Ricci v. Okin

781 F. Supp. 826, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 887, 1992 WL 10541
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 22, 1992
DocketCiv. A. 72-0469-T, 74-2768-T, 75-3910-T, 75-5023-T and 75-5210-T
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 781 F. Supp. 826 (Ricci v. Okin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ricci v. Okin, 781 F. Supp. 826, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 887, 1992 WL 10541 (D. Mass. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION

TAURO, Chief Judge.

This court held hearings on October 28, November 25, and December 9, 1991 to discuss several matters pertaining to the *827 Paul A. Dever State School (“Dever”). 1 The October 28 hearing was scheduled because of reports from the Office of Quality Assurance (“OQA”) and the Department'of Public Health (“DPH”) that serious deficiencies existed in the delivery of services to class members residing at Dever.

During the October 28 hearing, this court asked the Health Care Finance Administration (“HCFA”) 2 to conduct a full survey of Dever in order to determine the extent and pervasiveness of the, problems there. HCFA reported at the November 25 hearing that many serious deficiencies existed. Indeed, HCFA informed the court and the defendants that the cited deficiencies must be corrected by February 13, 1992 or Dever would lose its Medicaid certification and its federal funding.

HCFA’s survey determined that the deficiencies at Dever were primarily associated with organization, utilization and training of staff. At the hearing, it was made clear that an additional problem at Dever was the adverse impact on staff and residents that followed Governor Weld’s June, 1991 announcement that Dever would be closed within three years. 3 Unfortunately,. this concept for consolidation was announced even though no specific implementation plans had been formulated. Shortly thereafter, employee absenteeism at Dever rose dramatically. Staff morale, already shaken by layoffs initiated in November, 1990, plummeted. In August the school’s Superintendent resigned.

This court has noted on a number of occasions that the Consent Decrees, and subsequent orders of the court, clearly establish procedures for the allocation of staff resources, as well as processes for making community placement's in accordance with each class members’ Individual Service Plan (“ISP”). 4

Consistent with those long established procedures, the court has made it clear that, until a detailed plan is in place for the relocation of Dever residents and the reallocation of related resources, the defendants should not consider the closure of Dever a certáinty. The court has also made clear that, during any phase out of Dever, all services and staffing levels must be maintained in accordance with Consent Decree standards and this court’s orders. These points were reiterated at the December 9, 1991 hearing during which time the court discussed language in a personnel advertisement that assumed the closure of Dever in three years. 5

The purpose of this memorandum is to once again clarify the defendants’ obligations to class members in proceeding with development of plans for implementing the Governor’s various proposals to consolidate facilities for the mentally retarded. The court is not opposed to the *828 eventual closing of Dever or any other Consent Decree facility. But, the court will not allow services to deteriorate at a facility while the state defendants go through the process of deciding what is going to happen to the residents. Rather, it is this court’s expectation that a plan, founded upon the defendants’ obligations, will be provided to assure that all class members will be protected throughout the process. Those obligations, specified in the Consent Decrees, the Personnel Decree, the Capital/Community Plan, Title XIX, and the court’s memorandum and order of October 9, 1986 (Disengagement Order), 6 require the maintenance of adequate personnel levels at the state schools, the ongoing provision of services in accordance with class members’ ISPs, and the utilization of evaluation and monitoring mechanisms.

I.

The Personnel Decree, agreed to by the parties on July 10, 1978, provides that the defendants have a “continuing commitment under the terms of this Decree ... to comply with the personnel standards for care and treatment set forth in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, and regulations. promulgated thereunder.” Personnel Decree ¶ 2. Specifically, II10 of the Personnel Decree recognized that, with decreasing resident population at the schools, staffing levels should be correspondingly adjusted. Before such changes could take place, however, the defendants agreed to obtain agreement of plaintiffs' counsel or, failing that, to bring any disagreement to the attention of the court for its resolution. Id. H 10.

In 1986, to eliminate the need for continuing court intervention, this court adopted certain procedures, developed by the defendants under the supervision of HCFA. These procedures allow for adjustments in personnel levels at the schools to implement the defendants’ planned reassignment of staff to housing agenda programs. The defendants created the “Single Standard Methodology” and various quality assurance and reporting procedures to ensure that services would be in place for class members upon their move to the community, and that services would be maintained at the state schools for those still residing there.

In the Disengagement Order, the court extended the use of the Single Standard Methodology to any situation in the future that would call for adjustment of staffing at the state schools resulting from community placement or increased resident need. The court expects the defendants to continue utilizing these procedures should they seek to reduce staffing levels at any of the schools.

II.

In addition to maintaining staffing levels at the state schools, the defendants are obligated to substantially provide an array of services to each class member in accordance with his or her ISP. The Consent Decrees were fashioned by the parties to ensure the provision of those services wherever class members reside. For example, the Dever and Wrentham Decrees provide that “[t]he defendants will substantially provide or cause to be provided the services recommended in the individual service plan of each member for so long as such services are needed.” Dever and Wrentham Decrees H 14. In order to close Dever, or any other Consent Decree facility, the defendants must assure this court that they will meet each class member’s needs, as specified in his or her ISP.

The Decrees permit significant changes in the life circumstances of class members, including the anticipated movement of a majority of class members from institutional environments to community homes. The Capital/Community Plan (“CCP”), an attachment to the Dever and Wrentham Decrees, specifically sets forth how the defendants are to comply with the requirements of the Dever and Wrentham Decrees for class members residing outside the Dever *829 and Wrentham State Schools. See CCP ¶ 1.

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Related

M.D. v. Department of Developmental Services
985 N.E.2d 863 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2013)
Ricci v. Okin
770 F. Supp. 2d 438 (D. Massachusetts, 2011)
Ricci v. Patrick
544 F.3d 8 (First Circuit, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
781 F. Supp. 826, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 887, 1992 WL 10541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ricci-v-okin-mad-1992.