LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge:
The question in this case is whether the Bank for Foreign Trade, an agency of the Soviet Union, is a “person” within the meaning of the fourth exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). We hold that it is.
I. FACTS.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States, an independent federal agency, is a banking corporation that helps facilitate and finance exports and imports between the United States and other countries.
See generally
12 U.S.C. § 635
et seq.;
12 C.F.R. § 402.1. Eximbank, as it is known, derives its funds primarily from the sale of debentures in the private market, and not from congressional appropriations. The Bank is managed by a five-member board of directors appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.
In 1972 the Bank for Foreign Trade, an agency of the Soviet Union, approached Ex-imbank for help in financing the export from the United States of goods and services for use in the construction of an ammonia manufacturing facility in the Soviet Union. In June of 1973, after negotiations, Eximbank issued a preliminary commitment for credit of $180 million to the Bank for Foreign Trade. At the same time, the Bank for Foreign Trade negotiated a separate agreement with a consortium of private lenders, headed by the Bank of America, for the extension of an additional $180 million credit to be used for the construction project.
Late in the summer of 1973, during discussions between the Bank of America and Eximbank concerning coordination of the two credits, Eximbank proposed that the two credits be consolidated into a single loan agreement among the Bank of America consortium, Eximbank, and the Bank for Foreign Trade.
The proposal was agreeable to all parties, and on May 21, 1974, after some further negotiations, the three parties executed a consolidated final loan agreement.
On July 2, 1974 plaintiff Senator Richard (Dick) Stone, then a candidate for the United States Senate from Florida, requested that Eximbank furnish him a copy of the
loan agreement. William J. Casey, chairman of Eximbank, denied the request on the ground that the loan agreement was confidential and could not be disclosed without the consent of the other parties to the agreement.
Plaintiff sought such consent from the Bank for Foreign Trade, but it was refused. Eximbank did, however, provide plaintiff with copies of the resolution adopted by Eximbank’s board of directors approving the loan, which sets forth its basic terms,
and of the press release that Eximbank issued the day the loan agreement was executed.
Plaintiff thereupon filed suit against Ex-imbank and its president in federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking to compel disclosure of the agreement. Eximbank filed a motion for summary judgment together with an affidavit of its general counsel. The motion asserted that the loan agreement was protected from disclosure by the fourth exemption of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), which exempts “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” Plaintiff, taking the position that any loan agreement between Eximbank and the Bank for Foreign Trade was not within this exemption, moved the district court to conduct an
in camera
examination of the consolidated loan agreement to determine whether the terms of the loan by Eximbank to the Bank for Foreign Trade could be separated from the terms of the loan by the Bank of America consortium to the Bank for Foreign Trade, and whether any material pertaining to the latter loan was not exempt from disclosure. The Bank of America filed an amicus memorandum opposing disclosure of any part of the consolidated loan agreement, together with an affidavit of its senior vice president in charge of lending to European borrowers.
After further briefing, and without the requested
in camera
examination, the district court granted Eximbank’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the loan agreement was exempt from disclosure in its entirety. Plaintiff appeals.
II. DISCUSSION.
On this appeal, plaintiff does not seek disclosure of the terms of the loan by the ' Bank of America consortium to the Bank for Foreign Trade. Instead, he seeks disclosure only of that portion of the consolidated loan agreement that sets forth the terms of the loan by Eximbank to the Bank for Foreign Trade. Plaintiff concedes that this portion of the agreement contains “commercial or financial information” within the meaning of § 552(b)(4). Brief for Appellant at 10; Reply Brief for Appellant at 4 n. 9. His argument is that the Bank for Foreign Trade is not a “person” within the meaning of the Act, so that the commercial or financial information reflected in the loan agreement was not “obtained from a person.”
The core of plaintiff’s argument is that Congress’ intent in enacting the fourth exemption was to protect only American citizens and businesses, and not citizens, businesses, or agencies of a foreign country. He points to no legislative history disclaiming an intention to protect non-Americans. Instead, he relies on the absence of legislative history expressly embracing such an intention. He also points to the fact that the Senate Committee substituted the word “person” for “public” in § 552(b)(4) when it reported out the bill that became the Freedom of Information Act.
See
S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). He argues that the term “public” would not have included foreign nationals or entities and that the substitution of “person” was not intended to broaden the scope of the fourth exemption.
What all this overlooks is that the term “person” is defined for purposes of § 552 in § 551, a fact of which we must assume Congress was aware:
For the purpose of this subchapter—
(2) ‘person’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; .
“Agency” does not include an agency of a foreign government, § 551:
For the purpose of this subchapter— (1) ‘agency’ means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include [specified exemptions].
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LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge:
The question in this case is whether the Bank for Foreign Trade, an agency of the Soviet Union, is a “person” within the meaning of the fourth exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). We hold that it is.
I. FACTS.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States, an independent federal agency, is a banking corporation that helps facilitate and finance exports and imports between the United States and other countries.
See generally
12 U.S.C. § 635
et seq.;
12 C.F.R. § 402.1. Eximbank, as it is known, derives its funds primarily from the sale of debentures in the private market, and not from congressional appropriations. The Bank is managed by a five-member board of directors appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.
In 1972 the Bank for Foreign Trade, an agency of the Soviet Union, approached Ex-imbank for help in financing the export from the United States of goods and services for use in the construction of an ammonia manufacturing facility in the Soviet Union. In June of 1973, after negotiations, Eximbank issued a preliminary commitment for credit of $180 million to the Bank for Foreign Trade. At the same time, the Bank for Foreign Trade negotiated a separate agreement with a consortium of private lenders, headed by the Bank of America, for the extension of an additional $180 million credit to be used for the construction project.
Late in the summer of 1973, during discussions between the Bank of America and Eximbank concerning coordination of the two credits, Eximbank proposed that the two credits be consolidated into a single loan agreement among the Bank of America consortium, Eximbank, and the Bank for Foreign Trade.
The proposal was agreeable to all parties, and on May 21, 1974, after some further negotiations, the three parties executed a consolidated final loan agreement.
On July 2, 1974 plaintiff Senator Richard (Dick) Stone, then a candidate for the United States Senate from Florida, requested that Eximbank furnish him a copy of the
loan agreement. William J. Casey, chairman of Eximbank, denied the request on the ground that the loan agreement was confidential and could not be disclosed without the consent of the other parties to the agreement.
Plaintiff sought such consent from the Bank for Foreign Trade, but it was refused. Eximbank did, however, provide plaintiff with copies of the resolution adopted by Eximbank’s board of directors approving the loan, which sets forth its basic terms,
and of the press release that Eximbank issued the day the loan agreement was executed.
Plaintiff thereupon filed suit against Ex-imbank and its president in federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking to compel disclosure of the agreement. Eximbank filed a motion for summary judgment together with an affidavit of its general counsel. The motion asserted that the loan agreement was protected from disclosure by the fourth exemption of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), which exempts “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” Plaintiff, taking the position that any loan agreement between Eximbank and the Bank for Foreign Trade was not within this exemption, moved the district court to conduct an
in camera
examination of the consolidated loan agreement to determine whether the terms of the loan by Eximbank to the Bank for Foreign Trade could be separated from the terms of the loan by the Bank of America consortium to the Bank for Foreign Trade, and whether any material pertaining to the latter loan was not exempt from disclosure. The Bank of America filed an amicus memorandum opposing disclosure of any part of the consolidated loan agreement, together with an affidavit of its senior vice president in charge of lending to European borrowers.
After further briefing, and without the requested
in camera
examination, the district court granted Eximbank’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the loan agreement was exempt from disclosure in its entirety. Plaintiff appeals.
II. DISCUSSION.
On this appeal, plaintiff does not seek disclosure of the terms of the loan by the ' Bank of America consortium to the Bank for Foreign Trade. Instead, he seeks disclosure only of that portion of the consolidated loan agreement that sets forth the terms of the loan by Eximbank to the Bank for Foreign Trade. Plaintiff concedes that this portion of the agreement contains “commercial or financial information” within the meaning of § 552(b)(4). Brief for Appellant at 10; Reply Brief for Appellant at 4 n. 9. His argument is that the Bank for Foreign Trade is not a “person” within the meaning of the Act, so that the commercial or financial information reflected in the loan agreement was not “obtained from a person.”
The core of plaintiff’s argument is that Congress’ intent in enacting the fourth exemption was to protect only American citizens and businesses, and not citizens, businesses, or agencies of a foreign country. He points to no legislative history disclaiming an intention to protect non-Americans. Instead, he relies on the absence of legislative history expressly embracing such an intention. He also points to the fact that the Senate Committee substituted the word “person” for “public” in § 552(b)(4) when it reported out the bill that became the Freedom of Information Act.
See
S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). He argues that the term “public” would not have included foreign nationals or entities and that the substitution of “person” was not intended to broaden the scope of the fourth exemption.
What all this overlooks is that the term “person” is defined for purposes of § 552 in § 551, a fact of which we must assume Congress was aware:
For the purpose of this subchapter—
(2) ‘person’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency; .
“Agency” does not include an agency of a foreign government, § 551:
For the purpose of this subchapter— (1) ‘agency’ means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include [specified exemptions].
Nothing in this definition of “person” suggests an intention to limit its plain terms to
American
individuals and “public or private” organization. The two courts that have touched upon the question have declined to hold that foreign citizens or entities are not “persons” within the purview of § 551(2).
See Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica, S.A. (Concica) v. Hannah,
148 U.S.App.D.C. 159, 459 F.2d 1183, 1190 & n. 4 (1972) (“[T]he Administrative Procedure Act uses the words ‘any person’ not ‘any citizen,’ ” citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(2));
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger,
385 F.Supp. 769, 776 (D.D.C.1974) (holding Mexican government is a “person” within meaning of 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(2) and 552(a)(3)).
Moreover, it appears that Congress was, in fact, given notice by the Comptroller General that use of the word “person” in the Freedom of Information Act would bestow rights under the Act on non-Americans.
See Hearings on S. 1160 et a 1. before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 376 (1965).
Finally, in enacting the Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Congress demonstrated its awareness df the breadth of the term “person” as defined in § 551(2) by-using, instead, the term “individual,” defined as “a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” . 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2);
see
S.Rep.No.1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1974).
In sum, we find no warrant for reading into either § 552(b)(4) or § 551(2) a limitation on the term “person” that Congress neither put there nor demonstrated any intention to put there. We hold that § 552(b)(4) is not limited to protecting information obtained only from American citizens or organizations, and therefore reject plaintiff’s argument that information obtained from the Bank for Foreign Trade is not information obtained “from a person” within the meaning of § 552(b)(4). We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.