Richard Dennis Lancaster v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 10-24-00370-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00370-CR

Richard Dennis Lancaster, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On appeal from the 54th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Susan N. Kelly, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 1989-24-C2

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard Dennis Lancaster pled guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual

assault and was sentenced to eight years in prison. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.021. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to set aside

the indictment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In his first issue, Lancaster contends the trial court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss his indictment based on a due process violation pursuant to the State’s delay of 30 years between the indictment and his arrest. 1 Lancaster

cites to United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752

(1977), United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468

(1971), Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969),

and United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988) in support of his

contention that the State’s delay violated the due process clause and required

a dismissal of his indictment. The cases cited by Lancaster, however, do not

support his issue.

The United States Supreme Court in both Lovasco and Marion reviewed

potential due process violations for preindictment delay, not post-

indictment/pre-arrest delay. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; Marion, 404 U.S.

at 325. Further, the opinions in Hooey and Diacolios pertain solely to a Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial not the denial of due process. See Hooey,

393 U.S. at 383; Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 80. In other words, Lancaster has

presented this Court with no case authority to support his issue that the trial

court erred. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Neville v. State, 622 S.W.3d 99, 104

(Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.). Thus, this issue is improperly briefed and

presents nothing for review. See id.; Solis v. State, No. AP-77,109, 2025 Tex.

Crim. App. LEXIS 795, at *35 (Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2025) (publish); Lucio v.

1 Lancaster raised a Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial claim as well as the due process claim in the trial court. However, on appeal, he only challenges the trial court’s determination of his due process claim.

Lancaster v. State Page 2 State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Lancaster’s first issue is overruled.

In his second issue, Lancaster complains the trial court did not prepare

findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested, and thus, we should

require the trial court to do so. The State asserted in its brief that the appellate

record does not contain a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Lancaster has not contested the State’s assertion, and we have not found any

request in the record as well. 2 Thus, because there is nothing in the record to

indicate Lancaster requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, this issue

is not preserved and is overruled. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

Having overruled each issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

LEE HARRIS Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 19, 2026 Before Justice Smith, Justice Harris, and Senior Chief Justice Rose 3 Affirmed Do Not Publish CR25

2 The record contains a motion for extension of time to file a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and a notice of past due findings and conclusions; but it does not contain the required request.

3 The Honorable Jeff Rose, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.

Lancaster v. State Page 3