IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
RICHARD HORTON, : : Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:23-cv-3888 : v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley : CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al., : Magistrate Judge S. Courter Shimeall : Defendants. :
OPINION & ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 142). Oral argument was held in this matter. Following careful consideration and the benefit of oral argument, this Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background1 This case stems from an armed robbery committed on October 9, 2004. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 15). Defendant Brenda K. Walker and Sam Sias (who was terminated as a defendant as of March 7, 2024), detectives with the Columbus Division of Police, were assigned as the lead investigators for the robbery. (Id. ¶ 23). The victims gave Defendant Walker a description of the robber including details that the robber was a Black male with light skin, between 5 feet 9 inches and 6 feet tall, and had been wearing a grey hoodie tied tight around his face so that only his eyes and nose were visible. (Id. ¶¶ 28–34). One victim told Defendant Walker that he could identify the robber and informed Defendant Walker that the robber’s name is “Richard Diggs” also known as
1 At summary judgment, this Court recites the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See, e.g., Lange v. McGinnis, 644 F. App'x 672, 673 (6th Cir. 2016); Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 803 (6th Cir. 2019). “Adidas boy.” (Id. ¶ 34). After Defendants learned Plaintiff’s name, “Richard Horton”, Defendant Walker requested a fingerprint analysis comparing the fingerprints recovered from the crime scene with Plaintiff’s known fingerprints. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40). The fingerprint analysis confirmed that the fingerprints recovered from the crime scene were not left by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 41). On December 4, 2004, Defendant Walker showed the victims a photo array of six individuals, including a
photograph of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 57). The victims identified Plaintiff after Defendant Walker instructed them to “[l]ook carefully at the photographs of all six people then advise the detective whether or not you recognize anyone.” (Id.). On December 15, 2004, Defendant Walker filed a criminal complaint and issued an arrest warrant against Plaintiff in connection with the robbery. (Id. ¶¶ 60–61). On December 27, 2004, Plaintiff voluntarily turned himself into the police and, in February of 2006, Plaintiff was tried for robbery, identified by testimony at trial by the victims as the perpetrator, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to 23 years in prison. (Id. ¶¶ 89–99). In January 2022, after consistently maintaining his innocence, Plaintiff’s convictions were
vacated based upon evidence from newly developed DNA technology and the trial court’s barring the use of a victim’s testimony at a new trial. (Id. ¶ 101; ECF No. 18 ¶ 101). B. Procedural Background On November 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Columbus and Detective Walker and Detective Sam Sias, who is now deceased. (ECF No. 1). On March 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint substituting the estate of Detective Sias as a defendant. (ECF No. 17). The Amended Complaint sets forth nine counts against Defendants: (i) due process violations (fourteenth amendment) (42 U.S.C. §1983); (ii) deprivation of liberty without probable cause (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) (42 U.S.C. §1983); (iii) failure to intervene (42 U.S.C. §1983); (iv) conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. §1983); (v) malicious prosecution (state law); (vi) intentional infliction of emotional distress (state law); (vii) civil conspiracy (state law); (viii) respondeat superior (state law); and (ix) indemnification (state law). Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint and a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts VIII and IX. (ECF Nos. 18, 19). On February 13, 2025, this Court issued an
Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts VIII and IX. (ECF No. 55). Count VIII, the respondeat superior (state law) claim was dismissed with prejudice, and Count IX, the indemnification (state law) claim was dismissed without prejudice. (Id.) On February 20, 2026, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 141), followed by an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 142), on February 23, 2026. Plaintiff responded on March 28, 2026. (See ECF Nos. 149–155). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 716–17 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court’s role is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249. Evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative” will not defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249–50. The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of presenting the Court with law and argument in support of its motion, as well as “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “If the moving party satisfies its burden, then the burden of going forward shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury.” Cox v. Ky.
Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995). “The Court views factual evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009). Even so, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support [the nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). III. LAW AND ANALYSIS Defendants seek summary judgment on all aspects of the Complaint. With respect to the §
1983 claims they argue that: (1) Detective Walker is entitled to summary judgment and qualified immunity on the claim that Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated by the unduly suggestive photo array; (2) Detective Walker is entitled to summary judgment on the due process claim alleging that she conducted a single “show-up”; (3) there is no viable due process claim against Detective Walker based on the prophylactic rule; (4) Detective Walker is entitled to summary judgment and qualified immunity on the claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), alleging that she did not turn over her field notes to the prosecutor; (5) Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the additional claims under Brady v. Maryland, alleging that there was a nondisclosure of a notation that the gun was in the intruder’s left hand, and second, that there was a failure to disclose the result of a second crime-scene fingerprint analysis; (6) Detective Walker is entitled to summary judgment and qualified immunity on the claim that evidence was fabricated; (7) Defendant City of Columbus is entitled to summary judgment on all federal claims based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and Political Subdivision Immunity under O.R.C. § 2744; (8) Defendant Walker is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining
state-law claims, malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 142 at 5–9). As an initial matter, Plaintiff agrees voluntarily to dismiss Count III, failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Count IV, conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and Count VII, civil conspiracy (state law), against Defendant Walker. (ECF No. 149 at 131). A. Federal Claims Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “by its terms does not create any substantive rights but rather ‘merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.’” Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 302 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 2000)). To prevail on his § 1983 claims, Plaintiff “‘must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived [Mr. Horton] of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’” Id. (quoting Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2001)). Defendants argue that Detective Walker is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity because her conduct did not violate Horton’s clearly established constitutional rights. Qualified immunity doctrine generally protects “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity analysis comprises two considerations: (1) “whether the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right;” and (2) “whether the right at issue was clearly established when the event occurred so that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2021). If the answer to these questions is “yes,”
qualified immunity is not proper. Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). An official “cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, Michigan, 969 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 2020). To determine whether a right is clearly established, “a district court must look to then-existing binding precedent from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit or itself.” Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 111 F.3d 131 (6th Cir. 1997). It is not the case that for a right to be “clearly established,” the specific action at issue must have previously been held unlawful, but “it is the
say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The analysis of whether a right is “clearly established” must be “undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, summary judgment should be denied if the undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendants violated clearly established rights or if there is a factual dispute “such that it cannot be determined before trial whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights.” Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir. 1988); see Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper “if genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the officer committed acts that would violate a clearly established right”). Defendant City of Columbus argues it is entitled to summary judgment on all federal claims asserted against it because Plaintiff cannot establish any of the essential elements set out in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690–94 (1978). Plaintiff’s federal claims against
each Defendant are discussed in turn below. 1. Defendant Walker Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Walker violated Mr. Horton’s constitutional rights on three grounds. First, Defendant Walker deprived Plaintiff of his right to a fair trial, due process, and liberty without probable cause by fabricating evidence. Second, Defendant Walker deprived Plaintiff of his right to a fair trial, due process, and liberty without probable cause by deliberately withholding exculpatory evidence. Third, using an unduly suggestive photo identification, Defendant Walker deprived Plaintiff of his Constitutional right to a fair trial, due process, and liberty without probable cause. In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant Walker argues
that she is entitled to qualified immunity, rendering her non-liable for suit on any of Mr. Horton’s claims. The Court will address these claims in this order. a. Fabrication of Evidence A fabrication-of-evidence claim under § 1983 alleges that a defendant "knowingly fabricated evidence against [a plaintiff], and [that] there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury." Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th Cir. 1997). Viewing a fabrication-of-evidence claim for the purposes of section 1983, “the Fourth Amendment is violated when probable cause rests on fabricated evidence presented to a grand jury or to a judge determining probable cause.” Id. (citing King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 588-90 (6th Cir. 2017)); see also Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 616 n.5 (6th Cir. 2014) (“A Fourth Amendment claim for fabrication of evidence lies where a defendant knowingly manufactures probable cause, thereby effecting a seizure”). Under an alternate basis, the Fourteenth Amendment, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is also ‘violated when evidence is knowingly fabricated and a reasonable likelihood exists that the false evidence
would have affected the decision of the jury.’” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 815 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gregory, 444 F.3d at 737). “The relevant question is not whether the fabricated evidence was shown to the jury; it is whether the statement affected the decision of the jury.” Id. at 816. Defendants argue that the only allegation of fabrication by the Plaintiff in the amended complaint alleges that the “manufactured evidence ‘include[ed] eyewitness identifications procured through the use of unduly suggestive tactics.’” (ECF Nos. 142 at 75, 15 at ¶ 130). Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s additional allegations that Detective Walker’s summary police reports were fabricated also warrant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, because
“there is no evidence in the record to show what evidence was presented to the grand jury.” (ECF No. 142 at 77). While some of Detective Walker’s summary reports could have been seen by the grand jury, there is no evidence to indicate such a fact. (Id.). Finally, Defendants contend that “Detective Walker’s typed investigative summaries were not introduced as evidence at the criminal trial.” (ECF No. 142 at 79). Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that “Defendant Walker knowingly fabricated” evidence, and “all five [pieces of evidence] speak to the reliability of the witnesses and the ability of the witnesses to identify the perpetrator.” (ECF No. 149 at 62). Specifically, the five pieces of allegedly fabricated evidence highlighted by Plaintiff are (1) Richard McClanahan only gave Defendant Walker the first name Richard in the October 13, 2004 interview; (2) Defendant Walker first received the last name Horton during a phone call from Richard McClanahan on October 28, 2004; (3) In the interview on October 28, 2004, Richard McClanahan stated that the perpetrator’s height was 6’0”; (4) Rhonda Curry stated that she could see the face of the perpetrator in her interview on October 9, 2004; and (5) Richard McClanahan stated that he saw the face of the
robber in his October 13, 2004, interview. (Id. at 61–62). Plaintiff further argues that “Defendant Walker’s fabricated reports were used as the basis for charging Horton.” (Id.). Ultimately, Plaintiff argues that the alleged fabricated evidence was then used as the basis for the criminal charge and resulting trial, and thus, forms the basis for the § 1983 claim because the “only evidence” against Plaintiff in this case was the eyewitness identifications. (Id.). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding allegedly fabricated evidence by Defendant Walker during the course of the investigation. It follows that a reasonable jury could conclude that such fabricated evidence was used as the basis for Plaintiff’s Horton’s criminal charges, which
ultimately led to his trial and conviction. In Jackson, the Sixth Circuit found that “fabricated evidence that ‘is used as [the] basis for a criminal charge’ can form the basis for a § 1983 claim because, absent that evidence, there would have been no jury.” 925 F.3d at 816. Such is the case here and, at bottom, should be a question for the jury. Therefore, this Court DENIES summary judgment on this claim. b. Withholding Exculpatory Evidence Under Brady v. Maryland In 1963, the Supreme Court announced that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Sixth Circuit has held that “the due process guarantees recognized in Brady also impose an analogous or derivative obligation on the police.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009). The Court first notes that Detective Walker is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The Sixth Circuit has held that a police officer's obligation to turn over all exculpatory evidence has been clearly established
since 1990. See id. at 381–82 (“Decisions from other circuits recognizing the type of ‘Brady- derived claims that [the plaintiff] asserts here date back as far as 1964. In fact, at least three circuits recognized prior to August 1990 ... that this right was clearly established. Although our recognition of this type of a claim is more recent and less specific, the overwhelming number of decisions from other circuits recognizing this type of claim satisfies us that any reasonable police officer would know that suppressing exculpatory evidence was a violation of the accused's constitutional rights.”). Because the right was clearly established as early as 1990, it was clearly established at the time of Detective Walker’s actions in this case, and she is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. The question remains for the Court to resolve, then, whether Detective Walker fulfilled
her obligation to turn over all exculpatory evidence. Generally, police share in the state's obligations under Brady, or that the Constitution imposes on the police obligations analogous to those recognized in Brady. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1999) ("One standard police function is to provide information to the prosecutor and the courts. Thus, a police officer sometimes may be liable if he fails to apprise the prosecutor or a judicial officer of known exculpatory information.") (quoting Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 446- 47 (5th Cir. 1997)) ("[A] plaintiff states a section 1983 claim against a police officer who, after learning of 'patently exculpatory evidence,' deliberately fails to disclose it to the prosecutor." (citation omitted). Defendants argue that Defendant Walker is entitled to summary judgment on this claim, specifically pertaining to the handwritten notes and the name Richard Diggs, first, because in 2004, there was no requirement for police officers in Ohio to include their handwritten interview notes
in the informational packets they sent to the county prosecutor, and that her notes were protected by discovery. (ECF No. 142 at 58–59). Defendants further argue that, in 2004, and for years prior, Richard Diggs was an inmate at Chillicothe Correctional Institution, and therefore, it was physically impossible for him to have committed the Loew Street robbery. (Id. at 60–61). On the contrary, Plaintiff’s assert that Defendant Walker suppressed evidence, including the name of Richard Diggs, that the gun was in the perpetrator’s left hand, the latent fingerprint results received during Horton’s criminal trial, the single-photo identification procedure, and whether Defendant Walker introduced the name Horton. (ECF No. 149 at 66). Specifically, Plaintiff focuses on the name Richard Diggs, and whether he was a potential perpetrator given that
“Walker did not know at the time that Richard Diggs was not a credible alternative suspect.” (ECF No. 149 at 69). Construing the facts in favor of the Plaintiff, those same facts could lead a reasonable jury to believe that Defendant Walker failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, including the name of Richard Diggs and the latent fingerprint comparison, to the prosecutor during the investigation and at trial. It is only when the police have “substantial exculpatory evidence to conclude that” an alternate suspect is innocent does Brady cease requiring disclosure. See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 345 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1998). Further, as the Supreme Court in United States v. Bagley reiterated, “impeachment evidence, however, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.” 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). If such impeachment evidence is “disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.” Id. (citing Brady, 373 U.S., at 87). Here, it is evident that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Richard Diggs as a potential alternative suspect was exculpatory, and if it was, whether Defendant Walker
has substantial evidence to support the determination, at the time of the investigation, that Richard Diggs was innocent and could not have committed the robbery. Although Defendants contend in their brief that the name Richard Diggs “was not material of favorable,” this Court disagrees. (ECF No. 142 at 23). Certainly, that evidence could have been impeachment evidence, even though Richard Diggs himself could not have been at the crime scene. There is further dispute concerning the latent fingerprint comparison that Defendant Walker conducted during Plaintiff’s trial, neither of which belonged to Plaintiff Horton, that the Plaintiff alleges were never provided to the prosecution or the defense. (ECF No. 149 at 39). Defendants do not dispute that a latent fingerprint analysis was conducted during trial with a print
that matched one of the witnesses, Richard McClanahan, but no prints belonging to Plaintiff Horton. (ECF No. 142 at 23). At this juncture, the Court is unable to resolve the question of whether Detective Walker fulfilled her obligation to turn over exculpatory and impeachment evidence, based upon the disputed facts, as it will be one for the jury. Therefore, this Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Brady claim. c. The Unduly Suggestive Photo Array When considering suggestive identification claims, “A defendant’s due process right to a fair trial prevents the introduction of out-of-court identification evidence when that evidence is ‘so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.’” United States v. Radaker-Carter, 151 F.4th 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012)). In Stovall, the Supreme Court solidified that “due process encompasses protection from the threat of ‘irreparable mistaken identification’ posed by eyewitness identifications stemming from ‘unnecessarily suggestive’ identification procedures.” Nolen v.
Ford, No. 25-1370, 2026 WL 1763350, at *4 (6th Cir. June 18, 2026) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 201–02 (1967)). While an unduly suggestive identification procedure alone does not necessarily violate a defendant’s constitutional rights, “the admission at trial of such an identification, unless harmless, can violate a criminal defendant’s core due process rights.” Salter v. City of Detroit, 133 F.4th 527, 540 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081, 1087 (6th Cir. 1977) Courts analyze suggestive identification claims in two steps. Salter, 133 F.4th at 538 (6th Cir. 2025). First, the court examines whether the identification procedure itself was “unnecessarily suggestive.” (Id.) (quoting Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 704 (6th Cir. 2007)). If the court
finds that the procedure was in fact suggestive, it determines whether the identification was “nevertheless reliable,” despite the use of a suggestive procedure. (Id.). In determining whether an identification was nevertheless reliable, courts consider the totality of the circumstances based on five factors: “(1) the witness’s opportunity to view the suspect, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the suspect, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time he identified the suspect, and (5) the time between the crime and the identification.” (Id.) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)). Defendant argues that Defendant Walker is entitled to qualified immunity on the unduly suggestive identification procedure claim. Defendants contend that the photo array procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive because it did not “steer” the eyewitnesses, McClanahan and Curry, “to identify Horton independent of their ‘honest recollection.’” (ECF No. 142 at 34). Defendants further assert that it was these witnesses who “directed Detective Walker” to Plaintiff Horton by name, and not the other way around.” (Id.; ECF No. 134-1 at 59–60, 119–123). Plaintiff alleges that the photo array is suggestive because McClanahan and Curry described the individual as
having lighter skin and Plaintiff Horton “was the only light-skinned person in the photo array.” (ECF No. 17 at ¶¶ 53–55). Plaintiff further argues that “the record viewed in Horton’s favor shows that both eyewitnesses identified Horton as the robber even though Horton had nothing to do with the crime and was not at the scene.” (ECF No. 149 at 92). In United States v. Washington, the defendant argued that the photo array used to identify him was impermissibly suggestive because the “police officers chose darker-skinned individuals than himself to appear in the photo array alongside him.” 714 F.3d 962, 967 (6th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit disagreed. (Id.) In its analysis, the court examined whether the other men in the photo array had facial hair and were around the same age as the defendant and likened the case to United States
v. Sullivan, where it held that a photo array “did not improperly single out a defendant,” even where the defendant was the only suspect in the photo array with “noticeably blue eyes.” (Id. at 967–68). However, the Washington court also recognized that the defendants skin tone was “very close to the men in photos four and five,” and there was not a “drastic difference in the defendant’s skin tone and the remaining photos.” (Id. at 967) The facts of the case before this Court are not analogous to Washington. According to the record, “testimony offered by Detective Walker at Horton’s criminal trial indicated that she prepared the photograph array using “AFIS,” which requires you to pull up the person you want to include in the array along with descriptors like “black male, approximate weight, style or shortness of hair, facial hair glasses,” upon which the computer randomly selects photographs and then they photo array is prepared. (ECF Nos. 149 at 20; 142 at 18; 134-1 at 123–124). However, Plaintiff Horton is the only light-skinned black male in the photo array, to an obvious degree. Unlike in Washington, by this Court’s review, there is a drastic difference in skin tone between Plaintiff Horton and the remaining five men in the photo array. Given that witness Rhonda Curry
described the perpetrator is “light skin–yellow” in an interview with Detective Walker on October 9, 2004, and witness Richard McClanahan described the individual as “light skin” a few days later on October 13, 2004, at minimum, the Court finds the photo array to be unduly suggestive. (ECF No. 149 at 10, 13). The Court is similarly not persuaded by the reliability of the identification. First, based on the record, it is not evident to the Court that either witness had a sufficient opportunity to view the suspect or did so with a sufficient degree of attention. Rhonda Curry stated in her October 9. 2004, interview with Detective Walker that the individual had “a gray hoodie tied tight around his face,” and that he “told her to quit looking at him, so she hid her face in a pillow.” (Id. at 10–11). Further,
Richard McClanahan stated in a police report from October 9, 2004, that “the offender was wearing a grey hoodie, pulled tight over his face, and that he could not see the face of the perpetrator.” (Id. at 10). Additionally, the accuracy of the description given by the witnesses is unconvincing to the Court. Richard McClanahan originally described the perpetrator is “40 years old, a Black male, 6’2”, 150 pounds, had brown eyes, unknown hair color, and a thin build.” (Id. at 10). In the subsequent interview, Richard McClanahan described the individual as “a Black male, 27-28 years old, 5’9”–6’0”, light skin, with short nappy hair, busy eyebrows.” (Id. at 13). Although the second description given by McClanahan matches that of Richard Horton, the first description given on the day of the robbery does not. Third, despite Defendants’ testimony that Detective Walker asked McClanahan to describe his level of certainty in identifying Plaintiff in the six-pack photo array, and McClanahan’s statement that “the voice, the same eyebrows, wearing the same pants from the night before” it is not clear
to the Court at the summary judgment stage that the identification was “nonetheless reliable,” despite the unduly suggestive photo array, when viewing the analysis through the lens of the totality of the circumstances. (ECF Nos. 142 at 19; 134-1 at 9, 355, 356). Nor is the Court persuaded by Curry’s certainty that “He is the one. I recognized the eyes. I know those eyes, it is him” if Curry was only able to see the perpetrator with a hoodie tied tight around his face and had her face hidden in a pillow. (ECF No. 142 at 19; 134-1 at 20–21, 357, 358). Finally, the photo array occurred on December 4, 2004, nearly two months after the crime itself occurred, further casting doubt on the reliability of the identification. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 115–16 (finding an identification accurate where the description was given to police minutes after
the crime and the photographic identification took place only two days later). The Court thus finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that the photographic array presented by Detective Walker was unduly suggestive and not otherwise reliable, and therefore, DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that the photo array is unduly suggestive. 2. Defendant City of Columbus Plaintiff also brings his § 1983 claims against Defendant City of Columbus as a “municipal corporation that is or was the employer” of the individual defendants. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff argues that “the City of Columbus is also responsible for the policies and practices of the Columbus Division of Police, regardless of whether the Individual Defendants were aware that acting in accordance with certain of the Division’s policies and practices would deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.” (Id.). Section 1983 creates a civil cause of action for deprivation of federal rights by any person acting under color of law; but it does not establish full respondeat superior liability for actions of
municipal employees. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. Rather, the employee’s action must “fairly be said to represent official policy” of the local government. Id. at 694. To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, an aggrieved party first must have suffered a constitutional injury. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Municipal liability for such injuries may attach in any of four ways. “[T]he plaintiff may prove: ‘(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.’” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Whichever of the four routes is taken, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a close causal connection between the policy and the injuries suffered as well.” Johnson v. Hardin Cty., 908 F.2d 1280, 1285 (6th Cir. 1990). In other words, “the municipal action [must be] the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997). Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate municipal liability under any Monell theory. As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that “Horton cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation by Detective Walker or any other CPD officer,” and therefore, there is no municipal liability. (ECF No. 142 at 82–83). Concerning the first Monell theory, Defendants argue, Plaintiff fails to show the existence of an improper municipal policy or custom. (Id. at 84–85). Instead, Defendants contend that Horton “does not identify any specific written policy that is unconstitutional or that directs the underlying conduct that is allegedly unconstitutional.” Rather, Defendants argue, Horton “generally alleges” that the City of Columbus implemented unconstitutional policies. (Id. at 85) (citing Am. Compl., ECF No. 17 at ¶¶ 103-115). Concerning the second Monell theory, Defendants argue that Horton has not demonstrated that a decisionmaker
ordered or provided approval of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at 86). Instead, Defendants argue, that Horton does not present any facts or evidence demonstrating that any actions by Detective Walker were “taken because of prior or contemporaneous approval by a municipal official with final decision-making authority” or that any official ratified the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. (Id.). With respect to the third Monell theory, Defendants argue that Horton “cannot show that the training or supervision received by Columbus police officers was lacking or inadequate. . .” (Id. at 87). Defendants further argue that Detective Walker was a “seasoned” detective in 2004, detectives were “trained that the prosecutor needs to know everything the police know,” any deficiency was not the result of deliberate indifference, nor can
Horton provide evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations. (Id. at 87–91). Regarding the final Monell theory, Defendants argue that Horton has not alleged facts that show “a clear pattern of illegal activity,” nor has Horton “shown a historical failure” by the City of Columbus to discipline or investigate misconduct. (Id. at 92–93). Plaintiff argues that Defendant City of Columbus is liable under Monell’s first theory that the City of Columbus lacked any policy pertaining to Brady obligations and implementation of identification procedures. Plaintiff next asserts that Defendant City of Columbus is liable under Monell’s second theory for failure to train or supervise. Plaintiff asserts that by the City’s own admission, it had “no division-wide policy requiring officers to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors at all.” (ECF No. 149 at 120). Plaintiff argues that it is well established that “CPD did not provide meaningful, mandatory, or policy-driven training on Brady obligations in 2004.” (Id. at 124). Regarding deliberate indifference, Plaintiff argues that the City of Columbus failing to adopt a policy regarding disclosure of exculpatory evidence until 2010–2011 confirms its indifference. (Id. at 128). Plaintiff argues that “a reasonable jury could conclude that optional,
undocumented, or content-unknown training is no training at all when it is measured against the constitutional duty at issue.” (Id.). a. Failure to supervise/train To succeed on an inadequate training claim, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) that a training program is inadequate to the tasks that the officers must perform; (2) that the inadequacy is the result of the City's deliberate indifference; and (3) that the inadequacy is closely related to or actually caused the plaintiff's injury.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 463 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). In effect, Plaintiff must “identify a deficiency in the training program and show that the specific deficiency actually caused a constitutional violation.” Shepherd v. City
of Columbus, 2006 WL 840386, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2006) (Marbley, J.) (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Defendant City of Columbus failed to supervise or train its police detectives. Plaintiff never identified any deficiencies in CPD training, beyond drawing conclusions that “a reasonable jury could therefore conclude that the City’s training program was plainly insufficient and reflected deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of criminal suspects,” and further conclusions that “at most, detectives received fragmentary and optional exposure to the concept of exculpatory evidence, without clear guidance, enforcement, or accountability.” (ECF No. 149 at 125). Defendants submitted testimony from Defendant Walker that she received “five months of basic police training while she was in the police academy in the 1980’s.” (ECF Nos. 133-1 at 31; 142 at 87). Defendant Walker also testified that she received additional training from senior robbery detectives and “worked with that detective for about a month or five weeks to learn how to complete robbery investigations.” (ECF Nos. 133-1 at 32–33; 142 at 87). Further testimony from Defendant Walker indicated that “as a CPD detective in 2004,
she was required to document exculpatory evidence that she collected during an investigation.” (ECF No. 133-1 at 40–41; 142 at 88). In addition, based on the testimony of Dana Farbacker, a retired CPD detective, Defendants contend that “detectives were trained that the prosecutor needs to know everything the police know.” (ECF No. 130-1 at 80–83; 142 at 90). Moreover, aside from concluding that “the suppression of exculpatory evidence was not an isolated deviation from policy; it was the predictable product of a system with no meaningful rules governing documentation, preservation, or disclosure,” Plaintiff fails to point to similar cases in which CPD detectives committed similar alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiff’s claim fails because the record is devoid of evidence of a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees” that “is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). For the reasons above, this Court GRANTS summary judgment to Defendant City of Columbus as to the issue of Monell liability. B. State Law Claims 1. Defendant Walker Plaintiff also brings Ohio tort claims against Defendant Walker for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Act, O.R.C. § 2744, municipal employees are immune from liability for such claims unless one of the following applies: a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities; (b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or (c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon an employee, because that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section that an employee may sue and be sued, or because the section uses the term “shall” in a provision pertaining to an employee.
O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6). Defendants argue that statutory immunity under O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6) shields Defendant Walker from suit on the state-law claims because she “was acting within the course and scope of her employment and official responsibilities at all relevant times.” (ECF No. 142 at 95). Defendants further contend that none of Defendant Walker’s conduct supports a finding of malice, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness. (Id.). Plaintiff simply counters that “qualified immunity is not available to Defendant Walker on any of the Plaintiff’s federal claims and, as such, neither is officer tort immunity.” (ECF No. 149 at 112). Ohio law generally shields employees of political subdivisions from liability civil actions brought to recover damages caused by acts or omissions connected to government functions. O.R.C. § 2744.03(A). That immunity exists unless: “(a) [t]he employee's acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities; (b) [t]he employee's acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; [or] (c) [c]ivil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code.” O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6). Here, Plaintiff’s sole argument against Defendant Walker’s immunity under O.R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6) is that she is not entitled to any qualified immunity on any of the federal claims. This Court agrees. In instances where federal qualified immunity and Ohio state law immunity rest on the same issues of material fact, this Court “may review the state-law immunity defense ‘through the lens of federal qualified immunity analysis.” Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 759 (6th Cir. 2018). The
same issues that plague Defendants’ federal claims, namely, the disputed facts weaving between the suggestive photo array, the Brady claim, and the alleged fabrication of evidence also muddy the state law waters. Consequently, because this Court denied Defendants’ summary judgment on each of the federal claims against Defendant Walker, she is not then entitled to qualified immunity on the state law claims against her. 2. Defendant City of Columbus Plaintiff also brings Ohio tort claims against the City of Columbus for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. (ECF No. 17 at 23– 24). Under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Act, O.R.C. § 2744(A)(1), political subdivisions
are not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any action or omission of the political subdivision of an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, except in the following cases where the damages were caused by: (a) the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority; (b) negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions; (c) their negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads; (d) the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function, including, but not limited to, office buildings and courthouses, but not including jails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility; or (e) when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code
O.R.C. § 2744.02(B)(1)–(5). When confronting claims subject to the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, the court embarks on a three-part analysis to determine whether the political subdivision, in this case the City of Columbus, is immune from civil liability. Hubbard v. Canton City Sch. Bd. of Edn., 2002- Ohio-6718, ¶ 10, 97 Ohio St. 3d 451, 453, 780 N.E.2d 543, 546 (citing Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610 (1998)). The first tier of the analysis concerns the “general rule” that political subdivisions are immune from liability, although this immunity “is not absolute. Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018-Ohio-2121, ¶ 15, 153 Ohio St. 3d 611, 109 N.E.3d 1210 (citation omitted). The second tier of the analysis asks the court to determine whether the conduct falls within any of the five listed exceptions. (Id.). The third and final tier only applies if any of the exceptions are applicable, and the court is then required to determine if any of the defenses in O.R.C. 2744.03 apply. (Id.). Defendants argue that the City of Columbus is immune from suit on the state-law tort claims because Plaintiff is only seeking to recover damages for injury, death, and loss to person or property by the alleged conduct, and thus, the City is afforded presumptive immunity. (ECF No. 142 at 94). Defendants further argue that, based on the alleged facts of the Complaint, Horton cannot establish one of the five statutory exceptions to the City’s immunity. (Id.). Specifically, as set out in O.R.C. § 2744.02(B)(5), there is no other provision of the Ohio Revised Code that would otherwise impose liability upon the City for the conduct or injuries in Horton’s complaint. (Id.). In Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff does not address any arguments related to Defendant City of Columbus’s argument that it is immune from suit under O.R.C. § 2744.03(A), Plaintiff only addresses this theory of immunity regarding Detective Walker’s individual liability for the state-law tort claims. (See generally ECF No. 149). Sixth Circuit law makes clear that, “parties forfeit arguments at the summary judgment stage by failing to adequately address them in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023).
Based on the above, the Court finds that the City of Columbus is immune from Plaintiff’s remaining state-law tort claims consistent with Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, O.R.C. § 2744.03(A). The tortious conduct which Horton alleges the state-law claims, his arrest, trial, and prosecution, occurred while Detective Walker was performing a governmental function as a police detective. (See Conner v. City of Columbus, No. 2:10-CV-511, 2012 WL 3262743 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2012)) (finding no civil liability for the City of Columbus where the conduct of the officer was a governmental function and no exception of immunity applied). Upon reviewing the exceptions listed in O.R.C. § 2744.02(B), no exception applies in this case, and apart from that, Plaintiff does not appear to assert any argument in its brief that would produce a genuine issue of material fact,
such that a jury could find the City’s conduct to fall within such an exception. Thus, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the state law claims as they pertain to the City of Columbus. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, this Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 142). Specifically, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ summary judgment for the § 1983 municipal liability claim against Defendant City of Columbus, and Plaintiff’s state law tort claims against Defendant City of Columbus. This Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to § 1983 against Defendant Detective Walker for the Brady violation, the fabrication of evidence claim, the unduly suggestive photo claim, and the remaining state law claims against Detective Walker, individually. IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DATED: September 8, 2026