Richard Adame v. George Shake, Marianne Howland, and Howland Shake Law, LLP

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 07-26-00026-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00026-CV

RICHARD ADAME, APPELLANT

V.

GEORGE SHAKE, MARIANNE HOWLAND, AND HOWLAND SHAKE LAW, LLP, APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 160th District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-25-13824, Honorable Aiesha Redmond, Presiding

February 4, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Richard Adame, brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s

order granting Appellees’ motion to compel arbitration. Because no statute authorizes an

appeal from such an order, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Adame sued Appellees, George Shake, Marianne Howland, and Howland Shake

Law, LLP, asserting various claims arising from alleged legal malpractice. Appellees

responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration and to stay all trial court proceedings pending completion of the arbitration. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.021. The

trial court granted the motion, and Adame appealed.

The appeal was initially filed in the Fifth Court of Appeals and later transferred to

this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Before the transfer, the Fifth Court notified Adame that it

appeared to lack appellate jurisdiction because no statute authorizes an interlocutory

appeal from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration.

An appellate court may review only final judgments or interlocutory orders made

immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195

(Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). Although

Section 171.098 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits an interlocutory appeal

from an order denying an application to compel arbitration, there is no statutory authority

permitting an interlocutory appeal from an order granting such an application. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE §§ 171.021, 171.098; Patton v. Johnson, No. 05-19-00314-CV,

2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 9417, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 28, 2019, no pet.) (“Statutory

law does not permit an appeal from an order compelling arbitration). “The [Texas

Arbitration Act] is one-sided, allowing interlocutory appeals solely from orders that deny

arbitration. Similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes no provision for an

interlocutory appeal from an order compelling arbitration.” Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242

S.W.3d 30, 31 (Tex. 2007).

In response to the jurisdictional inquiry, Adame contends that the trial court’s order

either constitutes a final judgment or is appealable by interlocutory appeal. Neither

2 contention has merit. Adame argues that the trial court’s ruling “effectively removes

Appellant’s claims from the judicial forum and leaves nothing for the trial court to

adjudicate . . . until arbitration concludes,” thereby functioning “as a final disposition of

Appellant’s claims in court.” The test for finality was established by the Supreme Court

in Lehmann. There, the Supreme Court held, “. . . when there has not been a conventional

trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually

disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states

that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06. Here,

the trial court’s order does not dispose of any parties or claims and contains no finality

language. Patton v. Johnson, No. 05-19-00314-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2327, at *2–

3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 19, 2020, no pet.) (holding that an order granting a motion to

compel arbitration is not a final judgment). Thus, under Lehmann, it is not a final

judgment.

Adame next claims that interlocutory review is permitted because he challenges

the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166

S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). Kellogg, however, does not hold that

issues of contract formation or arbitrability are reviewable by interlocutory appeal when

the trial court grants a motion to compel arbitration. And, we have found no authority so

holding.

Because no final judgment or appealable order is presented for review, we dismiss

the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Per Curiam