Ricardo Isaac Alonso v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
• Decided: April 15, 2026
• Docket: 04-25-00404-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00404-CR

Ricardo Isaac ALONSO, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021CR0409 Benjamin Robertson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 15, 2026

AFFIRMED

Ricardo Isaac Alonso appeals from his conviction for the offense of deadly conduct, a Class

A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.05(a),(e). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we do

not recite them except as necessary to advise the parties of our decision and the basic reasons for

it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 04-25-00404-CR

On January 14, 2021, Alonso was indicted for the offense of aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon alleged to have been committed on or about September 28, 2019. The charges arose

from an incident in which Alonso, while fleeing from law enforcement officers, collided with the

complainant’s vehicle, causing her injuries. Alonso pled not guilty. On June 4, 2025, a jury found

Alonso guilty of the lesser included offense of deadly conduct. Punishment was assessed at a

$4,000 fine and one year in jail. Alonso’s sentence was suspended and he was placed on

community supervision for two years. This appeal followed.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole issue, Alonso contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his

conviction. Specifically, he contends the State failed to prove he caused the collision, asserting

there was evidence the complainant turned her vehicle toward him with her bright headlights on.

To determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court

views all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to decide whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010). “The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of

witnesses, and juries may draw multiple reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each is

supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016). “The jury is not, however, allowed to draw conclusions based on speculation.” Id. A

reviewing court determines whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the

combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Hooper v. State,

214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). When the record supports conflicting inferences,

-2- 04-25-00404-CR

a reviewing court must presume that the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the

prosecution and defer to that determination. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia v. State, 367

S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

A person commits deadly conduct if he recklessly engages in conduct that places another

in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.05(a). An offense under

subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 22.05(e).

The jury heard testimony that Alonso was actively evading law enforcement at the time of

the collision. Michael Villar, an investigator with the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office, testified that

Alonso was asleep inside his vehicle, which was parked in the middle of the roadway. Villar

attempted to wake Alonso by banging on the window and when Alonso awoke, he immediately

accelerated and fled, heading in the wrong direction. Villar returned to his patrol vehicle and

pursued Alonso for a couple of minutes before Alonso struck the complainant’s car. Villar further

testified that Alonso was driving in the middle of the eastbound and westbound lanes and swerved

into oncoming traffic when his vehicle collided with the complainant’s vehicle. Traffic was

“heavy” at the time because it was the early morning “rush hour.” Before colliding with the

complainant’s vehicle, Alonso almost hit two other vehicles on the road.

The complainant testified that she was driving to work when she observed police lights and

sirens and pulled to the side of the road. She realized the police were pursuing Alonso and that his

vehicle was about to strike her driver’s side door. In an effort to protect herself, she moved her

vehicle so that the hood rather than the driver’s door would absorb the impact. Alonso’s vehicle

struck her car, crushing the door and pinning her leg. She freed herself and exited through the

passenger side door. The complainant suffered serious injuries, including cuts, severe bruising,

and a concussion resulting in a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury.

-3- 04-25-00404-CR

Alonso testified in his own defense, stating that before he hit the complainant’s car, he “just

remember[ed] everything being lit up. I couldn’t see in front of me.” He added that it was “like

high beams were being shone on me.” He further denied that the officer knocked on his car window

or tried to pull him over. According to Alonso, basically everything the officer told the jury was a

lie.

On appeal, Alonso maintains the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict

because any rational jury would have had to speculate about who caused the collision. He contends

the State proved through its case-in-chief that the complainant caused the accident because she

turned her car and its bright lights into the path of Alonso’s car. However, the jury was the sole

judge of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Garcia, 367 S.W.3d

at 687. And, it was the jury’s duty to resolve any conflicts in the evidence, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at

778. Thus, the jury was free to disbelieve Alonso’s testimony that he collided with the

complainant’s car because he was blinded by another vehicle’s high beams. See id. at 779.

Additionally, the jury was free to credit the officer’s testimony that Alonso accelerated and fled

and drove into oncoming traffic. See id. Based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the

evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, a rational jury could have found, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that Alonso recklessly engaged in conduct that placed another in imminent

danger of serious bodily injury.

CONCLUSION

We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support Alonso’s conviction. The judgment is

affirmed.

Adrian A. Spears II, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH

-4-