IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00297-CV
RHONDA L FORSTHOFF, Appellant v.
BRAZOS COUNTY, A SELF-INSURED COUNTY THROUGH THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT POOL, Appellees
From the 272nd District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 14-000052-CV-272
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this pro-se appeal, appellant, Rhonda L. Forsthoff, challenges the trial court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Brazos County, a self-insured
county through the Texas Association of Counties Risk Management Pool. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
This matter pertains to a claim filed by appellant for workers’-compensation
benefits stemming from an on-the-job accident that occurred on May 30, 2012.
Appellant, formerly a detention officer and quartermaster at the Brazos County jail, has
alleged that she injured her lower back while lifting a case of toilet paper at the jail. In
her filings, appellant has argued that she sustained a sacroiliac injury that was
compensable.
The Texas Workers Compensation Commission conducted a contested case
hearing, at appellant’s request, to determine whether appellant’s alleged sacroiliac
injury was a “compensable injury.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer
issued an order stating that: (1) appellant sustained a compensable injury on May 30,
2012, but that the compensable injury did not extend to and include her alleged
sacroiliac injury; (2) appellant reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on
August 23, 2012; and (3) appellant’s impairment rating (“IR”) was 5%. Accordingly, the
hearing officer denied appellant benefits related to her alleged sacroiliac injury.
Unhappy with the hearing officer’s decision, appellant appealed. On November
25, 2013, the Texas Workers Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s
decision. Thereafter, appellant appealed the decision of the Texas Workers
Compensation Commission and filed suit in the 272nd Judicial District Court in Brazos
County.
In response to appellant’s suit, appellee filed an answer denying appellant’s
allegations and a motion for summary judgment. In its summary-judgment motion,
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 2 appellee asserted that the undisputed medical evidence conclusively established that
appellant’s May 30, 2012 accident was not the cause of her alleged sacroiliac injury.
Appellee attached numerous medical records to its motion. The trial court set
appellee’s motion for a hearing. Seven days prior to the hearing, appellant filed an
unsworn pro-se response to the summary-judgment motion without attaching any
evidence.
On July 14, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on appellee’s summary-
judgment motion. Appellant was present and had an opportunity to argue her case. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it would take the matter
under advisement. A week after the hearing, appellant filed a pro-se brief, attaching
evidence for the first time. Subsequently, on August 4, 2014, the trial court granted
appellee’s motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment dismissing
appellant’s claim. This pro-se appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). In reviewing a traditional motion for
summary judgment, we must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors
could differ in their conclusions in light of all the evidence presented. See Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). We must consider all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable
inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolving any doubts against the motion. See
id. at 756.
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 3 III. ANALYSIS1
At the outset, we note that, in her brief, appellant does not cite any legal
authority to support her contentions that the trial court erred. Instead, she merely re-
argues the facts that have been presented to the trial court and the Texas Workers
Compensation Commission. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 requires a party to
provide the reviewing court with “a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the
argument made in the body of the brief.” Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling
U.S.A., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); see TEX.
R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). “This
is not done by merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal
citations.”2 Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 106 S.W.3d at 128; see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
Therefore, because appellant’s arguments are completely devoid of any legal support,
we must conclude that the issues have been inadequately briefed and, therefore,
waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 106 S.W.3d at 128.
1 Appellant’s pro-se brief does not contain a specific section for issues presented. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 38.1(f). However, based on a liberal reading of her brief, appellant appears to challenge the trial court’s conclusions of law that her sacroiliac injury was not compensable; that she achieved MMI on August 23, 2012; and that her IR is 5%.
2 We also recognize that appellant elected to represent herself on appeal. Under Texas law, pro- se litigants, as appellant is here, are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys with regard to compliance with applicable laws and rules of procedure. See In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves. Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel.”)).
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 4 And even if appellant had adequately briefed her issues, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to appellant, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of appellee. See Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 755; see also Knott, 128
S.W.3d at 215. First, the properly-admitted summary-judgment evidence does not
indicate that the May 30, 2012 accident caused appellant’s sacroiliac injury; instead, the
documentary evidence of several doctors demonstrates that appellant suffered a lumbar
strain as a result of the May 30, 2012 accident; that she reached MMI on August 23,
2012; and that her IR is 5%.3 Moreover, appellant did not timely submit summary-
judgment evidence for the trial court to consider. Specifically, appellant first provided
evidence in her pro-se brief, which was submitted a week after the summary-judgment
hearing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (“Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not
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IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00297-CV
RHONDA L FORSTHOFF, Appellant v.
BRAZOS COUNTY, A SELF-INSURED COUNTY THROUGH THE TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT POOL, Appellees
From the 272nd District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 14-000052-CV-272
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this pro-se appeal, appellant, Rhonda L. Forsthoff, challenges the trial court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Brazos County, a self-insured
county through the Texas Association of Counties Risk Management Pool. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
This matter pertains to a claim filed by appellant for workers’-compensation
benefits stemming from an on-the-job accident that occurred on May 30, 2012.
Appellant, formerly a detention officer and quartermaster at the Brazos County jail, has
alleged that she injured her lower back while lifting a case of toilet paper at the jail. In
her filings, appellant has argued that she sustained a sacroiliac injury that was
compensable.
The Texas Workers Compensation Commission conducted a contested case
hearing, at appellant’s request, to determine whether appellant’s alleged sacroiliac
injury was a “compensable injury.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer
issued an order stating that: (1) appellant sustained a compensable injury on May 30,
2012, but that the compensable injury did not extend to and include her alleged
sacroiliac injury; (2) appellant reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on
August 23, 2012; and (3) appellant’s impairment rating (“IR”) was 5%. Accordingly, the
hearing officer denied appellant benefits related to her alleged sacroiliac injury.
Unhappy with the hearing officer’s decision, appellant appealed. On November
25, 2013, the Texas Workers Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the hearing officer’s
decision. Thereafter, appellant appealed the decision of the Texas Workers
Compensation Commission and filed suit in the 272nd Judicial District Court in Brazos
County.
In response to appellant’s suit, appellee filed an answer denying appellant’s
allegations and a motion for summary judgment. In its summary-judgment motion,
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 2 appellee asserted that the undisputed medical evidence conclusively established that
appellant’s May 30, 2012 accident was not the cause of her alleged sacroiliac injury.
Appellee attached numerous medical records to its motion. The trial court set
appellee’s motion for a hearing. Seven days prior to the hearing, appellant filed an
unsworn pro-se response to the summary-judgment motion without attaching any
evidence.
On July 14, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on appellee’s summary-
judgment motion. Appellant was present and had an opportunity to argue her case. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that it would take the matter
under advisement. A week after the hearing, appellant filed a pro-se brief, attaching
evidence for the first time. Subsequently, on August 4, 2014, the trial court granted
appellee’s motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment dismissing
appellant’s claim. This pro-se appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). In reviewing a traditional motion for
summary judgment, we must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors
could differ in their conclusions in light of all the evidence presented. See Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). We must consider all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable
inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolving any doubts against the motion. See
id. at 756.
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 3 III. ANALYSIS1
At the outset, we note that, in her brief, appellant does not cite any legal
authority to support her contentions that the trial court erred. Instead, she merely re-
argues the facts that have been presented to the trial court and the Texas Workers
Compensation Commission. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 requires a party to
provide the reviewing court with “a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the
argument made in the body of the brief.” Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling
U.S.A., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); see TEX.
R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). “This
is not done by merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal
citations.”2 Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 106 S.W.3d at 128; see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
Therefore, because appellant’s arguments are completely devoid of any legal support,
we must conclude that the issues have been inadequately briefed and, therefore,
waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 106 S.W.3d at 128.
1 Appellant’s pro-se brief does not contain a specific section for issues presented. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 38.1(f). However, based on a liberal reading of her brief, appellant appears to challenge the trial court’s conclusions of law that her sacroiliac injury was not compensable; that she achieved MMI on August 23, 2012; and that her IR is 5%.
2 We also recognize that appellant elected to represent herself on appeal. Under Texas law, pro- se litigants, as appellant is here, are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys with regard to compliance with applicable laws and rules of procedure. See In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves. Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel.”)).
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 4 And even if appellant had adequately briefed her issues, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to appellant, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of appellee. See Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 755; see also Knott, 128
S.W.3d at 215. First, the properly-admitted summary-judgment evidence does not
indicate that the May 30, 2012 accident caused appellant’s sacroiliac injury; instead, the
documentary evidence of several doctors demonstrates that appellant suffered a lumbar
strain as a result of the May 30, 2012 accident; that she reached MMI on August 23,
2012; and that her IR is 5%.3 Moreover, appellant did not timely submit summary-
judgment evidence for the trial court to consider. Specifically, appellant first provided
evidence in her pro-se brief, which was submitted a week after the summary-judgment
hearing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (“Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not
later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits
or other written response.”). Appellant’s responses to appellee’s summary-judgment
motion that were timely filed contained only appellant’s own unsworn testimony that is
inadmissible because it was not sworn, and because appellant is not an expert on
medical causation. See TEX. R. EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation . . . .”);
see also id. at R. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
3 Treating Doctors Siva Ayyar and John P. Obermiller both determined that appellant’s “compensable injury” only included a lumbar strain. Moreover, in his report, Dr. Obermiller mentioned that appellant’s selected doctor, Catherine Locke, M.D., merely diagnosed appellant with back pain; Dr. Locke did not mention any neurologic losses attributable to sacroilitis. Doctors Hadley and Fino also concluded that appellant had a lumbar injury but did not mention any neurologic loss or sacroilitis. Nevertheless, appellant was later diagnosed with sacroiliac joint dysfunction; however, it was determined that this diagnosis was not caused by appellant’s May 30, 2012 accident. Appellant has not tendered any competent summary-judgment evidence to refute these findings.
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 5 the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). Accordingly, we overrule all of
appellant’s issues on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AL SCOGGINS Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed February 5, 2015 [CV06]
Forsthoff v. Brazos County Page 6