Richard D. Casity v. Amador County, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD D. CASITY, No. 2:25-cv-03065-DAD-SCR 12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 AMADOR COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and accordingly this matter is referred to the undersigned 18 pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s First 19 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 4). The Court has screened the FAC pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and recommends the action be dismissed for failure to state a claim as it is 21 barred by the doctrine set out in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-87 (1994). 22 I. Background and Procedural History 23 Plaintiff filed this action on October 22, 2025, and complains of an “unjust conviction” 24 and that he served an “unauthorized” sentence. ECF No. 1 at 4-5. The Court granted Plaintiff’s 25 motion to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 26 1915(e)(2). ECF No. 3. The Court found the complaint failed to state a claim and advised 27 Plaintiff that it appeared to be barred by the Heck doctrine. ECF No. 3 at 5. The Court also noted 28 that Plaintiff had filed seven prior lawsuits in this District since 2022, and that many involved the .1 same subject matter and defendants as the instant action. ECF No. 3 at 4. As Plaintiff sues a 2 judge and prosecuting attorney, the Court’s screening order also addressed judicial and 3 prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 4-5. 4 The Court allowed leave to amend and told Plaintiff that if he chose to amend, he must 5 address the issues set forth in the screening order. Id. at 6. Plaintiff filed a first amended 6 complaint (FAC), which is now before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 7 II. Analysis 8 Plaintiff’s FAC does not cure the deficiencies set forth in the prior screening order. The 9 FAC is a mere two pages and is more the format of a narrative letter than a complaint. ECF No. 10 4. It does not contain a jurisdictional statement, it does not clearly identify the parties, and it is 11 not delineated into numbered paragraphs. The FAC confirms that Plaintiff went to trial on 12 criminal charges, was convicted, and sentenced to four years and four months. Id. at 1. He states 13 that the appellate court ordered resentencing, which “took one year off” of his sentence. Id. 14 The Court recommends the action be dismissed for the reasons stated in the prior 15 screening order. ECF No. 3. The action is barred by Heck. See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 16 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (explaining that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior 17 invalidation) – no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the 18 prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in 19 that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”).1 Here, 20 Plaintiff specifically challenges his conviction as unlawful and argues the duration of his sentence 21 was unauthorized. In addition to the Heck bar, two of the Defendants have immunity, and one 22 Defendant is not a state actor. See ECF No. 3 at 4-5. Additionally, there are no allegations to 23 establish Monell liability as to the County. The Court concludes that because Plaintiff’s claims 24 are Heck barred, he fails to state a claim and the action must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e). 25 See Washington v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding 26 27 1 That plaintiff has completed his sentence does not alter application of the Heck doctrine. See 28 Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1153 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). .l | “that Heck dismissals may constitute Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals for failure to state a claim when the 2 || pleadings present an ‘obvious bar to securing relief’ under Heck” (citation omitted)). 3 Ill. Leave to Amend 4 The Court has considered Plaintiffs pro se status and whether he should be granted leave 5 | toamend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[a] district court should not 6 | dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the 7 || deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”). The Court has already 8 || allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to amend and finds that further leave to amend would be futile. 9 | The Court recommends denying further leave to amend. See Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 292 10 | F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“when a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to 11 | amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad”). 12 IV. Conclusion 13 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 14 1. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and this action be dismissed without prejudice; 15 and 16 2. The Clerk be directed to enter Judgment and close this file. 17 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 18 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen 19 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, either party may file written 20 | objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's 21 | Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 22 || specified time may result in waiver of the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. 23 || Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 || Dated: January 14, 2026. 25 Kink 26 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE