Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-0273 ____________
RICHARD BARRY RANDOLPH, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
December 5, 2024
COURIEL, J.
Richard Barry Randolph, a prisoner under sentence of death,
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his third
successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Thirty-five years after his conviction,
Randolph claims to have learned of newly discovered evidence: the
identity of his birth parents. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. As explained below, we affirm.
I
A jury found Randolph guilty of first-degree murder, armed robbery, sexual battery with force likely to cause serious personal
injury or with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle.
We have previously recounted the facts of his brutal crime. See
Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331, 332-33 (Fla. 1990). What is of
primary relevance to his current appeal is that, at the penalty phase
of his trial, Randolph presented testimony from a single witness:
psychologist Dr. Harry Krop. Dr. Krop testified that Randolph was
adopted at five months of age by an emotionally unstable mother
and physically abusive father, which contributed, along with his
later substance use, to his atypical personality disorder. Dr. Krop
testified that Randolph’s birth parents were young college students,
but no other information about them was known. The jury
recommended the death penalty. The trial court accepted that
recommendation and sentenced Randolph to death. We affirmed.
Id. at 332.
Randolph’s postconviction relief efforts have been
unsuccessful. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 676 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1996)
(consolidating and remanding all “Howard Pearl” cases); Randolph v.
State, 853 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2003) (affirming the postconviction
court’s finding that none of the additional mitigation witnesses at
-2- the evidentiary hearing offered any evidence other than what had
already been presented by Dr. Krop at the penalty phase); Randolph
v. Crosby, 861 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2003) (denying petition for habeas
relief); Randolph v. State, 320 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2021) (affirming
denial of second successive postconviction motion).
A recent change in New York law allowed Randolph to retrieve
his original birth certificate, reunite with his birth mother, and
learn additional facts about his birth parents. His birth mother was
in fact a 17-year-old high school student when he was born, not a
college student. Both his birth parents did indeed graduate from
college, however, and both went on to have successful relationships
and careers after placing him for adoption. Neither of them appears
to have been affected by mental health challenges or substance use
disorders. Each of his birth parents would, if called, testify to that
effect.
Randolph claims that this information, coupled with testimony
from an adoption expert, would probably yield a life sentence. This
newly discovered evidence would help his case, he contends,
because it would tend to show that he lacked a genetic
predisposition to criminal violence, and that a significant
-3- contributing factor to his decision-making was the cruelty he
suffered as a child from his adoptive parents.
The circuit court summarily denied the motion, ruling that the
proffered evidence, even if newly discovered, fails under the second
prong of Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). The court
reasoned, in part, that the evidence is neither relevant to his
character nor the circumstances of the offense. This appeal follows.
II
The circuit court did not err in denying Randolph’s
postconviction motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
“[This Court] review[s] a circuit court’s summary rejection of a
postconviction claim de novo, ‘accepting the movant’s factual
allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record,
and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the
movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238,
1239 n.2 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1215
(Fla. 2019)). “A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on
a rule 3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant makes a facially
sufficient claim that requires a factual determination.’ ” Rogers v.
-4- State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108
So. 3d 558, 560 (Fla. 2012)).
To be facially sufficient, newly discovered evidence must meet
the two-prong Jones test. We have described that test as follows:
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such [a] nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 53 (Fla. 2022) (alteration in
original) (quoting Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016)).
Since Randolph sought to vacate his death sentence rather than his
conviction, “the second prong requires [a showing] that the newly
discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.”
Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla. 2018). Summary denial
of a newly-discovered-evidence claim is authorized “if the motion,
files, and record refute the allegations pertaining to either (or both)
prongs of the Jones test.” Rogers, 327 So. 3d at 787 (citing Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)).
While the scope of permissible mitigation evidence is broad,
see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), Randolph has not
-5- shown that evidence regarding the identity of his birth parents
would probably yield a less severe sentence.
We accept his factual allegations as true, as our precedent
requires. Yet mitigation evidence must be “relevant to the
defendant’s character, his prior record, and the circumstances of
the offense in issue.” Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 944 (Fla. 2009)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Hess v. State, 794 So. 2d 1249, 1269
(Fla. 2001)), as revised on denial of reh’g (Oct. 8, 2009); see also
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (“Nothing in this opinion limits the
traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence
not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense.”).
The identity of Randolph’s birth parents, their degree of
educational attainment at the time of his birth, and their generally
successful lives do not tend to prove or disprove any matter at
issue.
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Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-0273 ____________
RICHARD BARRY RANDOLPH, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
December 5, 2024
COURIEL, J.
Richard Barry Randolph, a prisoner under sentence of death,
appeals the circuit court’s order summarily denying his third
successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Thirty-five years after his conviction,
Randolph claims to have learned of newly discovered evidence: the
identity of his birth parents. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. As explained below, we affirm.
I
A jury found Randolph guilty of first-degree murder, armed robbery, sexual battery with force likely to cause serious personal
injury or with a deadly weapon, and grand theft of a motor vehicle.
We have previously recounted the facts of his brutal crime. See
Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331, 332-33 (Fla. 1990). What is of
primary relevance to his current appeal is that, at the penalty phase
of his trial, Randolph presented testimony from a single witness:
psychologist Dr. Harry Krop. Dr. Krop testified that Randolph was
adopted at five months of age by an emotionally unstable mother
and physically abusive father, which contributed, along with his
later substance use, to his atypical personality disorder. Dr. Krop
testified that Randolph’s birth parents were young college students,
but no other information about them was known. The jury
recommended the death penalty. The trial court accepted that
recommendation and sentenced Randolph to death. We affirmed.
Id. at 332.
Randolph’s postconviction relief efforts have been
unsuccessful. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 676 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1996)
(consolidating and remanding all “Howard Pearl” cases); Randolph v.
State, 853 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2003) (affirming the postconviction
court’s finding that none of the additional mitigation witnesses at
-2- the evidentiary hearing offered any evidence other than what had
already been presented by Dr. Krop at the penalty phase); Randolph
v. Crosby, 861 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2003) (denying petition for habeas
relief); Randolph v. State, 320 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2021) (affirming
denial of second successive postconviction motion).
A recent change in New York law allowed Randolph to retrieve
his original birth certificate, reunite with his birth mother, and
learn additional facts about his birth parents. His birth mother was
in fact a 17-year-old high school student when he was born, not a
college student. Both his birth parents did indeed graduate from
college, however, and both went on to have successful relationships
and careers after placing him for adoption. Neither of them appears
to have been affected by mental health challenges or substance use
disorders. Each of his birth parents would, if called, testify to that
effect.
Randolph claims that this information, coupled with testimony
from an adoption expert, would probably yield a life sentence. This
newly discovered evidence would help his case, he contends,
because it would tend to show that he lacked a genetic
predisposition to criminal violence, and that a significant
-3- contributing factor to his decision-making was the cruelty he
suffered as a child from his adoptive parents.
The circuit court summarily denied the motion, ruling that the
proffered evidence, even if newly discovered, fails under the second
prong of Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998). The court
reasoned, in part, that the evidence is neither relevant to his
character nor the circumstances of the offense. This appeal follows.
II
The circuit court did not err in denying Randolph’s
postconviction motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
“[This Court] review[s] a circuit court’s summary rejection of a
postconviction claim de novo, ‘accepting the movant’s factual
allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record,
and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the
movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238,
1239 n.2 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1215
(Fla. 2019)). “A circuit court should hold an evidentiary hearing on
a rule 3.851 motion ‘whenever the movant makes a facially
sufficient claim that requires a factual determination.’ ” Rogers v.
-4- State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108
So. 3d 558, 560 (Fla. 2012)).
To be facially sufficient, newly discovered evidence must meet
the two-prong Jones test. We have described that test as follows:
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such [a] nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50, 53 (Fla. 2022) (alteration in
original) (quoting Long v. State, 183 So. 3d 342, 345 (Fla. 2016)).
Since Randolph sought to vacate his death sentence rather than his
conviction, “the second prong requires [a showing] that the newly
discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.”
Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 249 (Fla. 2018). Summary denial
of a newly-discovered-evidence claim is authorized “if the motion,
files, and record refute the allegations pertaining to either (or both)
prongs of the Jones test.” Rogers, 327 So. 3d at 787 (citing Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)).
While the scope of permissible mitigation evidence is broad,
see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), Randolph has not
-5- shown that evidence regarding the identity of his birth parents
would probably yield a less severe sentence.
We accept his factual allegations as true, as our precedent
requires. Yet mitigation evidence must be “relevant to the
defendant’s character, his prior record, and the circumstances of
the offense in issue.” Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 944 (Fla. 2009)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Hess v. State, 794 So. 2d 1249, 1269
(Fla. 2001)), as revised on denial of reh’g (Oct. 8, 2009); see also
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12 (“Nothing in this opinion limits the
traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence
not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the
circumstances of his offense.”).
The identity of Randolph’s birth parents, their degree of
educational attainment at the time of his birth, and their generally
successful lives do not tend to prove or disprove any matter at
issue. He therefore cannot show that the evidence he seeks to
introduce would yield a less severe sentence. And even if
Randolph’s genetic traits were a matter on which the sentencing
court had to pass, the fact that his birth parents are from all
outward appearances well-adjusted people would not necessarily
-6- establish anything about their, or his, inherited traits. See
§ 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2023).
Had Randolph not been adopted, or adopted by different
people, it well may be that the environmental factors that
contributed to his development would have been different. But Dr.
Krop already testified that the abuse Randolph suffered from his
adoptive parents contributed to or reinforced his personality
disorder. Dr. Krop also testified about the increased likelihood of
strong psychological well-being for individuals raised by stable and
loving parents compared to those raised by abusive ones.
The newly discovered information is also not relevant to the
four aggravating factors at issue: that the crime was committed
during commission or flight after commission of a sexual battery; to
avoid or prevent lawful arrest; for pecuniary gain; and under
circumstances that rendered it especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. Summary denial was appropriate in light of these
conclusively established aggravators.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order summarily
denying Randolph’s third successive postconviction motion.
-7- It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Putnam County, Howard O. McGillin, Judge Case No. 541988CF001357CFAXMX
Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Jeanine Cohen, Staff Attorney, Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Doris Meacham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
-8-