Richard A. Simoneaux v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: January 6, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CP-01127-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-CP-01127-COA

RICHARD A. SIMONEAUX APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/04/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAVID H. STRONG JR. COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RICHARD A. SIMONEAUX (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ASHLEY LAUREN SULSER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/06/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND WEDDLE, JJ.

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Richard Simoneaux appeals from the order of the Pike County Circuit Court

dismissing his fourth motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). Finding no error,

we affirm the circuit court’s order.

FACTS

¶2. This Court has previously recounted the relevant facts and procedural history of

Simoneaux’s underlying convictions and previous PCR motions as follows:

In 2004, Simoneaux pled guilty in two separate cause numbers to six charges: one count of attempted burglary, two counts of voyeurism, one count of sexual battery, one count of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, and one count of burglary of a dwelling. The circuit court sentenced Simoneaux to serve a total of twenty-five years in custody, with the sentence in each count to run concurrently with the others.

Following his convictions and sentences, Simoneaux filed two PCR motions. In his first PCR motion, Simoneaux raised multiple arguments, including claims that his guilty pleas were involuntary and that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Simoneaux v. State (Simoneaux I), 29 So. 3d 26, 29-30 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Other than striking a banishment provision contained in Simoneaux’s sentencing order, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Simoneaux’s requested relief. Id. at 40 (¶54). With regard to Simoneaux’s second PCR motion, this Court found that he was essentially asserting a Brady violation (i.e., that the State had suppressed evidence), which his voluntary guilty pleas precluded. Simoneaux v. State (Simoneaux II), 205 So. 3d 695, 697 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). We therefore affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the second PCR motion. Id. at (¶9).

In 2021, Simoneaux filed his third . . . PCR motion in which he alleged issues related to the voluntariness of his guilty pleas and the effectiveness of his trial attorney. The circuit court concluded Simoneaux’s third PCR motion was not only successive but was also barred by the relevant statute of limitations and res judicata. Moreover, the circuit court found that Simoneaux’s claims failed to meet any statutory exceptions to the procedural bars.

Simoneaux v. State (Simoneaux III), 359 So. 3d 665, 666-67 (¶¶2-4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)

(footnote omitted). In affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of Simoneaux’s third PCR

motion, this Court found that Simoneaux’s motion was not only barred as a successive

motion but was also filed outside the three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 667 (¶6). We

further found that Simoneaux’s claims failed to fall within one of the enumerated statutory

exceptions to the litigation bars. Id. at 667-68 (¶¶7-8).

¶3. Later that year, on November 6, 2023, Simoneaux filed a “Motion to Vacate and Set

Aside [His] Conviction[s] and Sentence[s].” As in his prior motions, Simoneaux again

asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntary guilty pleas, illegal

2 sentences, and suppression of exculpatory evidence. Based on his claim that exculpatory

evidence had been suppressed, Simoneaux also filed a motion seeking to expand the record

in his case to include numerous documents and information from his trial attorney, the

prosecutor’s office, and the local prison.

¶4. Treating Simoneaux’s “Motion to Vacate and Set Aside [His] Conviction[s] and

Sentence[s]” as one seeking PCR, the circuit court found it was Simoneaux’s fourth such

motion and merely “relitigate[d] issues already presented in previous motions, denied by the

[circuit] court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, particularly pertaining to the ineffective

assistance of counsel [that Simoneaux] allegedly received leading up to his guilty plea[s].”

The circuit court also found that Simoneaux was “properly advised of the minimum and

maximum sentences for the charges against him[] and was sentenced according to statutory

guidelines set by the controlling statute at the time he was sentenced.” The circuit court

concluded that Simoneaux’s claims lacked merit and did not require an evidentiary hearing.

The circuit court entered an order dismissing Simoneaux’s fourth PCR motion as successive,

untimely filed, and barred by res judicata. The circuit court likewise dismissed Simoneaux’s

motion to expand the record. Aggrieved by the circuit court’s order dismissing his fourth

PCR motion, Simoneaux appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. “On review of a circuit court’s dismissal or denial of a PCR motion, we decline to

reverse unless the circuit court’s decision is clearly erroneous. We review questions of law

de novo.” Farris v. State, 394 So. 3d 1028, 1030 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citations and

3 internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶6. Although Simoneaux asserts that the circuit court erred by considering his current

filing to be a PCR motion, his claims include the allegation that his guilty pleas were

involuntary due to his attorney’s coercive conduct and misleading legal advice. See Miss.

Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(g) (Rev. 2020) (identifying an involuntary guilty plea as a basis for

relief under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA)). As

discussed, Simoneaux also asserts that he received an illegal sentence and that exculpatory

evidence had been suppressed in his case. “[I]t is well established that a pleading cognizable

under the [UPCCRA] will be treated as a PCR motion that is subject to the procedural rules

promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or characterized the

pleading.” Pickle v. State, 351 So. 3d 464, 466 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation

mark omitted). Thus, we find that the circuit court properly treated Simoneaux’s current

motion as one seeking PCR.

¶7. Because the present filing constitutes Simoneaux’s fourth PCR motion and was filed

around nineteen years after Simoneaux entered his guilty pleas, the motion is untimely and

impermissibly successive. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-5(2), 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2020).

Although enumerated statutory exceptions apply to the UPCCRA’s three-year statute of

limitations and successive-motions bar, Simoneaux must demonstrate that one of the

statutory exceptions applies. Simoneaux III, 359 So. 3d at 667 (¶7). Simoneaux has failed

to meet this burden, and we do not find that any of his claims fall within the UPCCRA’s

4 enumerated exceptions. We therefore find no error in the circuit court’s dismissal of

Simoneaux’s current PCR motion.

CONCLUSION

¶8. Because Simoneaux’s current motion is time-barred, is successive, and fails to

demonstrate that a statutory exception applies, we find no error in the circuit court’s order

dismissing Simoneaux’s fourth PCR motion.

¶9. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.