Rice v. Dean

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 22, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2918
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

___________________________________ ) WILLIAM EARL RICE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-2918 (RC) ) M.C. DEAN, INC., ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on Defendant M.C. Dean Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 7, filed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12(b)(6) and 41(b), and unopposed. For

the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES the complaint and

this civil action without prejudice.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In addition, Rule 8(d)

requires that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P.

8(d)(1). “Taken together, [these provisions] underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and

brevity by the federal pleading rules.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(quoting In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting 5 Wright &

Miller § 1217, at 169 (2d ed. 1990))). “Rule 8(a) does not require a short and plain complaint,

but rather a short and plain statement of the claim.” Middlebrooks v. St. Coletta of Greater

Washington, Inc., No. 09-cv-1281 (ESH), 2009 WL 3163061, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2009)

1 (quoting Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 670) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis in original). Enforcement of these rules is left to the Court’s discretion, see Achagzai

v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 109 F. Supp. 3d 67, 69 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at

669), and under Rule 41(b), the Court may dismiss a claim or a civil action if a plaintiff fails to

comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any Court order, FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Ordinarily, dismissal of a complaint under Rule 8 “is . . . reserved for those cases in

which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true

substance, if any, is well disguised.” Banks v. Gonzales, 496 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C.

2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, a complaint which

“contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor

meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments,”

Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977), is subject to dismissal. And “[d]ismissal

is appropriate if a complaint is so confusing that a defendant cannot be expected to frame a

response” to it. Brown v. Dalton, No. 96-5285, 1997 WL 362505, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1997)

(per curiam) (citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

The complaint is presented on a preprinted form with a typewritten statement attached.

See generally Compl. (ECF No. 1). Crucial bits of information are missing. For example, the

complaint neither states a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, see id. at 3 (page numbers designated

by CM/ECF), nor demands relief, see id. at 5.

Plaintiff represents that his typewritten statement is “based on [his] notes and

recollection,” id. at 7, and purports to describe events from June 2020, when M.C. Dean, Inc.

hired him as a permanent employee, see id., through his termination in or about April 2023, see

2 id. at 8. Defendant’s description of the statement as “a stream-of-consciousness narrative of

[plaintiff’s] thoughts [with] vague references to his subjective beliefs about purported differential

treatment based on his race,” Def.’s Mem. (ECF No. 7-1) at 3, is accurate. That said, there are

three reasons to construe the complaint as one alleging race discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Plaintiff identifies himself as Black, see

Compl. at 6, selected a preprinted form complaint titled “Complaint for Employment

Discrimination,” and alleges receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, see id. at 4. Here begins and ends the statement’s

clarity.

For example, plaintiff alleges “[h]arassment,” id. at 7, and having made “complaints

about disparagement,” id. at 7, without factual allegations describing what, exactly, plaintiff

means by harassment and disparagement. It is not clear whether plaintiff intends to bring

another claim under Title VII, such as hostile work environment. Mentioned is the Family

Medical Leave Act, see id. at 8, yet it is not clear that plaintiff ever took FMLA leave or intends

to raise a claim under FMLA. As drafted, the complaint does not give defendant fair notice of

the claims against it, and is so poorly organized, that defendant reasonably cannot be expected to

prepare a proper response to it.

In this circumstance, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court ordinarily would

direct plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The Court declines to do so because, it appears,

plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this matter. His last filing with the Court was his motion for

an extension of time on June 30, 2025, and even though the Court granted the extension, plaintiff

still has not filed a response.

3 III. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that the complaint fails to meet the minimum pleading standard set

forth in Rule 8(a) and, therefore, grants defendant’s motion to dismiss. An Order is issued

separately.

DATE: October 22, 2025 /s/ RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge