Ribotsky v. Lupkin

114 Misc. 2d 913, 452 N.Y.S.2d 806, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3586
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 22, 1982
StatusPublished

This text of 114 Misc. 2d 913 (Ribotsky v. Lupkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ribotsky v. Lupkin, 114 Misc. 2d 913, 452 N.Y.S.2d 806, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3586 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Richard Lee Price, J.

THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The petitioner was duly appointed a New York City marshal on August 13, 1958. On October 24, 1979, petitioner was suspended from his office pursuant to a joint order of the Appellate Division charging petitioner and 10 other marshals with various crimes relating to their offices. The joint order sought to suspend the marshals pending disposition of the criminal proceedings. (This joint order was subsequently overturned by the United States District Court.)

On November 7,1980, petitioner was sentenced upon his conviction for the crimes charged. Contemporaneously therewith, petitioner’s tenure of office was terminated, [914]*914pursuant to the vacatur provided under section 30 of the Public Officers Law.1

Although it is unclear from the papers submitted, the petitioner apparently became “re-employed” by a city marshal’s office sometime after his removal as a city marshal. The nature of petitioner’s employment is disputed.

On July 2, 1981, the Department of Investigation, by signature of Stanley Lupkin, then commissioner of the department, issued appendix (directive) Q-104, which addressed the issue of employment of former city marshals.

The directive reads, in pertinent part: “any former Marshal who has been convicted of a crime related to the performance of his/her official duties may not be employed by any present City Marshal when such employment bears a direct relationship to the criminal offense for which the former marshal was convicted”.

Thereafter, on August 25, 1981, a meeting was held by the respondents to discuss the continued employment of the petitioner. On August 31, 1981, the petitioner’s employer, City Marshal Jacob Ribotsky (petitioner’s father) received notification that petitioner’s employment must be terminated.2

petitioner’s controverted factual allegations

Petitioner alleges that the offenses underlying his removal from office and criminal conviction resulted from certain “sham auctions” conductéd “away from the office” by petitioner and others. No further elucidation is offered by petitioner regarding the nature of the offenses.

[915]*915Petitioner also alleges that the activities he performed at the city marshal’s office after his removal as a city marshal were of a “menial clerical” character. The petitioner describes these duties in the following manner: “the clerical duties * * * included such office functions as answering the telephone, filing papers, opening the mail and posting entires [sic] in the firm’s ledgers.”

The petitioner alleges further that at the meeting of August 31, 1981, respondent Litwack maintained that petitioner “would be permitted to sweep the floors and clean the windows with a reservation that in sweeping the floors (the petitioner’s) eyes would not have occasion to read a scrap of paper that may have fallen to the floor”.

respondents’ controverted factual allegations

The respondents allege that the petitioner was convicted “for violating Title 18, U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(d), 1951, 1341 and 2 in that he did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others to conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the Civil Court of the City of New York, through a pattern of racketeering activity, to devise a scheme to defraud and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, did cause to be delivered by mail payments to attorneys for judgment creditors, representing less than full amounts which had been received at sham public auction sales and engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce.”

Furthermore, respondents allege that while petitioner’s employment after removal might be loosely characterized as “clerical”, his duties went beyond that nominal classification: “the petitioner, who was making $750.00 per week, was filing papers for the marshal, answering the marshal’s telephones, opening the marshal’s mail and making entries into the marshal’s official books and records. The petitioner, in filing Civil Court mandates, was therefore directly involved in the affairs of the Civil Court. The petitioner answered telephone calls dealing with questions regarding not only the service of process emanating from the Civil Court but the scheduling of auctions of property to satisfy Civil Court judgments. The petitioner was opening mail which contained cash to satisfy Civil Court judg[916]*916ments. The petitioner was entering information regarding auction sales and other Civil Court process and the receipt of money into the official records of an enforcement officer of the Civil Court.”

Respondents maintain the following with respect to the employability of petitioner within City Marshal Ribotsky’s office: “It was explained that if there were other functions that the Marshal would like his son to perform he should first check with this Department to see if they were proscribed by the Directive.”

This statement was contained in a personnel memo written by respondent Kenneth Litwack following the August 25, 1981 meeting.

petitioner’s asserted bases for relief

Petitioner now brings on this CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel respondents to vacate their determination prohibiting the petitioner from “procuring employment with the office of a City Marshal”.

Petitioner attacks this determination on several levels:

(1) Directive Q-104 is obviously based on section 752 of the Correction Law and therefore is inapplicable to petitioner because the office of the city marshal is not a “public agency” as required for coverage by that statute.

(2) The authority given to the Department of Investigation pursuant to joint order 453 pertains solely to daily activities and conduct of city marshals and does not include the power to set hiring and firing guidelines.

(3) Issuance of directive Q-104 was arbitrary and capricious and particularly aimed at punishing petitioner.

(4) The directive violates the United States Constitution in that it

(A) violates the equal protection clause, and

(B) constitutes a bill of attainder and ex post facto decree in violation of sections 9 and 10 of article I.

(5) The directive violates the Human Rights Law of the State of New York.

(6) The directive violates the spirit and concept of section 752 of the Correction Law.

[917]*917(7) The directive violates the spirit and intent of section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code and title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 US Stat 241, 253).

(8) The directive has been applied arbitrarily and capriciously to the petitioner.

The above constitutes petitioner’s formal objections to the activities engaged in by the respondents vis-a-vis the petitioner. All these objections, however, boil down to two primary accusations:

(1) The very issuance of directive Q-104 is unfair (or violates a United States or State Constitution or statute) because it treats convicted ex-city marshals differently than convicted felons in general.

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Bluebook (online)
114 Misc. 2d 913, 452 N.Y.S.2d 806, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ribotsky-v-lupkin-nysupct-1982.