Rel: March 28, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025 _________________________
CR-2024-0611 _________________________
Richard Brokenborough
v.
Alabama Department of Corrections et al.
Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court (CV-24-35)
ANDERSON, Judge.
Richard Brokenborough appeals the Elmore Circuit Court's
judgment summarily dismissing of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. CR-2024-0611
On May 10, 2024, Brokenborough filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that the Alabama Department of Corrections
("ADOC") and the warden of the correctional facility where
Brokenborough is currently housed ("the respondents"), had improperly
denied him credit for 2,640 days of correctional incentive time on his 40-
year sentence imposed for a third-degree-robbery conviction. (C. 4-7.)
Brokenborough pleaded that, while serving his sentence in the custody
of ADOC, he requested an Interstate Corrections Compact Transfer,
which was granted. Thereafter, he was transferred to the custody of the
Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC"), and he served his sentence
in FDOC's custody from February 2011 to May 2022. Brokenborough's
petition claimed that he had earned 2,640 days of correctional incentive
time while in the custody of FDOC, pursuant to its rules and regulations.
Brokenborough was returned to the custody and control of ADOC on May
31, 2022, and his petition claimed that ADOC had failed to apply the
2,640 days of correctional incentive time that he had earned for work
performed while in the custody of FDOC.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss Brokenborough's
petition, arguing that pursuant to § 14-9-41(e)(1)(c), Ala. Code 1975,
2 CR-2024-0611
Brokenborough was ineligible to earn correctional incentive time because
he had received a 40-year sentence for third-degree robbery. Further, the
respondents argued that "the fact that [Brokenborough] served time in
FDOC custody pursuant to the [Interstate Corrections Compact] does not
change his [correctional-incentive-]time eligibility," because, they stated,
the State of Florida was acting solely as an agent for the State of Alabama
under § 14-13-2, Ala. Code 1975.
On July 26, 2024, the circuit court granted the respondent's motion
to dismiss. Brokenborough timely appealed.
On appeal, Brokenborough reasserts the claim raised in his
petition. He maintains that by adopting the Interstate Corrections
Compact ("the ICC"), codified at § 14-13-1, et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
Alabama agreed to all the terms of the ICC, including provisions
permitting an inmate to participate in programs provided by the
receiving state. Thus, he reasons, because ADOC received progress
reports notifying it that Brokenborough was receiving correctional
incentive time under FDOC's regulations, ADOC could have notified
FDOC of his ineligibility to earn that time "before [he] was granted and
earned 2,640-days good time." (Brokenborough's brief at 11.) He also
3 CR-2024-0611
argues that his correctional incentive time could not be taken away
without due process.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper method by which
to test whether ADOC has correctly calculated the time an inmate must
serve in prison. See Breach v. State, 687 So. 2d 1257 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996); Swicegood v. State, 646 So. 2d 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). We
review the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Ward v. State, 929 So. 2d 1048 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2005). Furthermore, this Court will assume that ADOC's
calculations are correct unless there is some proof to the contrary.
Montgomery v. State, 967 So. 2d 103, 104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). "A
circuit court may summarily deny a habeas petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing if the pleadings are sufficient to show that there is
no merit to the petition." Id. at 105.
As an initial matter, the language of the ICC is unambiguous
regarding the governing law applicable to inmates who have been
transferred under its authority. Here, Brokenborough contends that
because "progress reports" that included information regarding
correctional incentive time provided for by Florida law were sent to
4 CR-2024-0611
ADOC, he should be entitled to have his sentence reduced accordingly.
The ICC, however, clearly provides that the only purpose of such reports
is so that "each inmate may have official review of his or her record in
determining and altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance
with the law which may obtain in the sending state." § 14-13-2, Art. IV(d),
Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). Moreover, as to Brokenborough's claim
that he "participated" in Florida programs that entitled him to a "good-
time" reduction to his sentence, the ICC provides only that an inmate
confined pursuant to its terms may have his "obligations modified or his
status changed" by actions or proceedings "in which he could have
participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending
state located within such state." § 14-13-2, Art. IV(h), Ala. Code 1975.
Hence, Alabama law applies to Brokenborough's ICC-based claim.
In Alabama, "no prisoner may receive correctional incentive time
[if] … he or she has been sentenced to life, sentenced to death, or has
received a sentence for more than 15 years." § 14-9-41, Ala. Code 1975. It
is undisputed that Brokenborough was sentenced to 40 years'
imprisonment for his third-degree-burglary conviction and that he was
5 CR-2024-0611
transferred to a prison in Florida to serve a portion of that sentence.
Section 14-13-2, Art. IV, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"(a) Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate quarters and care or an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
"….
"(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state …"
(Emphasis added.) See also Mills v. State, 12 So. 3d 718, 720 (Ala. Crim.
App.
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Rel: March 28, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025 _________________________
CR-2024-0611 _________________________
Richard Brokenborough
v.
Alabama Department of Corrections et al.
Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court (CV-24-35)
ANDERSON, Judge.
Richard Brokenborough appeals the Elmore Circuit Court's
judgment summarily dismissing of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. CR-2024-0611
On May 10, 2024, Brokenborough filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that the Alabama Department of Corrections
("ADOC") and the warden of the correctional facility where
Brokenborough is currently housed ("the respondents"), had improperly
denied him credit for 2,640 days of correctional incentive time on his 40-
year sentence imposed for a third-degree-robbery conviction. (C. 4-7.)
Brokenborough pleaded that, while serving his sentence in the custody
of ADOC, he requested an Interstate Corrections Compact Transfer,
which was granted. Thereafter, he was transferred to the custody of the
Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC"), and he served his sentence
in FDOC's custody from February 2011 to May 2022. Brokenborough's
petition claimed that he had earned 2,640 days of correctional incentive
time while in the custody of FDOC, pursuant to its rules and regulations.
Brokenborough was returned to the custody and control of ADOC on May
31, 2022, and his petition claimed that ADOC had failed to apply the
2,640 days of correctional incentive time that he had earned for work
performed while in the custody of FDOC.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss Brokenborough's
petition, arguing that pursuant to § 14-9-41(e)(1)(c), Ala. Code 1975,
2 CR-2024-0611
Brokenborough was ineligible to earn correctional incentive time because
he had received a 40-year sentence for third-degree robbery. Further, the
respondents argued that "the fact that [Brokenborough] served time in
FDOC custody pursuant to the [Interstate Corrections Compact] does not
change his [correctional-incentive-]time eligibility," because, they stated,
the State of Florida was acting solely as an agent for the State of Alabama
under § 14-13-2, Ala. Code 1975.
On July 26, 2024, the circuit court granted the respondent's motion
to dismiss. Brokenborough timely appealed.
On appeal, Brokenborough reasserts the claim raised in his
petition. He maintains that by adopting the Interstate Corrections
Compact ("the ICC"), codified at § 14-13-1, et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
Alabama agreed to all the terms of the ICC, including provisions
permitting an inmate to participate in programs provided by the
receiving state. Thus, he reasons, because ADOC received progress
reports notifying it that Brokenborough was receiving correctional
incentive time under FDOC's regulations, ADOC could have notified
FDOC of his ineligibility to earn that time "before [he] was granted and
earned 2,640-days good time." (Brokenborough's brief at 11.) He also
3 CR-2024-0611
argues that his correctional incentive time could not be taken away
without due process.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper method by which
to test whether ADOC has correctly calculated the time an inmate must
serve in prison. See Breach v. State, 687 So. 2d 1257 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996); Swicegood v. State, 646 So. 2d 158 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). We
review the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Ward v. State, 929 So. 2d 1048 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2005). Furthermore, this Court will assume that ADOC's
calculations are correct unless there is some proof to the contrary.
Montgomery v. State, 967 So. 2d 103, 104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). "A
circuit court may summarily deny a habeas petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing if the pleadings are sufficient to show that there is
no merit to the petition." Id. at 105.
As an initial matter, the language of the ICC is unambiguous
regarding the governing law applicable to inmates who have been
transferred under its authority. Here, Brokenborough contends that
because "progress reports" that included information regarding
correctional incentive time provided for by Florida law were sent to
4 CR-2024-0611
ADOC, he should be entitled to have his sentence reduced accordingly.
The ICC, however, clearly provides that the only purpose of such reports
is so that "each inmate may have official review of his or her record in
determining and altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance
with the law which may obtain in the sending state." § 14-13-2, Art. IV(d),
Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). Moreover, as to Brokenborough's claim
that he "participated" in Florida programs that entitled him to a "good-
time" reduction to his sentence, the ICC provides only that an inmate
confined pursuant to its terms may have his "obligations modified or his
status changed" by actions or proceedings "in which he could have
participated if confined in any appropriate institution of the sending
state located within such state." § 14-13-2, Art. IV(h), Ala. Code 1975.
Hence, Alabama law applies to Brokenborough's ICC-based claim.
In Alabama, "no prisoner may receive correctional incentive time
[if] … he or she has been sentenced to life, sentenced to death, or has
received a sentence for more than 15 years." § 14-9-41, Ala. Code 1975. It
is undisputed that Brokenborough was sentenced to 40 years'
imprisonment for his third-degree-burglary conviction and that he was
5 CR-2024-0611
transferred to a prison in Florida to serve a portion of that sentence.
Section 14-13-2, Art. IV, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"(a) Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate quarters and care or an appropriate program of rehabilitation or treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within an institution within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.
"….
"(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state …"
(Emphasis added.) See also Mills v. State, 12 So. 3d 718, 720 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2007) (holding that "the State of Alabama did not lose jurisdiction
over the appellant when it transferred him to a private prison facility in
Louisiana"). Therefore, because Brokenborough was still subject to the
jurisdiction of the State of Alabama despite being housed in an
institution in Florida, he was not eligible for correctional incentive time.
Brokenborough also contends on appeal that because he "earned
and was granted [correctional incentive time]," his correctional incentive
time could not be taken away without due process. (Brokenborough's
6 CR-2024-0611
brief at 12.) Brokenborough is correct that this Court has held that "once
an inmate earns correctional incentive time, it may not be taken away
without due process." See Coslett v. State, 697 So. 2d 61, 64 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1997). But under Alabama law, including the ICC, an inmate
serving over 15 years' imprisonment cannot accrue correctional incentive
time. Thus, contrary to his mistaken belief, Brokenborough never began
accruing correctional incentive time because he was never entitled to it
under Alabama law.
Nor did the ICC grant him any right to have his sentence modified
or his status changed pursuant to Florida law. § 14-13-2, Art. IV(h), Ala.
Code 1975. Under the ICC, FDOC acted as the agent of ADOC regarding
Brokenborough's confinement. Because ADOC possessed no statutory
authority to grant correctional incentive time to Brokenborough, it could
not grant actual authority to FDOC, as its agent, to grant correctional
incentive time. Further, because ADOC's inability to grant correctional
incentive time to Brokenborough is dictated by Alabama law,
Brokenborough cannot prevail under a theory that FDOC possessed
apparent authority to grant such time on behalf of ADOC. See Bowers v.
BBH SBMC, LLC, 393 So. 3d 20, 31-32 (Ala. 2023) (citing Daniel v. Scott,
7 CR-2024-0611
455 So. 2d 30, 32 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)). Therefore, he is not entitled to
relief on this claim.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.