IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CP-00400-COA
RIAN GATLIN APPELLANT v. HATTIESBURG PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/13/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BURNICE WESLEY CURRY IV COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RIAN GATLIN (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAY MARSHALL ATKINS EMILY MARTIN MORGAN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/18/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Alicia Wallace, as the natural mother and next friend of her minor daughter, Rian Gatlin,1 sued the Hattiesburg Public School District (the School District) under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for negligent supervision. Following a hearing on the School District’s motion for summary judgment, the Forrest County Circuit Court found that the evidence produced showed the School District used ordinary care and took reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to Rian, and Rian failed to present a genuine issue of
1 In the body of the complaint, the plaintiffs are listed as: “Rian Gatlin, by her natural mother and next friend, Alicia Wallace, and Rian Gatlin, individually.” However, in the style of the case, the plaintiff is listed solely as Rian Gatlin.
material fact as to whether the School District breached its duty of care. The circuit court therefore granted the School District’s summary judgment motion.
¶2. Rian now appeals pro se. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3. Rian attended Hattiesburg High School (HHS) with classmates Toni and Amaya, who are sisters. Rian, Toni, and Amaya were in the same first period class, and Rian and Toni were also in the same fourth period class.
¶4. On October 5, 2021, Rian reported that Toni had made rude comments about her hair at school. Following this incident, Rian’s mother, Alicia, confronted Toni and Amaya outside of school. Toni and Amaya claimed that during the encounter, Alicia threatened to shoot them. Rian and Alicia admitted that Alicia had confronted Toni and Amaya but denied that Alicia had made any threats.
¶5. The following day, Rian and Alicia met with school administrators to report that Toni had bullied Rian. That same day, Toni, Amaya, and their mother reported the confrontation with Alicia to school administration.
¶6. In response to these reports, Dr. Lashonda Short, the assistant principal of HHS, and Jazmine Holloway, a behavior specialist, met with Rian and Alicia to develop a “safety action plan” designed to prevent further contact between Toni and Rian. Dr. Short also met separately with Toni, Amaya, and their mother. The safety action plan developed for Rian included adjusting Rian’s class schedule, modifying her walking route between classes to avoid any contact with Toni and Amaya, and instructing Rian to report any incident of
3
bullying or physical contact from Toni or Amaya. The safety action plan was approved by Dr. Victor Hubbard, the head principal at HHS, and was implemented when Rian returned to school on October 11, 2021.
¶7. At the end of the school day on October 11, 2021, Rian claimed that she overheard Toni tell another student that she wanted to “beat up” Rian and Rian’s friend. Rian and Alicia both reported the incident to Dr. Hubbard. The following day, school administrators met with Toni, Amaya, and their mother and required them to sign the school’s “Anti-Conflict Agreement,” acknowledging that any physical altercation on campus would result in suspension or expulsion.
¶8. On November 2, 2021, Rian claimed that Toni intentionally bumped into her between classes. However, Rian did not report this incident to anyone at school until after the subject fight that occurred the next day.
¶9. The subject fight occurred on November 3, 2021, between third and fourth period classes.2 The walking route outlined in Rian’s safety plan required Rian to report directly to her fourth period class after her third period class. That day, Rian deviated from the route—instead of exiting her third period class and going directly to her fourth period class, Rian went to the school office to report the bumping incident from the prior day.
¶10. According to Rian, as she exited the building to go to the office, she heard Toni say, “I’m about to get suspended today.” Seconds later, Toni started swinging at Rian, and a fight
2 The record reflects that after the November 3 fight, Rian filled out an incident report stating that Toni had bumped into her the day before. Toni also reported the November 2 incident after the subject fight, but she claimed that Rian was the one who had bumped into her.
4
ensued. Rian claimed that although Amaya did not participate in the fight, Amaya stood nearby, shouting profanities and encouraging Toni to keep fighting.
¶11. As part of his administrative duties, Assistant Principal James Grubbs was monitoring the area outside the building where Rian’s third period class met. Grubbs testified in his deposition that when he saw the fight break out, he immediately responded to the altercation and used his walkie-talkie to alert School Resource Officers Adam Kelly and Darius Culberson and other faculty members for assistance. After breaking up the fight, the resource officers escorted Toni and Rian to the school office for disciplinary action.
¶12. On January 31, 2023, Alicia sued the School District for negligent supervision allegedly resulting in Rian’s physical and emotional trauma.3 On March 6, 2023, Alicia sought a default judgment against the School District. An entry of default was entered, and a motion for a default judgment was filed the same day.
¶13. On April 25, 2023, Alicia’s counsel moved to set aside the entry of default, and the circuit court entered an order setting aside the default against the School District. That same day, the School District filed its answer to Rian’s complaint.
¶14. On May 20, 2024, Alicia sent an email to her counsel, Michael Adelman, terminating his legal services. Adelman then filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and attached Alicia’s email to the motion. On May 24, 2024, the circuit court entered an order granting Adelman leave to withdraw as Alicia’s counsel and giving Alicia thirty days to obtain substitute counsel or advise the court that she intended to proceed pro se.
3 The record reflects that Alicia timely filed her notice of claim and complaint pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11 (Rev. 2019).
5
¶15. On June 21, 2024, Alicia filed a request for more time to obtain counsel. On July 2, 2024, the School District filed a motion to dismiss due to Alicia’s failure to comply with the circuit court’s order requiring her to obtain substitute counsel or advise the court that she intended to proceed pro se.4 Although no ruling on Alicia’s request for more time to obtain counsel appears in the record or on the docket, the transcript from the summary judgment hearing indicates that the circuit court granted Alicia’s motion.
¶16. On December 11, 2024, the School District filed a motion for summary judgment based on Alicia’s failure to produce sufficient evidence to prove each element of the negligent supervision claim—specifically, the failure to show that the School District breached its duty to provide a safe environment. The School District attached the following exhibits to its motion: excerpts from the deposition transcripts of Dr. Hubbard, Dr. Short, Grubbs, Holloway, Officer Culberson, Rian, and Alicia; the school discipline reports for Rian, Toni, and Amaya; the incident reports documenting the allegations of bullying; Rian’s safety action plan implemented by the administration; and the Anti-Conflict Agreements signed by Rian, Alicia, Toni, Amaya, and their mother.5 The School District also filed a motion for a trial setting.
4 The motion requesting more time and the motion to dismiss appear on the circuit court docket but were not made part of the record on appeal.
5 On appeal, Alicia claims that she did not sign the Anti-Conflict Agreement and that her signature, which appears on the document, was forged. Alicia therefore asserts that the circuit court “erred by accepting and relying upon a forged Anti-Conflict Agreement.” However, the deposition testimony of school administrators reflects that Alicia did sign the document. Whether she signed the document is immaterial, though, because Alicia admitted in her deposition that she read the document and was aware of its contents.
6
¶17. On December 30, Alicia filed a motion to stay the case or, in the alternative, for additional time to respond to the School District’s motion for summary judgment.6
¶18. The circuit court set a hearing for Alicia’s motion to stay the case and the School District’s motion for summary judgment. The day before the hearing, Alicia filed a response in opposition to the School District’s motion for summary judgment. In her response, Alicia asserted as follows:
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment fails to demonstrate that there are no disputed facts regarding [identify key disputed facts]. Plaintiffs evidence, including [cite specific evidence like deposition testimony or affidavit], establishes that [explain how the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact].
(Brackets in original). Alicia also argued that the fact that Rian was physically attacked at school—despite the School District’s claim that faculty members were actively monitoring student activities at all relevant times—was evidence that the School District breached its duty to provide a safe environment. Alicia also attached two orders from the Hattiesburg Municipal Court finding Alicia not guilty of simple assault due to lack of evidence. (The charges of simple assault stemmed from her alleged threats to Toni and Amaya.)
¶19. The circuit court held the hearing on Alicia’s motion to stay the case and the School District’s motion for summary judgment on March 5, 2025. At the hearing, Alicia made an ore tenus motion for additional time to obtain new counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that over nine months had passed since the court’s May 2024 order requiring Alicia to either obtain substitute counsel after terminating Adelman or advise the
6 This motion does not appear in the record.
7
court that she intended to proceed pro se, and Alicia still had not complied with the order. The circuit court also explained that because Rian was twenty years old at the time of the hearing, Alicia, a non-attorney, could not act as her counsel:
THE COURT: (to Alicia) Are you an attorney?
[Alicia]: No. I’m her mother.
THE COURT: And how old is [Rian]?
[Rian]: I’m 20 years old.
THE COURT: So you are 20, so you are over the age of 18?
[Rian]: Yes.
THE COURT: [Alicia], if I allow you to appear before her, I’m allowing you to engage in the unlicensed practice of law, which is a crime. So while you can sit at counsel table with [Rian], you cannot speak and you can’t represent her. By law she’s 18 years old, she can represent herself. But you can’t represent her. I just want to make that clear before we get started on this.[7]
7 Although not explicitly raised by the parties on appeal, we must address the circuit court judge’s statement regarding Rian’s age of majority and Alicia’s ability to represent herself as an interested party. The MTCA contains a minor savings clause, Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-46-11(4), which tolls the running of the MTCA’s statute of limitations for a minor under twenty-one years old. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court incorrectly stated that the age of majority under the MTCA is eighteen years old.
Pursuant to the MTCA’s minor savings clause, a minor’s parent “can be substituted as an interested party and file a complaint on [the minor’s] behalf until [the minor] is twenty-one, or [the minor] can individually file after turning twenty-one within the one-year statute of limitation prescribed under the MTCA.” Doe v. Holmes Cnty. Sch. Dist., 246 So. 3d 920, 924 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Despite the style of the case, the complaint reflects that Alicia was substituted for Rian as a real party in interest, and Alicia filed the complaint against the School District on Rian’s behalf. Id. We agree with the circuit court’s statement that Mississippi law specifically prohibits an individual who is not licensed to practice law to represent others in court; nonetheless, that individual may represent herself in court. Caissie v. State, 254 So. 3d 849, 856 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); see also Sapukotana v.
8
¶20. During the hearing, Rian attempted to introduce into evidence a video depicting the November 3, 2021 fight. Upon questioning by the circuit court, Rian admitted that she did not know the name of the person who recorded the video. The circuit court refused to admit the video into evidence.
¶21. On March 13, 2025, the circuit court entered its order granting summary judgment in favor of the School District. The circuit court found that Alicia’s response to the School District’s summary judgment motion was untimely, but the court still considered the response and Rian’s testimony. The circuit court ultimately held that Alicia failed to meet her burden of showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The circuit court explained that “[t]he evidence reveals that [the School District] utilized ordinary and reasonable care to prevent any injury to [Rian].” The circuit court further found:
[T]he evidence demonstrates that [the School District] undertook reasonable measures to prevent an altercation between [Rian] and other students as prior to the attack, [the School District] met with the involved students and parents, prepared and implemented a [s]afety [a]ction [p]lan to avoid the involved students from encountering one another on campus, and discussed an Anti-Conflict Agreement with [Rian and Alicia].
The circuit court also denied Alicia’s motion to stay the case or, in the alternative, to extend the time to respond to the motion for summary judgment.
¶22. Rian now appeals.
Sapukotana, 179 So. 3d 1105, 1112 (¶20) (Miss. 2015). Alicia was substituted as an interested party in the action against the School District, and she may represent herself. It was therefore improper for the circuit court not to allow Alicia to speak during the summary judgment hearing. However, we find that this improper ruling did not prejudice Alicia or Rian because the record reflects that the circuit court considered Alicia’s argument and her response to the School District’s summary judgment motion at the hearing.
9
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment
¶23. Rian argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the School District. In support of her argument, Rian asserts that the circuit court improperly excluded or ignored “critical” evidence, namely, the video footage depicting the November 3, 2021 fight.
¶24. This Court reviews a circuit court’s grant or denial of a summary judgment motion de novo. Bumpous ex rel. A.B. v. Tishomingo Cnty. Sch. Dist., 391 So. 3d 257, 260-61 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). When reviewing a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made.” Id. “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c)). The School District, as the summary judgment movant, “bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Robertson v. Houston, Miss. Pub. Sch. Dist., 335 So. 3d 1082, 1084
(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). When the summary judgment movant “demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party must rebut by producing significant probative evidence showing that there are indeed genuine issues for trial.” Id. (quotation mark omitted).
¶25. Rian’s main argument on appeal is that during the summary judgment hearing, the
10
circuit court erred by excluding the video depicting the fight. Rian maintains that the video “directly contradicted school personnel testimony and demonstrated a complete lack of supervision during the ambush.” We review a circuit court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Weaver v. Ross, 391 So. 3d 1240, 1245 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).
¶26. The hearing transcript reflects that after the School District presented its arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment, Rian8 asked if she could show the circuit court judge a video of the fight. Rian explained that the video was on her cellphone. The circuit court judge refused Rian’s request, but he inquired as to why Rian wanted to show the video. Rian claimed the video showed that Toni started the fight and that “the school was not doing their job.” Upon questioning by the circuit court judge, Rian stated that the video was recorded by a student who witnessed the fight, but Rian admitted that she did not know the name of the student.
¶27. The School District initially stated that it had no objection to the court admitting the video into evidence because the video “[is] not going to demonstrate that the [S]chool [D]istrict failed to take reasonable and ordinary measures to prevent the incident.” However, the School District argued that Rian’s attempt to introduce the video into evidence during the hearing without proper notice to the School District was “a sandbag technique.” The judge ultimately excluded the video from evidence, explaining that the video was not properly before the court because Rian could not identify the person who filmed the video and
8 As stated, the circuit court did not allow Alicia to represent Rian during the hearing and required Rian to proceed pro se.
11
therefore could not authenticate the video. The judge also advised Rian that the video was “basically thrown on the [School District] at the last minute” and explained that she should have submitted the evidence prior to the hearing.
¶28. The record reflects that the video at issue was not filed with the circuit court clerk or served on the School District prior to the summary judgment hearing.9 Alicia referenced the video in her opposing response to the School District’s motion for summary judgment, but she did not indicate that she intended to introduce the video at the summary judgment hearing. Alicia also did not indicate that she had filed the video with the circuit court clerk; rather, she stated that the video was uploaded to the internet. “Rule 56(c) requires materials considered on summary judgment to be ‘on file.’” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 179 So. 3d 1037, 1045 (¶18) (Miss. 2015). Additionally, “Rule 56(c) requires that all matters upon which a party or the court may rely must be filed with the clerk and served on the other party prior to the hearing.” Id. “It is certainly contrary to Rule 56(c) for the [circuit] court to consider documents that are not on file prior to the hearing on the motion.” Id. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court properly refused to consider the video.
¶29. We now turn to examine whether the School District met its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
¶30. As stated, Alicia, on behalf of Rian, filed a negligent supervision claim against the
9 On appeal, Rian claims that Alicia attempted to file a flash drive containing the video of the November 3 assault with her response in opposition to the School District’s motion for summary judgment but that the circuit court clerk would not accept the drive. A May 27, 2025 entry on the circuit court’s docket reflects that the court possessed a flash drive of the video at that time (more than two months after the summary judgment hearing), but the docket does not indicate when Alicia filed the flash drive.
12
School District. To prove a negligent supervision claim, “a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, proximate causation, and compensable damages.” Stephens v. Miller, 970 So. 2d 225, 227
(¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). We recognize that Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-69 (Rev. 2025) imposes upon school districts “a ministerial duty . . . to use ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students thereby providing a safe school environment.” Moss Point Sch. Dist. v. Stennis, 132 So. 3d 1047, 1050 (¶13) (Miss. 2014). To establish that the School District breached this duty, Rian bears “[the] burden of showing that [S]chool [D]istrict employees [did] not perform the duties to which they [were] assigned.” T.K. ex rel. D.K. v. Simpson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 846 So. 2d 312, 316 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Regarding a school’s duty to supervise its students, the Mississippi Supreme Court has clarified that “[a]bsent special, dangerous circumstances, a school district does not have the duty of providing constant supervision of all movements of pupils at all times.” Chaffee ex rel. Latham v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 270 So. 3d 905, 909 (¶22) (Miss. 2019). We further recognize that “[l]iability only attaches when a school fails to utilize ordinary care to prevent foreseeable injury.” T.K., 846 So. 2d at 317 (¶16).
¶31. In its motion for summary judgment, the School District argued that Alicia failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that the School District breached its duty to use ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to Rian. The School District submitted numerous exhibits in support of its motion, including depositions from school administrators as well as the safety action plan developed and implemented for Rian in
13
response to Toni and Amaya’s bullying. Dr. Hubbard, the head principal, testified in his deposition that HHS requires employees to monitor the location where Rian and Toni’s fight occurred. Dr. Hubbard confirmed that an administrator was on duty in that location at the time of the fight. Assistant Principal Grubbs testified in his deposition that as part of his duties, he was monitoring the location where the fight occurred. Grubbs stated that when he saw the fight break out, he immediately responded to the altercation and alerted school resource officers.
¶32. In response to Rian’s allegations that Toni had bullied her, school administration developed a safety action plan for Rian that adjusted her class schedule, modified her walking route between classes to avoid any contact with Toni and Amaya, and instructed Rian to report any incident of bullying or physical contact from Toni and Amaya. School administrators also testified that they met with Rian and Alicia, as well as Toni, Amaya, and their mother, and discussed the school’s Anti-Conflict Agreement, which stated that any physical altercation on campus would result in suspension or expulsion. Dr. Hubbard testified that the anti-conflict meeting and implementation of Rian’s safety action plan route appeared to have resolved the issue between Rian and Toni.
¶33. After reviewing the evidence, the circuit court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed to show that the School District breached its duty to use ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to Rian. We agree. First, “the record clearly establishes supervision of the children by the [employees] for the School District. There are no facts offered which indicate that their supervision was inadequate.” Chaffee, 270 So. 3d
14
at 909 (¶21). Furthermore, “we can find nothing to show that the School District either failed to provide [Rian] with a safe school environment or failed to use ordinary care and take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to [Rian].” Robertson, 335 So. 3d at 1086
(¶14). Although a fight between Rian and Toni was a foreseeable risk, we find that the School District took reasonable steps to minimize this risk by warning Rian, Toni, Amaya, and their parents about the consequences of physical altercations on campus and adjusting Rian’s class schedule and walking route to avoid contact with Toni and Amaya. Id.; see also J.E. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 264 So. 3d 786, 791-92 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). The deposition testimony further reflects that moments before the fight, Rian deviated from the walking route established in the safety plan and walked toward the school office, instead of directly to her fourth period class. This deviation resulted in a confrontation between Rian and Toni. During her deposition, Rian admitted that none of the school administration knew that Toni was about to fight her and that Rian herself “[was not] aware until [she] got outside.” As stated, Assistant Principal Grubbs, who was monitoring the area outside the building, immediately responded to the fight.
¶34. Upon review, we find no error in the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to the School District. Even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rian, we can find nothing to show that the School District either failed to provide Rian with a safe school environment or failed to use ordinary care and take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to Rian.
II. Additional Assignments of Error
15
¶35. In addition to arguing the circuit court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the School District, Rian raises other assignments of error: (1) whether the circuit court erred by setting aside the entry of default against the School District without Alicia’s notification or consent; (2) whether the circuit court erred by allowing the deposition of Officer Kelly to proceed without notice to Alicia;10 (3) whether Alicia’s prior trial counsel breached his professional duties by failing to notify Alicia of critical proceedings and withdrawing without adequate notice;11 (4) whether the circuit court improperly denied Alicia a reasonable extension of time to retain new counsel; (5) whether Alicia’s reliance on allegedly “false or misleading information” by the School District’s counsel led to reversible error; and (6) whether the circuit court improperly denied Alicia’s request to participate in the summary judgment hearing as Rian’s next friend, even though Rian had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.
¶36. Because Alicia failed to raise most of these issues before the circuit court, a procedural bar prevents us from addressing them,12 as “issues not raised in the trial court are barred from consideration at the appellate level.” Kimball Glassco Residential Ctr. Inc. v. Shanks, 64 So. 3d 941, 948 (¶22) (Miss. 2011). We will address the arguments that are
10 The record reflects that Officer Kelly was never deposed.
11 The record reflects that Alicia’s attorney, Adelman, informed Alicia he intended to withdraw as counsel. However, Alicia then sent an email to Adelman terminating his services.
12 Alicia and Rian chose to appeal this matter without the assistance of counsel. The supreme court has consistently held that “[a] pro se litigant shall be held to the same standard as an attorney.” In re Est. of Forrest, 165 So. 3d 548, 550 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
16
properly before us on appeal, though, and we ultimately find they lack merit.
¶37. The record reflects that Alicia’s counsel—not the School District—filed the motion to set aside the entry of default Alicia obtained against the School District. Therefore, under the invited-error doctrine, Rian cannot complain on appeal that the circuit court erred by setting aside the default without notifying Alicia and obtaining her consent. The supreme court has explained that “[a]n appellant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors which he invited or induced.” Busick v. St. John, 856 So. 2d 304, 314 (¶25) (Miss. 2003); see also Robb v. McLaughlin, 371 So. 3d 761, 780 (¶58) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).
¶38. We also find that the record does not support Rian’s argument that the circuit court improperly denied Alicia a reasonable extension of time to obtain new counsel. As discussed, on May 24, 2024, the circuit court ordered Alicia to obtain substitute counsel within thirty days or advise the court that she intended to proceed pro se. Approximately one month later, Alicia filed a motion seeking more time to obtain counsel. Although no ruling on Alicia’s motion for more time to obtain counsel appears in the record or on the circuit court docket, the transcript from the summary judgment hearing indicates that the circuit court granted the motion. At the time of the summary judgment hearing in March 2025, Alicia still had not complied with the circuit court’s order to obtain substitute counsel. Again, a party cannot complain on appeal about “[an] error of [her] own creation.” Ridgeway v. Hooker, 240 So. 3d 1202, 1209 (¶28) (Miss. 2018). Regardless, based on the facts before us, we find that the circuit court did not err in denying Alicia’s request for yet more time to obtain counsel.
17
CONCLUSION
¶39. After our review, we find that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the School District. We also find that Rian’s additional assignments of error lack merit. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶40. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.