Rice's Appeal

79 Pa. 168, 1874 Pa. LEXIS 228
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 2, 1874
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 79 Pa. 168 (Rice's Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rice's Appeal, 79 Pa. 168, 1874 Pa. LEXIS 228 (Pa. 1874).

Opinion

Chief Justice Agetew

delivered the opinion of the court, July 2d 1874.

The first subject for consideration is the fund in court. What does it represent? The mortgage under which the sale was made, embraced the entire railroad and all its land, property, franchises, sidings, workshops, stations, depots, machinery, rolling stock, and every thing of a tangible nature, then owned or to be thereafter acquired, together with all the corporate rights, privileges, franchises, easements and liberties, then existing or thereafter to be acquired. Thus not only the entire property, real and personal of the corporation, but even its capacity to make other property by its railroad and franchises, passed to the purchasers. By the terms of the Act of 8th April 1861, 1 Brightly 290 pi., 49, these purchasers became “ vested with all the right, title, interest, property, possession, claim, and demand in law and equity of, in and to such railroad, with its appertenances, and with all the rights, powers, immunities, privileges and franchises of the corporation.”

The fund in court, therefore, represents all that was tangible or valuable, belonging to the corporation, leaving it a denuded trunk, possessed of those powers only essential to the settlement of its [182]*182affairs: Commonwealth v. Central Pass. Railway Co., 2 P. F. Smith 506; Wellsborough & Tioga P. R. Co. v. Griffin, 7 Id. 417.

' It is to this fund, the jurisdiction of this court has attached, and hence the necessity of a full and entire distribution of. the fund among all the creditors entitled to it. Jurisdiction having attached, equity comprehends within its grasp all incidental matters necessary to enable it to make a full and final distribution, and, therefore, to terminate litigation, while it affords a perfect remedy : Souder’s Appeal, 7 P. F. Smith 502. Hence, in Kelly’s Appeal, 4 Harris 59, in a question of distribution, involving partnership property and individual creditors, Judge Bell said: “ The objection that the court or auditor had no power to state an account between the partners, is met by the answer, that the distribution of the proceeds of sheriff’s sales is to be determined according to law and equity, and it cannot be questioned that in such a case a chancellor from necessity would direct an account to be taken.” See also Overholt’s Appeal, 2 Jones 222. The doctrine is precisely the same in regard to distribution among creditors and others, in the Orphans’ Court. “ The power,” says Lewis, C. J., “ to decide all questions necessary to a proper distribution of the fund, follows the power of distribution, and vests in the Orphans’ Court as a necessary incident to the jurisdiction:” Bull’s Appeal, 12 Harris 288; Kittera’s Estate, 5 Id. 416. He states this further proposition. “ The right of each (claimant) to be heard in support of his claim, and in opposition to every claimant who interferes with it, is necessarily involved in the right to demand payment out of the fund.” See also Dundas’ Appeal, 23 P. F. Smith 474. It was, therefore, a grave error, on part of the master, instead of distributing the entire fund among the several claimants according to their rights, to award to the counsel of the Farmers’ National Bank of Reading, the Reading Savings Bank, and Bushong & Brother, the sum of $109,771.24, representing ninety-seven second mortgage bonds, and their overdue coupons, and a like error to award to the Kensington National Bank $73,536.57, representing sixty-five second mortgage bonds, and their overdue coupons. He should have awarded to the several parties named, the actual amount of their real debt, with interest to the day of sale, and the excess should have been distributed among the other creditors according to their rights. The effect of léaving this excess in the hands of these creditors, who held the bonds as mere cellaterals, was to ignore both the jurisdiction and the duty of the court, to make distribution of the entire fund in its hands according to law and equity. The error of the master was, in assuming that Richmond L. Jones would be entitled to this excess which would pass into his hands from these creditors, who had received the bonds through him, as collateral for the company’s debts. But the right of Mr. Jones to participate in the fund against other [183]*183creditors, and especially against Daniel V. Ahl, is one of the important questions in the distribution.

This brings us to consider the claim of Mr. Ahl to eighty thousand dollars for purchase-money, and his right to receive the same out of the fund in court which was produced by a sale under the second mortgage of $200,000. The battle before the master appears to have been fought over the question of the delivery of eighty bonds, from No. 1 to No. 80 inclusive, set apart by the railroad company for Mr. Ahl, and sent to Kennedy & Stewart, attorneys of the company, for delivery. These bonds were not delivered to Ahl, and were recalled by the company. On this ground the master thought that Mr. Ahl was not entitled to participate in the fund. But he misconceived Mr. Ahl’s claim. It did not rest on a sale and delivery of so many bonds, but on his prior right to so much money as these securities represented. It is because in equity he was by the terms of his antecedeut contract, the owner of so much of the mortgage which was raised under the terms of that contract to secure payment to him. of the remaining $80,000 purchase-money. He was therefore entitled to a place in the distribution of the fund produced by that mortgage unless a higher equity in third parties has supervened. A short statement will exhibit the nature and the equity of his claim. He was the vendor to the company of the property from which the fund has been produced. By the terms of his first agreement of sale, December 7th 1869, his deed to the railroad company was held in escrow in the hands of a third person as a security for their compliance with the terms of sale. The company found it necessary for their purpose to have the title absolutely in themselves, and came to a new arrangement with Mr. Ahl, on the 4th of June 1870, whereby he released his title to them and they agreed to pay him $50,000 in cash, instead of the judgment of $50,000 in the first agreement, and to deliver him $50,000 in first mortgage bonds and $80,000 in second mortgage bonds, in lieu of the $130,000 of stock and of $130,000 of bonds in the first agreement.

By the terms of the agreement of the 4th of June, the company were bound, within sixty days, to execute a second mortgage, not to exceed in amount $200,000, and to deliver to Ahl eighty one thousand dollar bonds, secured by his mortgage. This mortgage was not a thing in esse for which the parties were bargaining, but it was to be created as the means of securing the sum of the unpaid purchase-money. The agreement of the 4th of June 1870, was, therefore, to the extent of the $80,000 of purchase-money, a deed to lead the use of the mortgage and not a mere agreement, for a purchase. As soon as the mortgage was executed, Ahl’s right attached to it in equity by virtue of the prior agreement to lead its use, as to so much of it. The money represented by this por[184]*184tion of the mortgage and the bonds was his. It never belonged to the company. He had parted with his title on the express condition of the security of the second ’mortgage. His part had been performed, and in equity his right attached immediately. To this extent'the bonds accompanying the mortgage were his, and they were actually numbered and set apart to him; vide Treasurer Maltzberger’s letters to’Ahl, of 28th November 1870.

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Bluebook (online)
79 Pa. 168, 1874 Pa. LEXIS 228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rices-appeal-pa-1874.