Ricardo Calderon Gomez v. U.S. Attorney General

447 F. App'x 932
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedNovember 28, 2011
Docket11-12109
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 447 F. App'x 932 (Ricardo Calderon Gomez v. U.S. Attorney General) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ricardo Calderon Gomez v. U.S. Attorney General, 447 F. App'x 932 (11th Cir. 2011).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Ricardo Calderon Gomez seeks review of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). On appeal, Calderon Gomez argues that the BIA erred in determining that he had failed to establish past persecution. 1 He asserts that the BIA erred by determining that the persecution that he faced was not on account of one of the five enumerated grounds for asylum, specifically his imputed political opinion, as he had established that he had been persecuted because he had actively worked with the U Party by participating in social campaigns and providing food to displaced communities. Furthermore, Calderon Gomez argues that he had established that his fear of future persecution on account of imputed political opinion was reasonable. With respect to the BIA’s determination that his testimony *934 was not credible, Calderon Gomez asserts that he had filled out his 1-589 application with the assistance of a “non-trained individual,” and that the BIA was punishing him for not obtaining the assistance of an attorney to help him with the application.

We review the BIA’s decision as the final judgment, unless the BIA has expressly adopted the IJ’s decision. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir.2007). In that case, we review the IJ’s decision as well. Id. Here, the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s decision, and, therefore, we review only the BIA’s decision. See id.

The BIA’s factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2005). We will affirm the BIA’s decision “if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Under this test, we view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.2004) ien banc). Accordingly, “[t]o conclude the BIA’s decision should be reversed, we must find that the record not only supports the conclusion, but compels it.” Ruiz, 479 F.3d at 765 (internal quotations and citation omitted). When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005).

We review our subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir.2003). A petitioner must have exhausted all administrative remedies that are available as of right. INA § 242(d)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). We treat the exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional, and so we must consider whether we have jurisdiction over an issue even if the issue is not raised by the parties. See Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir.2003) (noting that this Court “lack[s] jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the BIA”). Thus, if an alien fails to challenge an adverse credibility determination in his appeal to the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to consider such a challenge in his petition for review, even if the BIA has considered the issue sua sponte. See Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1249-51 (11th Cir.2006).

An alien who arrives in, or is present in, the United States may apply for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The U.S. Attorney General or the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is defined in the INA as:

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality ... and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. ...

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The asylum applicant carries the burden of proving statutory “refugee” status. Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. To establish asylum eligibility the alien must, with specific credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily protected factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutorily listed factor will cause such persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b); Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir.2006).

*935 Past persecution is established when the applicant shows that (1) he was persecuted, and (2) the persecution was on account of a protected ground. Silva, 448 F.3d at 1236. An alien who has not shown past persecution may still be entitled to asylum or withholding of removal if he can demonstrate a future threat in his country to his life or freedom on the basis of a protected ground. To establish a well-founded fear, an applicant must demonstrate that his fear of future persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289-90. The alien must show a nexus between a statutorily protected ground and the feared persecution, and he can do so by presenting “specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on account of’ the statutorily listed factor. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1286 (quotations and emphasis omitted).

To qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, the applicant must show that if returned to his country, his “life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).

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447 F. App'x 932, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ricardo-calderon-gomez-v-us-attorney-general-ca11-2011.