J. Reynolds v. Muriel M. Reynolds, 309 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1962).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

After the divorce decree was entered by the Georgia divorce court, the plaintiff there (appellant here) filed what he variously describes as a petition, application or motion directed to the defendant (appellee here) to show cause why certain life insurance policies which had been produced by her under peremptory order of that court should not now be adjudged to be “the property of” the plaintiff and possession of them “delivered over to him.” No process was issued or served on defendant. The defendant, a nonresident of Georgia, removed the case to the United States District Court. Thereafter she moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction because of inadequate process or service thereof.

The District Court, after extensive hearings and on a record which details every possible relation between such policies and the divorce proceeding, denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand. Thereafter the Court dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction.

The District Court was right on both scores. Neither ownership nor right to possession of such policies was an issue in, or determined by, the divorce proceedings. The relief sought, by whatever name now described, was not ancillary. It was an independent, separate, new proceeding which the defendant was entitled to remove. Since it was not ancillary, the purported service by mere notice to defendant’s divorce action counsel was inadequate. Dismissal for want of jurisdiction over the defendant was therefore .appropriate.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

After the divorce decree was entered by the Georgia divorce court, the plaintiff there (appellant here) filed what he variously describes as a petition, application or motion directed to the defendant (appellee here) to show cause why certain life insurance policies which had been produced by her under peremptory order of that court should not now be adjudged to be “the property of” the plaintiff and possession of them “delivered over to him.” No process was issued or served on defendant. The defendant, a nonresident of Georgia, removed the case to the United States District Court. Thereafter she moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction because of inadequate process or service thereof.

The District Court, after extensive hearings and on a record which details every possible relation between such policies and the divorce proceeding, denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand. Thereafter the Court dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction.

The District Court was right on both scores. Neither ownership nor right to possession of such policies was an issue in, or determined by, the divorce proceedings. The relief sought, by whatever name now described, was not ancillary. It was an independent, separate, new proceeding which the defendant was entitled to remove. Since it was not ancillary, the purported service by mere notice to defendant’s divorce action counsel was inadequate. Dismissal for want of jurisdiction over the defendant was therefore .appropriate.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

309 F.2d 395, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-j-reynolds-v-muriel-m-reynolds-ca5-1962.

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