Ricardo Villarreal v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 09-24-00140-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-24-00140-CR ________________

RICARDO VILLARREAL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 21-10-13992-CR ________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Ricardo Villarreal for the offense

of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen, a first-degree

felony.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b)(2)(A). After a trial, a jury convicted

him. The trial court assessed punishment and sentenced Villarreal to sixty years of

1 Appellant’s name is spelled inconsistently throughout the record. In some places, he is referred to as “Villarreal,” and in others, “Villarrael” or “Villarael.” We use the spelling in the indictment and trial court’s judgment. 1 confinement. In a single issue, Villarreal challenges the trial court’s judgment and

asks whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State’s expert to testify over

Villarreal’s objection. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

testimony from the State’s expert witness. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as

discussed below.

BACKGROUND

Trial Evidence

Villarreal was accused of continuously sexually abusing his stepdaughter,

“Sara,” a child younger than fourteen.2 Evidence presented at trial revealed that the

abuse began when Sara was six years old and continued off and on for nine years.

Sara testified the abuse started with Villarreal inappropriately touching her vagina

and escalated to Villarreal touching her vagina with his penis and trying to “put it

in.”

According to Mother, Sara first outcried when she was six years old, but she

recanted the same day. There was evidence she outcried again when she was fifteen

or sixteen. Sara attributed her delayed outcry to Villarreal threatening her family,

among other things.

2 We use pseudonyms to refer to the alleged victim, a minor child, and the child’s family members. See Tex. Const. art. 1, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal judicial process”).

2 There was evidence that Villarreal engaged in grooming behaviors. Mother

testified at trial that Villarreal spent more time with Sara than the other children in

the home and bought her gifts, which was consistent with the investigating

detective’s testimony of what Villarreal reported during his interview with her.

According to Karen Rosario, a detective in the case, Villarreal described Sara as his

“sidekick.” Rosario felt that Villarreal was grooming Sara.

The forensic interviewer, Kelly Garcia, said she interviewed Sara twice when

Sara was fifteen. She described Sara’s withdrawn demeanor and crying. She also

explained that they ended the first interview due to Sara’s mental health. Garcia

described types of disclosures, including denial, active disclosure, tentative, recant,

and reaffirmation. She noted that the barriers to disclosure for Sara included fear and

embarrassment. Garcia testified that delayed outcries are common and explained the

reasons for that.

Sara testified that because of the abuse, she changed her appearance, she

attempted suicide many times by taking pills, struggled with anxiety, and began

cutting herself. When she was sixteen, Sara outcried again when her sister asked

about it. After her first forensic interview, the evidence showed that Sara was

hospitalized on an inpatient basis for suicidal ideation. The defense’s trial strategy

was to characterize Sara as “a troubled child” who made up the allegations and said

nothing for ten years.

3 Villarreal testified at trial and denied the allegations. According to Villarreal,

Sara was lazy, and he was the bad guy to make her clean and go to school. He

admitted to being mentally abusive to his children and stepchildren “at times.”

Villarreal testified that he never touched Sara inappropriately for purposes of sexual

arousal, and if he ever touched her inappropriately it was “by accident[]” while

wrestling. He claimed Sara made up the sexual assault allegations, because she was

mad that he took everything away from her.

Rule 702 Hearing and Expert Testimony

The State offered testimony from Dr. Danielle Madera, a clinical

psychologist, to explain sexual abuse dynamics. The State’s expert designation of

Madera stated that her “[a]reas of expertise include child psychology, trauma,

behavior surrounding disclosure of sexual and/or physical abuse, psychological and

sociological effects of child sexual and/or physical abuse, delayed disclosure of

sexual and/or physical abuse, process of disclosure, pedophilia, behaviors of abusers

and victims.”

The trial court conducted a Rule 702 hearing, and Madera described her

education, training, and credentials. She is a clinical psychologist. Her experience

includes providing “individual, group, family therapy, psychological evaluations,

and extended forensic evaluations to younger children, where there were allegations

4 of child sexual abuse.” She relayed that she has testified as an expert approximately

fifty times in other court cases.

To prepare for her testimony, Madera said she read the incident report but did

not listen to any testimony presented or know what evidence was introduced in the

case. She explained that her role was “to provide information related to my

experience, as well as the literature, for the jury to use as they see fit in this case[,]”

rather than provide testimony that would help prove one of the facts at issue in the

case. Madera said, “I’m going to offer information to help the jury understand the

dynamics of child sexual abuse, from my experience and the literature[,]” but would

not offer anything on guilt or innocence.

At the end of the hearing, Villarreal’s attorney objected that the knowledge

Madera would offer “is not relevant to help the jury determine the final fact issue in

question[,]” which he characterized as whether specific sex acts happened and how

many times. He argued that Madera was “merely bolstering . . . the State’s theory of

the case.” The State responded that Madera’s testimony was relevant, although she

was not there to establish whether the crime happened. Instead, the State contended

that Madera would help the jury understand the evidence, especially where the

defense raised issues with Sara’s behavior and being inconsistent. The trial court

ruled that Madera was qualified as an expert under Rule 702, and her “specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence.”

5 When Madera testified for the jury, she again described her qualifications,

education, training, and experience with child sexual abuse cases. She explained that

her purpose in testifying was “[t]o help the jury understand the dynamics of child

sexual abuse” from her “experience, as well as the literature, to use as you guys see

fit in this case.” Madera said she reviewed the incident report to prepare for her

testimony.

Madera explained what grooming was and that perpetrators use it to lower a

child’s inhibitions to abuse the child later sexually. She said that some common

examples of grooming included tickling, wrestling, or having their hands on a child

to lower their boundaries, special privileges, attention, and gifts. She noted that it

was common for children to know their abuser.

Madera discussed disclosures and told the jury that often, these cases involve

a delayed disclosure. She explained that sometimes children will provide partial

disclosures, meaning they do not relay every detail in their first interview, because

it involves “complex trauma” where they are “abused over years[.]” Madera testified

that a child cannot remember every detail over the course of years, but there will be

certain things that stick out, like the first or last time, or a time that was particularly

painful, different things will stand out, and “in time, the events will blend” when it

happens consistently. She provided an example of this type of recall and relaying

different details of a vacation trip to different individuals, there would be different

6 facts that one would tell their best friend versus their mother, but it does not make it

less truthful. Madera described sensory details that children recall.

Madera also testified about the concepts of outcrying and recanting. She

explained that often, children provide a partial disclosure and are “testing the water”

to see if their caregiver will believe them. If the caregiver’s response is not what the

child expects or is not supportive, “or for a multitude of reasons,” the child may pull

back and say “just kidding[]” because they are not ready to deal with the

ramifications of the disclosure. Madera outlined why a child may not remember a

recantation, including the time that passed or that a parent was very dismissive. She

noted that parents’ responses vary, and unfortunately, many do not believe the abuse

is happening, which can go back to grooming both the parent and the child that

allows the perpetrator to discredit the child.

Madera described the different emotional responses of children to the trauma,

including depression, anxiety, difficulty with interpersonal relationships, and

sexualized behavior. She acknowledged those could also be symptoms of bipolar

disorder, as could suicidal thoughts and that child sexual abuse can play into later

mental health diagnoses. She testified that sometimes children will not disclose,

because the perpetrator has threatened them. Madera noted that sometimes a

caregiver will know, but because of psychological reasons, like the caregiver’s

7 dependence on the perpetrator, they “seem to have a blind eye … or just completely

deny it.”

After Madera testified, the defense moved for a mistrial. Among other things,

the defense argued that she provided no evidence that would help the jury determine

any element in the case. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, reasoning that

based on the 702 hearing, Madera met the qualifications as an expert and testified to

matters that “would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence.”

ISSUE

In a single issue, Villarreal asks whether the trial court erred when it allowed

the State’s expert, clinical psychologist Dr. Danielle Madera, to testify over his

objection. In support of this issue, Villarreal contends the State failed to establish

the reliability and relevance of Madera’s testimony. Villarreal argues that Madera

only reviewed the incident report and could not identify the evidence she was

supposed to help the jury understand.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

We review a trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony for

an abuse of discretion. See Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tex. Crim. App.

2017). We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. See id. Texas Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of

expert testimony and provides that

8 [a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Tex. R. Evid. 702. A trial court must make

three separate inquiries, which must all be met before admitting expert testimony: “(1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder in deciding the case.”

Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Rodgers v.

State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “These conditions are

commonly referred to as (1) qualification, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance.” Rhomer

v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The reliability inquiry is

flexible. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134. “In some cases, the reliability of scientific

knowledge will be at issue; in others, ‘the relevant reliability concerns may focus

upon personal knowledge or experience.’” Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999)). That said, a proponent must establish some

foundation for the reliability of an expert’s opinion. Id. “‘Experience alone may

provide a sufficient basis for an expert’s testimony in some cases, but it cannot do

so in every case.’” Id. (quoting Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, 972 S.W.2d

713, 726 (Tex. 1998)).

9 Sister courts have previously concluded and explained that expert testimony

regarding the effect of sexual abuse on children is nonscientific expert

testimony. See Mulvihill v. State, 177 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); see also Bisbee v. State, No. 14-22-00164-CR, 2023 WL

5622828, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 31, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). Likewise, the Court of Criminal Appeals has

held that expert psychological testimony about characteristics commonly displayed

by child victims of sexual abuse is admissible. See Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817,

817–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding testimony was relevant and rejecting

argument that testimony should be excluded based on bolstering objection).

Psychology is typically considered a “soft science.” See Weatherred v. State, 15

S.W.3d 540, 542 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining that psychology is

generally included as a “soft” science); Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) (same). The reliability of “soft” science evidence

can be established by showing that: (1) the field of expertise involved is a legitimate

one; (2) the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that field;

and (3) the expert’s testimony properly relies upon or utilizes the principles involved

in that field. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542 (citation omitted). Further, the Court of

Criminal Appeals has determined that expert testimony regarding the grooming of

children for sexual abuse and behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children

10 is appropriate. See Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 667–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)

(explaining that expert testimony regarding grooming behavior was useful to the jury

and still involves matters beyond the understanding of the jury); Cohn, 849 S.W.2d

at 819 (explaining such evidence was relevant and admissible, rejecting bolstering

complaint).

ANALYSIS

At the 702 hearing, Madera explained in detail her education, training, and

over twenty years of experience dealing with child sex abuse victims. She testified

that she had a Ph.D. in clinical psychology. She did not sit through the trial, and her

only preparation was reviewing the incident report, and she explained that she would

not address whether Villarreal was guilty. Based on that, Villarreal contends her

testimony was not reliable or relevant. We disagree.

Madera explained her qualifications, which Villarreal agrees on appeal, show

her knowledge in the field of clinical psychology. She described her years of

practicing clinical psychology and providing clinical therapy to children, including

reviewing literature. See Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542. As a practitioner of

psychology, Madera’s testimony regarding her extensive experience and review of

the literature was consistent with meeting the three necessary considerations for the

reliability of a “soft science.” See id.; Reynolds, 227 S.W.3d at 371 (addressing

psychology as a “soft science”).

11 The evidence showed that Villarreal engaged in behaviors consistent with

grooming. The evidence also established that Sara had a delayed outcry, recanted an

earlier outcry, and suffered from multiple mental health and behavioral issues, all of

which the defense focused on at trial. Madera explained for the jury the dynamics of

grooming, provided examples of these behaviors and how perpetrators use these

behaviors to lower a victim’s defenses. Madera also described mental health issues

child sex abuse victims may experience, including depression and anxiety, but she

agreed that such things could stem from bipolar disorder, which was something Sara

suffered from. Finally, Madera discussed disclosures, delayed outcries and provided

reasons for why a child might recant an outcry. As outlined above, courts have

considered expert testimony on grooming behaviors and behavioral characteristics

of sexually abused children as appropriate, explaining that such testimony is relevant

and useful for the jury in understanding the evidence. See Morris, 361 S.W.3d at

667–68; Cohn, 849 S.W.2d at 819.

Here, the trial court could have reasonably determined that Madera’s

testimony based on her specialized knowledge in clinical psychology, child sex

abuse dynamics, including grooming behaviors, mental health issues seen in child

sex abuse victims, disclosures, and recantation would help the jury understand the

evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 702; Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542; see also Morris,

361 S.W.3d at 667–68; Cohn, 849 S.W.2d at 819. Since the decision to admit

12 Madera’s expert testimony under Rule 702 was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Wolfe, 509

S.W.3d at 335. We overrule Villarreal’s sole issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Villarreal’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice

Submitted on January 26, 2026 Opinion Delivered April 1, 2026 Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.