Richard Bennett v. Frank Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 22-35901
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD BENNETT, No. 22-35901

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05202-TLF

v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Theresa Lauren Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 11, 2026**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Richard Bennett appeals from the district court’s order denying counsel’s

motion for attorney’s fees under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). We

reverse and remand.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Bennett, represented by an attorney at the agency level and in the district

court, prevailed in securing an award of social security disability benefits. The

district court determined that the attorney-client contingency fee agreement was

reasonable, and that monetary calculation for attorney’s fees was also reasonable.

The district court also determined that the Commissioner failed to withhold an

adequate amount of funds to pay the attorney’s fees and, consequently, the court

concluded it did not have the authority to approve the requested award that it had

found reasonable.

I.

The district court erred in concluding it lacked the authority to approve

request for attorney’s fees. See Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 61-62 (2019)

(“[T]he amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct

payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for

representation before the agency or the court.”) (emphasis added). Although the

district court understandably declined to order the Commissioner to pay funds that

were not in the Commissioner’s possession, the district court failed to address the

attorney’s proposed order, which did not request a direct payment of fees from the

Commissioner, but did request an order approving the amount of fees. Moreover,

“[a]ny concerns about a shortage of withheld benefits for direct payment and the

2 consequences of such a shortage are best addressed to the agency, Congress, or the

attorney’s good judgment.” Id. at 62.

II.

The district court also erred in denying the motion for reconsideration

because it failed to address the primary contention requesting an order awarding an

amount of attorney’s fees. Such an order is required for the attorney to proceed

with an action for payment, either from the client or through agency procedures.

See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (“[T]he court-awarded fee is the only

way a successful SSDI attorney may recover fees for work performed before the

district court.”); see also Culbertson, 583 U.S. at 62.

We remand for a determination of an award of attorney’s fees in accordance

with this disposition.

REVERSED and REMANDED.