Ricardo Gaspar v. Merrick Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 3, 2023
• Docket: 22-1604
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1604 Doc: 24 Filed: 04/03/2023 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-1604

RICARDO ACOSTA GASPAR,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: February 28, 2023 Decided: April 3, 2023

Before NIEMEYER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Zoila Catalina Velasquez, LAW OFFICE OF ZOILA C. VELASQUEZ, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Petitioner. Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Timothy G. Hayes, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-1604 Doc: 24 Filed: 04/03/2023 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Ricardo Acosta Gaspar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) adopting and affirming the

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying Gaspar’s application for cancellation of removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The IJ concluded that Gaspar’s application failed because

he did not establish that his removal to Mexico would result in exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to his United States citizen children. We deny the petition for review.

The Attorney General “‘may cancel removal’ of an applicant who meets four

statutory criteria: 1) that the applicant has been physically present in the United States for

at least ten continuous years, 2) that the applicant had been a person ‘of good moral

character’ during that ten-year period, 3) that the applicant had not committed certain

enumerated offenses, and 4) that the applicant ‘establishes that removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the [applicant’s citizen or lawful permanent

resident] spouse, parent, or child[ren].’” Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland, 6 F.4th 552, 557

(4th Cir. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)). In Gonzalez

Galvan, we held that the IJ’s ruling that an applicant has not met the exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship requirement of § 1229b(b)(1) is a mixed question of law and

fact that we possess jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Id. at 560. But

in performing that review, we may not disturb “the IJ’s factual findings related to the

hardship determination,” and we assess only whether “the IJ erred in holding that [the]

evidence failed as a matter of law to satisfy the statutory standard of exceptional and

2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1604 Doc: 24 Filed: 04/03/2023 Pg: 3 of 3

extremely unusual hardship.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review

of that legal question is de novo. Id.

After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the IJ “applied the correct statutory

standard, considered all the evidence, and adequately explained the reasons for his ruling.”

Id. We therefore conclude that the IJ did not commit an error of law in denying Gaspar’s

application for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

PETITION DENIED