Richard Antonio Mendoza v. Donore Square Homeowners Association

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 25, 2023
• Docket: 04-22-00375-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00375-CV

Richard Antonio MENDOZA, Appellant

v.

DONORE SQUARE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-CI-20931 Honorable Solomon Casseb, III, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 25, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

In this interlocutory appeal, appellant Richard Antonio Mendoza appeals the trial court’s

temporary injunction order enjoining Mendoza from leasing rooms in a residential home to

multiple unrelated people in purported violation of restrictive covenants approved by the Donore

Square Homeowners Association (“the HOA”). 1 The restrictive covenants at issue here were

adopted by the HOA—pursuant to an amendment to the original declaration of restrictions—after

1 Mendoza does not contest the portion of the trial court’s temporary injunction order enjoining the operation of a business on the property and we do not address it here. 04-22-00375-CV

Mendoza acquired the property. Mendoza argues: (1) the restrictive covenants do not apply to his

property because the home was purchased before the original declaration of restrictions were

amended; (2) even if the restrictive covenants do apply to his property, he is not in violation of the

restrictive covenants; (3) the trial court’s temporary injunction destroys rather than preserves the

status quo; and (4) the HOA failed to show it would suffer imminent and irreparable injury unless

the purported violations were enjoined.

We must point out that our review is strictly limited to determine whether the trial court

clearly abused its discretion in granting or denying the temporary injunction. Davis v. Huey,

571 S.W.2d 859, 861–62 (Tex. 1978). This interlocutory appeal is not a means for the parties to

get an advanced ruling on the merits of their case before it has been developed and adjudicated at

trial. Id. Our decision today should not be interpreted as validation of either parties’ arguments.

Because the trial court’s temporary injunction order alters rather than preserves the status

quo, we reverse the temporary injunction order, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the

cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

In 2016, Mendoza’s mother, Debbie Mendoza (“Debbie”), purchased a residential home

(“the home” or “the property”) within the Donore Square Planned Unit Development with the

intent to lease individual rooms in the home. At that time, the home was subject to the “Declaration

of Covenants and Restrictions [for] Donore Square Planned Unit Development” (“the Original

Declaration”). Article IX, section 3 of the Original Declaration contained a restrictive covenant

that stated:

Each lot within the Properties shall be used for residential purposes only with a private single-family residence or Living Unit 2 . . . . The term “Residential

2 The Original Declaration defined “Living Unit” as “a single family residence and its attached or detached garage situated upon a Lot.”

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purposes” as used herein shall be held and construed to exclude any business, commercial, industrial, apartment house, hospital, clinic and/or professional uses and such excluded uses are hereby expressly prohibited.

Debbie did not interpret this provision as a restriction on her right to lease different rooms

in the home to multiple unrelated people. Though not explicitly conceded, the record reflects the

HOA did not view the room leases as a violation of the Original Declaration.

In 2018, Debbie transferred the property to Mendoza but continued to lease rooms in the

home on behalf of Mendoza pursuant to a power of attorney. In August 2019—pursuant to

subsection 209.0041(h) of the Texas Property Code—at least 67% of the members of the HOA

voted to amend the Original Declaration and adopted the “Amended and Restated Declaration of

Covenants and Restrictions [for] Donore Square Planned Unit Development” (“the Amended

Declaration”). 3 The Amended Declaration amended the restrictive covenant in article IX, section

3, stating:

All Lots shall be used solely for single-family residential purposes. Leases for less than all of an entire Lot are not valid. All leases must be for a minimum duration of six months.

It is undisputed that Mendoza continued to lease individual rooms within the home after

adoption of the Amended Declaration. The HOA sent Mendoza a letter informing him the room

leasing activities violated the restrictive covenants in the Amended Declaration. Mendoza

continued to lease individual rooms within the home, and the HOA eventually began fining

Mendoza for the alleged violations.

On October 27, 2020, Mendoza filed suit against the HOA seeking a declaratory judgment

that, among other things, the Amended Declaration does not apply to his use of leasing rooms to

3 Subsection 209.0041(h) of the Texas Property Code provides “a declaration may be amended only by a vote of 67 percent of the total votes allocated to property owners entitled to vote on the amendment of the declaration . . . .” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 209.0041(h).

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multiple unrelated people, and his use of the property does not violate the Amended Declaration.

Mendoza also sought injunctive relief and asserted a claim for tortious interference with property

rights. On March 15, 2022, the HOA filed a counterclaim requesting injunctive relief to enjoin

Mendoza from leasing out individual rooms to multiple unrelated tenants in purported violation of

the Amended Declaration.

On April 25, 2022, the trial court heard the HOA’s application for a temporary injunction

and granted the application on June 7, 2022. In its temporary injunction order, the trial court found

that Mendoza’s property is subject to the Amended Declaration and “leasing rooms to multiple

unrelated people” in the home violates the Amended Declaration. The order enjoined Mendoza

from using the property “for any purpose other than for single family residential purposes (no

leases of less than six months, or for less than the entire Lot)” and set deadlines for Mendoza to

cease renting rooms to the unrelated tenants. 4 Mendoza appeals the trial court’s temporary

injunction order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject

matter pending a trial on the merits.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).

“A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Id.

“To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements:

(1) a cause of action against the [counter-]defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and

(3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Id. “An injury is irreparable if

4 Mendoza represented to the trial court that some of the tenants suffered medical hardships. Therefore, based on the individual tenants’ hardships, the trial court set different dates by which different tenants were required to move out of the home.

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the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be

measured by any certain pecuniary standard.” Id.

“Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s sound

discretion.” Id. “A reviewing court should reverse an order granting injunctive relief only if the

trial court abused that discretion.” Id. “The reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for

the trial court’s judgment unless the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds

of reasonable discretion.” Id. However, the trial court has no discretion to incorrectly analyze or

apply the law and a clear failure to correctly analyze or apply the law will constitute an abuse of

discretion. Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., and Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911,

916 (Tex. 2020); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (stating “a clear

failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of

discretion”).

DISCUSSION

Although presented in two issues, Mendoza’s brief only asserts the trial court abused its

discretion when it granted the HOA’s application for a temporary injunction. Mendoza presents

four arguments to support his contention that the trial court erred when it issued the temporary

injunction order. First, Mendoza argues the restrictive covenants in the Amended Declaration do

not apply to him because he acquired the property before the Original Declaration was amended.

Second, Mendoza argues—even if the property is subject to the Amended Declaration—his use of

the property does not violate the Amended Declaration. Third, Mendoza argues the trial court’s

temporary injunction does not preserve the status quo. Fourth, Mendoza argues the HOA did not

show it would suffer imminent and irreparable harm if his use of the property was not enjoined.

We agree the temporary injunction altered rather than preserved the status quo. Because

this conclusion is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address Mendoza’s other arguments. See

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TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as

practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).

STATUS QUO

In his third argument, Mendoza asserts the trial court’s temporary injunction destroys rather

than preserves the status quo.

As mentioned above, a temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the

litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez,

487 S.W.3d 538, 555 (Tex. 2016). “The status quo is the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested

status which preceded the pending controversy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “If an act

of one party alters the relationship between that party and another, and the latter contests the action,

the status quo cannot be the relationship as it exists after the action.” Frey v. CST Props., LLC,

No. 04-13-00450-CV, 2014 WL 783324, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2014, no pet.)

(emphasis in original).

Here, the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status preceding the pending controversy

existed before the adoption of the Amended Declaration. Mendoza was leasing the home to

multiple unrelated people in accordance with the Original Declaration before the homeowners

amended the restrictive covenants. The Amended Declaration purportedly precluded Mendoza

from leasing the property to multiple unrelated people. The relationship between Mendoza and

the HOA was changed by the adoption of the Amended Declaration and Mendoza challenges the

effect of the Amended Declaration on his use of the property. In his pleadings, Mendoza argues

the Amended Declaration does not apply to his use of the property because he acquired the property

before the Amended Declaration was adopted. In the alternative, Mendoza argues that even if the

Amended Declaration does apply to Mendoza’s property, his leasing activities are not a violation

of the newly-adopted restrictive covenants. Thus, the entire controversy centers around whether

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the restrictive covenants in the Amended Declaration apply to Mendoza’s property and whether

Mendoza’s use of the property is a violation of the restrictive covenants in the Amended

Declaration. These questions should be resolved by a trial on the merits. See Marquez,

487 S.W.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (stating when the “central

question of the suit” is a determination of whether the status quo is a violative action, then “that

question should be determined with a full trial on the merits and injunctive relief can be used only

to preserve the last peaceable uncontested status between the parties”).

Preceding the controversy, and in compliance with the Original Declaration, Mendoza was

leasing the property to multiple unrelated people. Because Mendoza’s leasing activity—as it

existed before the adoption of the Amended Declaration—was the last, actual, peaceable, non-

contested status preceding the controversy, the trial court erred when it altered this status by

ordering Mendoza to evict his tenants and enjoined him from leasing to multiple unrelated people.

See City of Arlington v. City of Fort Worth, 873 S.W.2d 765, 768–69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1994, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (holding the status quo was the actions of the parties prior to the action

that created the controversy).

We hold the trial court’s temporary injunction altered rather than preserved the status quo.

Therefore, the trial court’s temporary injunction order constitutes an abuse of discretion. See

Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Paiz, 856 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no

writ). Accordingly, Mendoza’s first and second issues are sustained.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court’s temporary injunction order altered rather than preserved the status

quo, we reverse the trial court’s temporary injunction order, dissolve the temporary injunction, and

remand the cause for a full trial on the merits.

Irene Rios, Justice

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