Supreme Court
No. 2024-278-Appeal. (K 23-336M)
Richard Conway :
v. :
Amanda Orenberg. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. Supreme Court
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The plaintiff, Richard Conway, appeals
from three Family Court orders. The first awards the defendant, Amanda Orenberg,
primary placement of the parties’ two minor children, and the second, a handwritten
order, details the plaintiff’s child-support obligation owed to the defendant. Further,
the plaintiff requests that this Court vacate a child-support guideline worksheet
simultaneously entered as an order of the Family Court in this matter. On appeal,
the plaintiff argues that the Family Court erred in (1) failing to entertain any
testimony or evidence on the issues, (2) not considering the best interests of the
children, and (3) entering orders as consent orders over his objection.
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and
reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case -1- may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth
herein, we vacate the disputed portion of the placement order granting primary
placement to the defendant, affirm the child-support guideline worksheet, and
remand the case to the Family Court for further proceedings. Further, because we
affirm the child-support guideline worksheet, the plaintiff’s appeal of the
handwritten order is moot.
I
Facts and Travel
The parties in the present dispute were never married; however, they
cohabitated in a jointly owned home and share two minor children, born in 2017 and
2020. Their relationship began to deteriorate in September 2022, leading to their
separation on or about February 6, 2023.
The legal proceedings from which this appeal arises began on January 24,
2023, at which time plaintiff filed a miscellaneous complaint in the Family Court
seeking, among other relief, joint custody of their children with “placement to
[f]ather” and an award of child support in compliance with state guidelines. Before
responding to this suit, on February 20, 2023, defendant filed a separate complaint
against Mr. Conway due to alleged abuse. In that case, the court granted Ms.
Orenberg an ex parte temporary order for protection and awarded her temporary
-2- custody of the children. More detailed orders concerning parenting time were
subsequently entered.
On February 28, 2023, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim in
response to plaintiff’s initial suit. She sought sole custody and physical placement
of the children, child support, and other child-related costs. After a hearing on March
27, 2023, the court ordered that the parties participate in mediation through the
Family Court and continued the case, along with the companion case (the
protective-order complaint filed by defendant), to a later date.
In several subsequent hearings spanning over a year, the court issued several
orders. Included in such, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to
“investigate and make recommendations regarding custody,” ordered co-parenting
counseling for the parties, amended the parenting time/visitation schedule to give
plaintiff more time with the children (at the GAL’s recommendation), and ordered
that he comply with several discovery requests concerning the production of
documents relating to his income.
At a hearing on June 11, 2024, defendant agreed to dismiss her complaint for
an order of protection, and the protective order from that case was incorporated into
the present case. The hearing justice then asked if the parties had reached an
agreement, and defendant’s attorney indicated they had not. The defendant’s counsel
insinuated that plaintiff wanted to litigate the matter notwithstanding his
-3- unwillingness to cooperate with discovery. Counsel noted that it was his
understanding that the GAL recommended primary placement with defendant, and
he additionally put forth calculations that he believed to be appropriate regarding
child support.
In response, plaintiff’s attorney indicated that plaintiff believed the restraining
order was filed as a “crutch” to prevent plaintiff from obtaining primary placement
of the children. She also raised issues relating to plaintiff’s income, contending that
he was on disability, making around $18,000 a year, but appeared to have had some
significant real estate transactions in 2022 that defendant was using in the
child-support calculations. The hearing justice noted that, throughout the pendency
of the matter, there were several detailed orders put in place that had not been
appealed and indicated that “[plaintiff] has to have clean hands if I’m going to be
listening to any motions to change any of these orders.” By the close of the hearing,
the only agreement seemingly reached by the parties related to the designation of a
new location for exchanging the children per the parenting time schedule.
The last hearing in this matter occurred on June 25, 2024. Four orders were
entered by the court at this time, three of which are in contention on appeal. The
hearing justice addressed each order separately. First, she referenced an order
largely pertaining to the holiday visitation schedule of the children (the visitation
order). She stated, “I do have a consent order that was signed by everyone and
-4- presented to the [c]ourt, that I have approved and made an order of the [c]ourt
[b]ased on the recommendations of the guardian, the mediator, and looking at the
children’s best interest.” The visitation order was signed by defendant, the GAL,
both parties’ attorneys, and the hearing justice. It was subsequently entered as a
consent order and is not challenged on appeal.
Next, the hearing justice referenced an order prepared by defendant’s attorney
(the placement order) that addressed a variety of issues, including a provision stating
that defendant shall continue to have primary placement of the children. She
indicated that “[b]y agreement of the attorneys, it may enter as an order of the
[c]ourt.” The plaintiff now appeals from this order. The hearing justice then noted
that the court was presented with a child-support guideline worksheet that was
signed by both attorneys (the child-support guideline worksheet) and was to enter as
an order of the court. Lastly, she entered a handwritten order captioned “consent
order” (the handwritten order). Among other things, this order purported to establish
plaintiff’s child-support obligation in the amount of $1,254 per month (the same
amount as set forth in the child-support guideline worksheet). It also quantified an
arrearage owed by plaintiff, provided for Easter visitation, required notice if either
party travels out of state with the children, and memorialized that the “parties shall
share joint legal custody of their minor children.” The plaintiff also appeals from
these two orders.
-5- The hearing justice read the above referenced orders into the record, and, upon
the court’s inquiry, the GAL stated that she was in agreement with all of the orders
presented to the court. She added that, “[h]aving talked to the children, talked to the
counsellors, I received information from their schools, talked to the parties, this
would be my recommendation, that the parties share joint custody; that the
[d]efendant continue to have primary placement; and that the current schedule
remain in place.” The GAL also indicated that she believed this agreement was in
the best interests of both children. The hearing justice then stated that all of the
orders may enter.
Before the hearing concluded, plaintiff’s attorney noted that she wished to put
plaintiff’s objection on the record, stating that plaintiff believed it was in the best
interests of the children for him to have primary placement and that he also disagreed
with the child-support numbers. She added, “[a]nd I know that we can deal with
DHS at a later point.” All orders subsequently entered, and acting pro se, plaintiff
filed a timely notice of appeal on July 11, 2024.
II
Standard of Review
“On review, this Court will not disturb the findings of fact made by a justice
of the Family Court with respect to the issue of custody and the best interests of the
child unless the hearing justice abused his or her discretion in making such findings.”
-6- Andrade v. Andrade, 252 A.3d 755, 760 (R.I. 2021) (quoting DePrete v. DePrete, 44
A.3d 1260, 1270 (R.I. 2012)). “We will affirm the trial justice’s award concerning
custody and the best interests of the child unless his or her factual findings
overlooked or misconceived material evidence or were clearly wrong.” Id. (quoting
DePrete, 44 A.3d at 1270). Further, “[i]t is well established that the appropriate
award of child support is to be determined by the trial justice in his or her sound
discretion, and we shall not disturb such a determination on review absent a clear
abuse of that discretion.” Trojan v. Trojan, 208 A.3d 221, 229 (R.I. 2019) (quoting
Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 1035 (R.I. 2011)).
III
Discussion
The Placement Order
The plaintiff assigns error to the order awarding primary placement of the
minor children to defendant entered by the hearing justice on June 25, 2024. He
contends that the hearing justice did not consider the factors set forth by this Court
in Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990), make any findings of fact, and
failed to properly explain her reasoning. He also asserts that he was denied “due
process of law and an opportunity to be heard regarding the best interest of the
children at a testimonial hearing.” The defendant argues, conversely, that the hearing
justice “was clear in every hearing that she was considering all the factors involved,
-7- which included the [plaintiff]’s conduct throughout the proceedings, the
recommendations of the [GAL], and the fact that the [defendant] had the Order of
Protection from Abuse case against the [plaintiff].”
At the June 25 hearing, the hearing justice indicated that the placement order
was prepared by defendant’s attorney and, prior to reading it into the record, stated
that “[b]y agreement of the attorneys, it may enter as an order of the [c]ourt.”
Notably, neither plaintiff nor his attorney signed the order; however, the hearing
justice appears to have handwritten “By Agreement” above the signature line. At
the close of the hearing, plaintiff’s attorney stated that she wanted to put her client’s
objection on the record. She stated that “[plaintiff] believes it’s in the best interest
of the two children for him to have primary placement. * * * I also let him know that
if there were a change of circumstances, that he could file for a change of placement
if things change, but he is objecting to the placement order.”
While we unquestionably defer to the hearing justice’s findings of fact on a
determination of this nature, the record here is devoid of sufficient factual findings
to facilitate our review. It is well established that “the best interests of the child
remain the lode-star principle for determining child custody awards.” Ayriyan v.
Ayriyan, 994 A.2d 1207, 1213 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577,
579 (R.I. 2000)). We have set forth the pertinent factors in this analysis as follows:
“[T]he trial justice should consider: (1) the wishes of the child’s parents; (2) the reasonable preference of the child -8- (if he or she is of sufficient intelligence and understanding); (3) the interaction and relationship of the child to the parents; (4) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community; (5) the mental and physical health of the individuals involved; (6) the stability of the child’s home life; (7) the moral fitness of the parents; and (8) the willingness of each parent to facilitate a close relationship between the child and the other parent. Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913-14 (R.I. 1990). No one factor is determinative; rather, the trial justice should consider a combination of and an interaction among all relevant factors. Id. at 914.” Waters v. Magee, 877 A.2d 658, 664-65 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Africano v. Castelli, 837 A.2d 721, 728 (R.I. 2003)).
We have also made it clear that a magistrate or trial justice is not required to
use specific language or explicitly “refer to the Pettinato factors” in their decision.
Andreozzi v. Andreozzi, 813 A.2d 78, 83 (R.I. 2003); see also Chiappone v.
Chiappone, 984 A.2d 32, 38 (R.I. 2009) (“The incantation of the phrase the ‘best
interests of the child’ is not necessary, as long as the trial justice clearly articulates
the basis of her decision and as long as the decision demonstrates that paramount
consideration is given to the best interests of the child.”). However, in discerning
that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice in both Andreozzi
and Chiappone, we cited to the specific factual findings upon which their decisions
were based. See Andreozzi, 813 A.2d at 83 (noting that the magistrate indirectly
addressed the Pettinato factors by commenting on evidence relating to the
preference of the children, the relationship between the children and parents detailed
in the GAL’s report, and stating that keeping the children in their home and -9- community environment was in their best interest); Chiappone, 984 A.2d at 38
(stating that the trial justice indicated that the defendant had no relationship with the
children, detailed the reports of two doctors determining the needs of the children
and that the defendant’s absence had a negative impact on them, and summarized
her in camera review with the children expressing their preference not to see the
defendant).
Here, the record indicates that the sole evidence the hearing justice considered
on the issue of primary placement was the brief oral recommendation of the GAL.
While we recognize and appreciate the efforts of the GAL throughout this matter,
we are constrained by the fact that the hearing justice neglected to make any factual
findings concerning the children’s best interests. We have long recognized that “[a]
hearing justice must make findings of fact sufficient for this Court ‘to pass upon the
appropriateness of the order and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Now Courier,
LLC v. Better Carrier Corp., 965 A.2d 429, 434 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Chiaradio v.
Falck, 794 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 2002)). Accordingly, we vacate the order insofar as
it awards defendant primary placement of the children.
Child-Support Guideline Worksheet
The plaintiff additionally requests that this Court vacate the child-support
guideline worksheet entered as an order of the Family Court on June 25, 2024. He
characterizes this worksheet as a consent order and contends that, despite the fact
- 10 - that his lawyer “inexplicably” signed the guideline worksheet, she stated at the end
of the hearing that plaintiff was in disagreement with the child-support numbers. He
avers that “[t]hese contradictory actions and statements by [plaintiff]’s attorney
should leave this court to question whether the child support worksheet was truly
consented to by [plaintiff]’s prior attorney or was more of an acquiescence to the
trial justice[’s] demands to end the case.” The plaintiff further contends that he “was
deprived of an opportunity to present testimony and evidence concerning his income,
his receipt of social security disability benefits and ability to pay child support.”
A review of the transcript of the June 11, 2024 hearing helps to place this issue
in context. When asked by the hearing justice whether the parties had an agreement,
defendant’s counsel replied, “We do not, Your Honor.” With respect to child support,
he elaborated, “I ran numbers for child support based on the limited information I
do have and based on that calculation, [plaintiff] owes per month, $1,254 * * *.”
The plaintiff’s counsel, who was fairly new to the case, responded that she needed
“a little bit of time.” She indicated that she and defendant’s counsel had “been in
constant communication within the last week trying to get missing discovery items.”
The hearing justice’s frustration is palpable. While acknowledging that
counsel had entered only recently, she emphasized that there were some very detailed
and specific orders in effect concerning discovery as well as setting forth a parenting
schedule. The hearing justice admonished plaintiff’s counsel,
- 11 - “[Y]our client has to have clean hands * * *. It appears he is not cooperating with the discovery, and I could find him in contempt, and I could fine him, and I could require him to pay [defendant’s] attorneys[’] fees. So, I think you need to discuss with him what’s going on because I’m not very happy, given the travel of the case and the fact that this discovery has not been provided. I am looking for child support orders. I do not see a child support guideline here.”
The defendant’s counsel then indicated that he had prepared a guideline
worksheet based upon plaintiff’s 1040 tax forms in 2022 and 2023, the only
information that he had received. The hearing justice advised the parties that she
would hold the matter to give them “a chance to consult” and “look at that
worksheet.” She also stated that “the child support is retroactive to [February 28,
2023], so whatever the child support is by his not paying for a year doesn’t mean he
is not going to pay child support.” When the hearing resumed, defendant’s counsel
announced that the parties had reached an agreement, but that they were waiting to
see if plaintiff “can produce a bank check payable to” defendant. The case was
therefore continued for two weeks.
At the hearing on June 25, 2024, the hearing justice indicated that the “[c]ourt
was presented with a child support guideline that has also been signed by both
attorneys” in the amount of $1,254 per month. The guideline worksheet bears the
signature of plaintiff’s counsel, dated June 25, 2024, and defendant’s counsel, dated
June 11, 2024.
- 12 - This Court has recognized that the relationship between an attorney and client
is “essentially one of principal and agent.” DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc.,
755 A.2d 757, 766 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 309, 405 A.2d
1192, 1199 (1979)). Moreover, in explaining the nature of this relationship, we have
stated:
“[A]n attorney is an agent employed by a party to a case to manage the same for him. His contract of employment implies that the attorney is authorized to take such steps in representing his client as he may deem legal, proper and necessary, and his acts in that respect, in the absence of fraud, must be regarded as the acts of his client.” May v. Penn T.V. & Furniture Co., Inc., 686 A.2d 95, 99 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Cohen v. Goldman, 85 R.I. 434, 438, 132 A.2d 414, 416 (1957)).
“[I]n the absence of special circumstances, * * * a client is bound by the acts of his
attorney of record.” Brindle v. Brindle, 77 R.I. 90, 94, 73 A.2d 770, 771-72 (1950).
As such, we are satisfied that the child-support guideline worksheet constitutes a
valid order, and we find no cause to disturb the order on appeal. However, we note
that this determination does not preclude modification of the child-support
calculation upon appropriate motion in the Family Court. At the conclusion of the
June 25 hearing, plaintiff’s counsel stated, “I know that we can deal with DHS at a
later point.” See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 316 A.3d 1261, 1264-65 (R.I. 2024)
(holding that because the defendant explicitly agreed on the record to the Family
Court’s order authorizing the sale of specified marital property and did not request
- 13 - an evidentiary hearing on the matter, he thereafter waived his right to challenge the
order).
The Handwritten Order
The plaintiff additionally takes issue with the order handwritten by
defendant’s counsel, also entered on June 25, 2024. The plaintiff argues that the
hearing justice erred in entering the order as a consent order because it “was not
signed by the [plaintiff]’s lawyer and was objected to by the [plaintiff], on the
record.” The entirety of the handwritten order was read into the record. Concerning
child support, the hearing justice noted, “commencing July 1st, the [p]laintiff shall
pay child support in the amount of $1,254 per month” and “[c]hild support arrearage
as of today’s date is $7,104.” At the end of the hearing, however, plaintiff’s attorney
stated, “[plaintiff] is also in disagreement with the child support numbers.”
The order at issue contains five paragraphs. As referenced above, the first
paragraph establishes plaintiff’s child-support obligation in the amount of $1,254
per month. The second sets a child-support arrearage of $7,104 plus interest. The
remaining three paragraphs concern joint custody, placement of the minor children
on Easter, and notice requirements if either party should travel with the children
overnight outside the State of Rhode Island. Thus, only the first paragraph, and
perhaps the second, have any relevance to the issues currently before the Court.
- 14 - In light of our affirmance of the order contained in the child-support guideline
worksheet, the plaintiff’s objection to the handwritten order has become moot. See
Capital Video Corporation v. Bevilacqua, 338 A.3d 333, 337 (R.I. 2025) (“If this
Court’s judgment would fail to have a practical effect on the existing controversy,
the question is moot, and we will not render an opinion on the matter.”) (quoting
Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty, 334 A.3d 429, 435 (R.I. 2025)). Both
orders provide for a child-support obligation of $1,254 per month. As it appears that
this arrearage figure was calculated based on the monthly obligation set forth in the
child-support guideline worksheet, retroactive to February 28, 2023, it would remain
the same when calculated under either order. As such, we decline to address the
plaintiff’s allegation of error concerning the child-support obligation set forth in the
handwritten order.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the disputed portion of the
placement order granting primary placement to the defendant, affirm the
child-support guideline worksheet, and remand the case to the Family Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Further, because we affirm the
child-support guideline worksheet, the plaintiff’s appeal of the handwritten order is
moot. The record may be returned to the Family Court.
- 15 - STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE Licht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Richard Conway v. Amanda Orenberg.
No. 2024-278-Appeal. Case Number (K 23-336M)
Date Opinion Filed January 28, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Justices Long, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Kent County Family Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Laureen D'Ambra
For Plaintiff:
David S. Slepkow, Esq. Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
Crystal Abreu, Esq.