United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 25-2089
RHODE ISLAND STATE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; MAIN STREET ALLIANCE; CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS; CITY OF PAWTUCKET; CITY OF PROVIDENCE; CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; CITY OF BALTIMORE; CITY OF COLUMBUS; CITY OF DURHAM; CITY OF NEW HAVEN; AMOS HOUSE; DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. COMMUNITY CENTER; EAST BAY COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM; FEDERAL HILL HOUSE ASSOCIATION; THE MILAGROS PROJECT; UNITED WAY OF RHODE ISLAND; NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP; BLACK SHEEP MARKET,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
BROOKE L. ROLLINS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; RUSSELL T. VOUGHT, in his official capacity as Director of the United States Office of Management and Budget; UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET; SCOTT BESSENT, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; UNITED STATES,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Gelpí and Rikelman, Circuit Judges. Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. McArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, and Laura E. Myron, Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, on brief for appellants.
Amy R. Romero, Kevin Love Hubbard, DeLuca, Weizenbaum, Barry & Revens, Ltd., Kristin Bateman, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Jyoti Jasrasaria, Michael J. Torcello, Andrew Liang Bookbinder, Adnan Perwez, Robin F. Thurston, Skye L. Perryman, and Democracy Forward Foundation, on brief for appellees.
Jonathan Miller, Jenny Ma, Jean Larsen, and Public Rights Project, on brief for local governments and local government leaders as amici curiae in support of appellees.
Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Anna Lumelsky, Deputy State Solicitor, Michelle Pascucci, Vanessa Arslanian, State Trial Counsel, Liza Hirsch, Chief, Children's Justice Unit, Cassandra Thomson, Rauvin Johl, Peter Walkingshaw, Jak Kundl, Assistant Attorneys General, Katherine Dirks, Chief State Trial Counsel, Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General of Arizona, Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General of Colorado, William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawai'i, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of Illinois, Laura Kelly, in her official capacity as Governor of Kansas, Andy Beshear, in his official capacity as Governor of Kentucky, Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General of Maine, Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General of Maryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, Keith Ellison, Attorney General of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General of Nevada, Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez, Attorney General of New Mexico, Letitia James, Attorney General of New York, Jeff Jackson, Attorney General of North Carolina, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General of Oregon, Josh Shapiro, in his official capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark, Attorney General of Vermont, Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General of Wisconsin, on brief for Massachusetts, et al., as amici curiae in support of appellees.
Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Laurel A. Raymond, Brian Hauck, Jenner & Block LLP, Julia Spiegel, Emily Kirby, Allegra Chapman, Carlos Guevara, Inbar Pe'er, and Governors Action Alliance, on brief for bipartisan former governors as amici curiae in support of appellees.
- 2 - November 9, 2025
- 3 - RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Forty-two million people, one
out of every eight Americans, use monthly benefits from the federal
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to buy food for
themselves and their families. On October 24, 2025, a few weeks
into the current government shutdown, the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), which administers SNAP funding on behalf of
the federal government, announced it would not provide any funds
for November SNAP benefits. The plaintiffs in this
case -- nonprofits, local governments, a union, and a food
retailer -- sued to require USDA to provide full November benefits
using SNAP contingency funds Congress had appropriated for this
very purpose, as well as other funds available to USDA. The
district court granted a temporary restraining order requiring the
government to provide either full SNAP payments by November 3 or
partial payments by November 5. The government elected to provide
partial benefits. On Thursday, November 6, the district court
determined that the government had failed to comply with the order
because it did not provide partial payments in a timely manner; it
thus ordered the full payment of SNAP funds for November. The
government now asks us to stay that order in its entirety pending
its appeal. We deny that request.
- 4 - I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
SNAP provides monthly benefits to around one in eight
Americans, including fourteen million children and eight million
elderly individuals. Beneficiaries receive funds through an
electronic debit card that they use to buy food at grocery stores
and other food retailers. Although the federal government pays
for SNAP benefits, state governments administer them, including by
determining who is eligible and the amount of benefits that
eligible individuals and families should receive. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(a). Under federal law, SNAP benefits "shall be furnished
to all eligible households" that apply. Id. § 2014(a).
For low-income Americans, SNAP is a vital bulwark
against hunger and food insecurity. Access to food is, of course,
a basic human need. Further, food security is a critical factor
in health and well-being, the ability to stay in stable housing,
and children's physical and educational development. Without
SNAP, tens of millions would go hungry -- the first among a cascade
of other health and financial harms that would befall those forced
to go without enough food, particularly in the months leading up
to winter.
Congress appropriates federal funding for SNAP on an
annual basis. See id. § 2013(a). The latest annual appropriation
for SNAP expired on September 30, 2025. To take into account
- 5 - emergencies, however, Congress has provided for additional funds
to "be placed in reserve for use only in such amounts and at such
times as may become necessary to carry out program operations"
("contingency funds"). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,
Pub. L. No. 118-42, 138 Stat. 25, 93; see also Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, Pub. L. No. 119-4, §§
1101(a), 1103, 1109(a), 139 Stat. 9, 10. At the beginning of
October 2025, the contingency funds amounted to about $6 billion.
The current lapse in congressional appropriations -- the
government shutdown -- began on October 1, 2025. On October 10,
USDA sent a memorandum to state officials stating that "if the
current lapse in appropriations continues, there will be
insufficient funds to pay full November SNAP benefits for
approximately 42 million individuals across the [n]ation."
Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Agric. on Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefit and Administrative Expense
Update for November 2025 (Oct. 10, 2025) (emphasis added),
https://perma.cc/LDG4-DQMC.
Statutes governing SNAP provide for how the government
should manage shortfalls in funding. The statutes indicate that
USDA "shall limit the value of [SNAP payments] issued to an amount
not in excess of the appropriation" for a given fiscal year. 7
U.S.C. § 2027(b). USDA regulations then set forth procedures for
making those reduced payments. See 7 C.F.R. § 271.7. The
- 6 - regulations require, for example, that once USDA decides to make
reduced payments, it "shall notify State agencies of the date the
reduction is to take effect and by what percentage maximum SNAP
allotments amounts are to be reduced." Id. § 271.7(d)(1)(i).
According to the record here, USDA did not take any steps to
prepare to make partial payments either before or after the
shutdown. Instead, it only acted after it was ordered to do so by
the district court on October 31, during this litigation. The
record reflects that, before early November, USDA did not even
perform the calculation to determine what percentage of November
benefits could be paid with the contingency funds.
On October 24, as the shutdown continued, USDA announced
that it would "suspend[] all November 2025 benefit allotments until
such time as sufficient federal funding is provided, or until [it]
directs State agencies otherwise." Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of
Agric., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefit
and Administrative Expense Update for November 2025 (Oct. 24,
2025). Thus, one week before November SNAP benefits should have
kicked in, the government communicated that it would not provide
any benefits. USDA also announced that it would not use the $6
billion in contingency funds that Congress had previously
appropriated to make up for a shortfall. See Memorandum from U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Impact of the Government Lapse on November
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Household
- 7 - Benefits (Oct. 24, 2025), https://perma.cc/L343-L7YA. As USDA
explained its view at the time, those contingency funds were
available only to supplement benefits for which an appropriation
existed, so the funds could not be used once an appropriation
lapsed.1 On October 27, USDA posted to its website a banner stating
that "there will be no [SNAP] benefits issued November 01" because
"the well has run dry" in light of the shutdown. Food & Nutrition
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric. (Oct. 27, 2025),
https://perma.cc/BL88-8QU6.
B. Procedural History
The plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations, local
governments, a union, and a food retailer that represent and serve
people who rely on SNAP benefits. On October 30, they filed a
lawsuit alleging that USDA and other government entities and
officials ("the government") had violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) through their October 24 directive suspending
November SNAP benefits. They claimed that suspending benefits was
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, and that the
1 The district court noted that in the past, including in 2019 during President Trump's previous term in office, the government had acknowledged that it could use these contingency funds to cover SNAP benefits in the event of a government shutdown.
- 8 - government had "unlawfully withheld" SNAP payments.2 See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1), (2)(A).
On the same day the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, they
moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Specifically, they
asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin USDA's October 10
and 24 directives. They also asked the district court to require
the government to "release the withheld funding for SNAP benefits
insofar as funds are available under the contingency funds . . .
[or] under 7 U.S.C. § 2257." Section 2257 is a statute providing
that seven percent of the annual appropriations "for the
miscellaneous expenses of the work of any bureau, division, or
office of [USDA] shall be available interchangeably for
expenditures on the objects included within the general expenses
of such bureau, division, or office." 7 U.S.C. § 2257 (emphasis
added). It further states that USDA may not add more than that
amount (seven percent) "to any one item of appropriation except in
cases of extraordinary emergency." Id. (emphasis added).
At a hearing on October 31, the district court granted
plaintiffs' motion for a TRO. In a November 1 written order, it
ordered the government to use the contingency funds to supplement
SNAP benefits. The court also acknowledged that those contingency
2The plaintiffs also brought claims arising from the government's handling of work requirements related to the SNAP program. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal, so we do not discuss them further.
- 9 - funds would be insufficient to fully cover SNAP benefit payments
for November.
In light of the shortfall in funds, the district court
presented the government with two options to comply with its TRO.
First, the government could, "within its discretion, find the
additional funds necessary (beyond the contingency funds) to fully
fund the November SNAP payments." (Emphasis added.) The court
explained that the government could do so by using its § 2257
authority to transfer money from a fund established by section 32
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C. § 612c
("Section 32 fund"). The government conceded during the October 31
TRO hearing that it had the authority to fund November SNAP
payments in this way. The court further ordered that, should the
government select this option, it must make the SNAP payments by
Monday, November 3.
Second, and alternatively, the district court permitted
the government to make "partial payments" of November SNAP
benefits, including by using the contingency funds (but not the
Section 32 fund). The court specified that in doing so, however,
the government "must expeditiously resolve the administrative and
clerical burdens [associated with the partial payments that] it
described in its" prior filings. The court explained that this
option would require the government to "come up with a plan" to
distribute the partial payments "to all entitled beneficiaries."
- 10 - And "under no circumstances," the TRO stated, "shall the partial
payments be made later than Wednesday, November 5, 2025." Finally,
the court specified that if the government selected this second
option and chose, in its discretion, "not [to] use other funds in
addition to the contingency funds to make a full payment," any
decision to use such discretion "cannot be arbitrary or
capricious."
At no point did the government challenge the October 31
TRO after the district court issued it or request that the court
modify it in any way. Instead, on Monday, November 3, the
government submitted a report to the district court that it had
chosen the second option and had "worked diligently to comply with
the Court's order." It stated that by the end of the day on
November 3, the government would have "made the necessary funds
available" and "generat[ed] the table required for [s]tates to
calculate the [partial] benefits available for each eligible
household," given that full payments would not be forthcoming. An
accompanying declaration by a USDA official explained, however,
that even once the funds were made available and the table
circulated, at least some states would have to implement technical
changes to their SNAP systems that "w[ould] take anywhere from a
few weeks to up to several months."
The following day, November 4, the plaintiffs asked the
district court to enforce the October 31 TRO by requiring the
- 11 - government to provide full SNAP benefits in November. They argued
that, given the government's representation that it had elected to
make partial payments despite acknowledging that those partial
payments were unlikely to reach many SNAP recipients during
November, it had not complied with the court's original TRO. The
plaintiffs also asked, "in the alternative," for the district court
to "grant additional preliminary relief on the ground that the
decision to deny full benefits is arbitrary and capricious."
Following a November 6 hearing, the district court
granted both parts of the plaintiffs' November 4 motion -- that
is, it decided to enforce its October 31 TRO and to enter a new
TRO. It ruled first that the government had failed to comply with
the October 31 TRO, both by not resolving the administrative
burdens of making partial payments and by failing to ensure that
partial payments were actually disbursed to needy individuals by
November 5. The court explained that despite the government's
admission that partial payments would mean no SNAP payments in
November for many individuals, the government chose that option
anyway. Given the foreseeability of the problems that the
government's chosen path would entail, the court concluded that
the government's noncompliance with the October 31 TRO was
inexcusable. In order to effectuate its October 31 TRO, the court
thus required the government to make full November SNAP payments
by November 7.
- 12 - As to the plaintiffs' alternative request for a new TRO,
the district court agreed that the government's decision not to
make full SNAP payments was likely arbitrary and capricious. It
concluded that the plaintiffs' APA claim was likely to succeed on
four grounds: the government's failure to account for the
practical consequences of trying to make partial payments, the
government's legal misunderstanding of its § 2257 authority, the
government's implausible reasoning for refusing to access the
Section 32 fund, and the pretextual nature of that reasoning in
light of the government's shifting positions. Because of the
plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, along with the
weight of the equities in their favor, the court issued a second
TRO. That new TRO required the government to make full SNAP
payments by November 7, "by utilizing available Section 32 funds
in combination with the contingency funds."
On November 6, the government filed a notice of appeal
of the district court's orders. On November 7, it moved this court
for a stay pending appeal and an immediate administrative stay.
In the early evening of November 7, we denied the request
for an administrative stay and noted that the government's request
for a stay pending appeal remained pending. Shortly before our
order issued, the government filed an emergency motion in the U.S.
Supreme Court, also requesting a stay pending appeal and an
administrative stay. Justice Jackson granted an administrative
- 13 - stay pending our disposition of the government's motion for a stay.
That administrative stay is set to expire forty-eight hours after
we issue our decision on the government's stay request.
We conclude that the government has not met its burden
under the applicable stay factors and thus deny its request to
stay the district court's order granting the motion to enforce.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Before turning to the merits of the government's stay
motion, we address whether we have jurisdiction to consider it.
Generally, a TRO is not immediately reviewable on appeal. See 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But we do have statutory jurisdiction to
review a TRO that has the "'practical effect' of granting or
denying an injunction." Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 594 (2018)
(quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981)).
The government argues, and the plaintiffs do not
dispute, that the November 6 orders amount to a preliminary
injunction. We agree. Regardless of how we resolve this appeal,
the consequences are substantial and immediate. If we grant the
stay, millions of Americans will not receive their SNAP benefits.
If we deny the stay, the district court's orders require the
transfer and disbursement of billions of dollars. Further, the
district court entered the orders after adversarial briefing and
a hearing. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87 (1974). Thus,
- 14 - the "practical effect" of the orders is a preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) to consider
this motion.
B. The Government's Motion
"A stay pending appeal is an 'intrusion into the ordinary
processes of administration and judicial review,'" so this
"'extraordinary' relief" is never "granted as 'a matter of right.'"
Rhode Island v. Trump, 155 F.4th 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2025) (first
quoting New York v. Trump, 133 F.4th 51, 65 (1st Cir. 2025); and
then quoting Somerville Pub. Schs. v. McMahon, 139 F.4th 63, 68
(1st Cir. 2025)). "As the party seeking a stay pending appeal,
the [government] bears the burden of justifying the extraordinary
relief it requests." Am. Pub. Health Ass'n v. Nat'l Insts. of
Health, 145 F.4th 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2025) (citing Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009)).
To meet its burden for a stay, the government must
satisfy four well-established requirements. It must make: "(1) a
strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) a
showing that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) a
showing that the issuance of the stay will [not] substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) a
showing that the public interest lies with [it], not the
plaintiffs." Id. (first two alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Does 1-3 v. Mills, 39 F.4th 20,
- 15 - 24 (1st Cir. 2022)). When we consider a stay motion, "[w]e rely
on the parties to frame the issues for decision." Rhode Island,
155 F.4th at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New
York, 133 F.4th at 66).
The government has asked us to stay two orders entered
by the district court on November 6: the enforcement order and the
second TRO.3 Both of these orders granted the same relief -- full
payment of November SNAP benefits, including through the use of
the Section 32 fund, by November 7.
In its stay papers, the government largely ignores the
enforcement order. Instead, it focuses on why it is likely to
succeed in showing that the district court lacked authority under
the APA to require it to expend funds to fully cover November SNAP
benefits. It claims that there are no legal standards against
which the district court could review its decision under § 2257
not to draw on Section 32 funds and that Congress left that
discretionary decision entirely up to the agency. In so
contending, the government makes a serious argument that, under
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993), the district court could
not review that purely discretionary decision to decline to
transfer money in the Section 32 fund to cover SNAP.
3The government also asks us to stay the October 31 order "[t]o the extent [that it] require[s] USDA to expend funds beyond the SNAP contingency fund."
- 16 - But the district court did not order the government to
use the Section 32 fund until November 6. It did so after it
concluded that the government had failed to comply with its
October 31 TRO. As a remedy for that noncompliance, the court
ordered the government to make the full payment of November SNAP
benefits by November 7. Thus, even if we were to stay the second
TRO, the government could not obtain the relief that it seeks
unless it also meets its burden under the stay factors as to the
enforcement order.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the
government has failed to meet the stay factors as to the
enforcement order, and we deny a stay of that order.
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
"The most important" of the stay factors is the
"likelihood of success on the merits." Akebia Therapeutics, Inc.
v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2020). If the government fails
to make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the
merits, "the remaining elements are of little consequence." Id.
We review an order to enforce a judgment for abuse of
discretion, and we see no reason not to apply the same standard to
the analogous order here. See Harvey v. Johanns, 494 F.3d 237,
240 (1st Cir. 2007). Nor does the government argue for a different
standard in its stay papers. We review the district court's
underlying findings of fact in support of its enforcement order
- 17 - for clear error. See, e.g., Becky's Broncos, LLC v. Town of
Nantucket, 138 F.4th 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2025). In light of the
record and the arguments before us, we conclude that the government
has not met its burden to show that the district court abused its
discretion in issuing the enforcement order.
To begin, we emphasize what the parties do not dispute.
First, the government agrees that it can use the contingency funds
to provide partial November SNAP benefits (despite its initial
position that those funds were inaccessible). Indeed, in its stay
papers to us, the government requests a stay only "[t]o the extent
[that the district court's orders] require USDA to expend funds
beyond the SNAP contingency fund." (Emphasis added.) Second, the
government agrees that it has the authority, under governing
statutes including § 2257, to transfer money from the Section 32
fund and use it to pay November SNAP benefits in full. In fact,
when the district court posed this question directly to the
government at the October 31 hearing by asking, "You would agree
under [a] statutory reading that the agency could use Section 32
to pay benefits?", the government responded, "Yes." The Section
32 fund contains more than $23 billion. Thus, there is no dispute
that the government could -- as both a legal and practical
matter -- pay November SNAP benefits in full by transferring about
$4 billion from that fund. There is also no dispute that if the
government were to do so, it would avoid the considerable and
- 18 - time-consuming technical difficulties that come with making
partial payments.
The parties' disagreement centers on the government's
decision not to make the transfer from the Section 32 fund. The
government argues that the decision is committed to agency
discretion by law and that, in any event, the district court erred
in concluding that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. See
5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(2), 706(2)(A).
But neither of those arguments by the government address
the November 6 enforcement order, which directed the government to
fully fund November SNAP benefits because of the government's
failure to comply with the October 31 TRO. In its stay papers,
the government devotes, at most, three sentences to addressing
that order.
Specifically, as to the enforcement order, the
government states:
USDA complied with the district court's original injunction by depleting the multi-year contingency fund to make a partial payment of November SNAP benefits but declined to transfer billions of dollars from other food-security programs, like the Child Nutrition Programs. That choice is not reviewable under the APA. Even assuming that USDA has some discretionary authority to transfer funds to support SNAP benefits in the absence of an appropriation for SNAP, the determination of whether to use that authority to deplete funds from one congressionally mandated program to pay for another program with an insufficient appropriation falls
- 19 - squarely within the APA exception for decisions committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
This limited argument is not persuasive, as the district
court's enforcement order was not based on an analysis of the APA.
To the contrary, the court made clear that the enforcement order
was based on the government's noncompliance with its October 31
TRO. That TRO, it recounted, presented the government with two
options: either "use Section 32 funds, contingency funds, or both
to make a full payment of SNAP benefits," or "use contingency funds
to make a partial payment of SNAP benefits." If the government
chose the latter option, the district court explained, it was
required to "expeditiously resolve the administrative and clerical
burdens" and "under no circumstances shall the partial payments be
made later than" November 5. The district court granted the motion
to enforce because it determined that the government "did neither."
Of course, the government argued to the district court
that it did comply with the October 31 TRO because it exhausted
the contingency funds to issue partial payments. But the district
court disagreed. And the government's bare assertion in its stay
motion, which we quote above, falls far short of a strong showing
that it is likely to succeed in demonstrating that the district
court erred in finding otherwise.
As the district court properly considered in issuing the
enforcement order, USDA knew at the very latest by
- 20 - October 10 -- the day it sent its first memorandum to the
states -- that normal appropriations would be unavailable to cover
November benefits. It also knew full well that making partial
payments would be technically difficult, as it had never been done
before. But it proceeded to do nothing to attempt to solve that
problem over the following three weeks. It made no calculations,
prepared no tables, and took no other logistical steps to prepare
for a shortfall.
Instead, in an unexplained reversal from its 2019
position, the government announced that it would make no November
SNAP payments at all because it lacked the authority to use the
contingency funds. Once this litigation began, the government
then changed its position again -- it agreed that it could access
the backup funding sources. But it was, in the government's
telling, essentially too late at that point. Making partial
payments that would actually reach individuals in any reasonable
time period was too difficult, and the government decided that
accessing the Section 32 fund to make full payments was imprudent.
Yet, even after the October 31 TRO issued, and knowing all this,
the government chose the partial funding of November SNAP benefits
that the order permitted only if those partial benefits would be
available expeditiously and by a certain date.
The district court concluded that the government's
actions "undermined both the intent and the effectiveness" of its
- 21 - October 31 TRO. As it explained, the government "knew that, at
the time [it] chose [to issue partial payments], [it] would be
prolonging implementation and frustrating the very purpose of the
TRO." The stay motion at no point addresses this basis for the
district court's finding that the government did not comply with
the October 31 TRO.
The government does assert at one point that "[t]he
district court also erred by concluding it was unreasonable for
USDA to 'choose to go down this path [of a partial payment] in
light of the difficulties and delays attendant to making a partial
payment.'" And, in support of that argument, the government points
out that "in the separate case in Massachusetts, the [s]tates have
admitted that some of them are technologically prepared to
implement partial benefits immediately." It then contends that
"[a]ny delays on the part of the [s]tates, who are not party to
this suit, [and] that are not so prepared are beyond the control
of USDA."
But even if we treat the government's argument on this
point as disputing the finding that it did not comply with the
October 31 TRO, we do not see how the government has made a strong
showing that it is likely to succeed in challenging that finding.
The district court held that the government undermined its
October 31 order by proceeding down the partial funding path while
knowing that doing so would not result in satisfying the conditions
- 22 - established in that order. The government simply does not address
that basis for the district court's finding of noncompliance.
"[F]ederal courts are not reduced to issuing
injunctions . . . and hoping for compliance. Once issued, an
injunction may be enforced." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690
(1978), abrogation on other grounds recognized by, Dep't of Agric.
Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 56 (2024).
"[T]he question whether a party adequately has complied with a
court order is a matter peculiarly within the ken of the judge who
issued the order." Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir.
1999). And a court has "great discretion when deciding how to
enforce violations of its own orders." Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v.
Arrow Commc'n Lab'ys, Inc., 305 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
see also Kemp v. Peterson, 940 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1991)
("[T]he general rule [is] that a court is authorized to issue all
orders necessary to enforce orders it has previously issued in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.").
Here, the district court fashioned a remedy to ensure
that its October 31 TRO was followed, after considering the
government's noncompliance and concluding that the obstacles it
claimed existed were in fact "the foreseeable result of [the
government's] own choices." That remedy -- requiring the
government to "make full SNAP payments . . . by utilizing
available Section 32 funds in combination with the contingency
- 23 - funds" -- directly relates to the court's October 31 TRO. And the
government does not argue in its stay motion that the enforcement
order was an improper remedy for its noncompliance with the
October 31 TRO to the extent that it failed to comply with that
order.
In sum, the government fails to meaningfully challenge
the district court's determination that it failed to comply with
the October 31 TRO. Nor does the government advance any argument
that the district court lacked authority to order the full funding
of November SNAP benefits as a means of addressing any such
noncompliance. The government has thus failed to make a "strong
showing" that it is likely to succeed on the merits -- that is, to
show that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
motion to enforce.
To be sure, the government does argue that the district
court lacked authority to issue the October 31 TRO to the extent
that order requires the government to fully fund the November SNAP
benefits. It contends that "Congress clearly contemplated that
USDA would reduce allotments when faced with a shortfall in annual
appropriations." To support this point, it emphasizes that the
governing statute instructs that USDA "shall" make partial
payments. Nevertheless, the government does not contest that it
did not even begin to follow the regulatory process for making
partial payments until the district court ordered it to do so.
- 24 - That is apparently why the government had to correct its own
mathematical calculations mid-stream, by informing the states on
November 4 that contingency funds could cover 65 percent of
November payments, as opposed to 50 percent of such payments, as
the government had indicated on the previous day.
In any event, the district court has now found that the
government failed to comply with that October 31 TRO, from which
no stay was sought and no appeal was taken that would have
prevented the order from taking effect during the period of alleged
noncompliance. Thus, for present purposes, the question that the
government's motion to stay the enforcement order presents is
this: Has the government made a strong showing that it is likely
to succeed in establishing either (a) that the district court erred
in finding noncompliance with the October 31 TRO or (b) that,
insofar as it did not err in that regard, it could not order full
funding in consequence of that noncompliance?
As we have explained, the answer is no. In the single
paragraph it devotes in its stay motion to addressing the
enforcement order, the government does not make a strong showing
of likely success in either respect. And in the only other passage
of the stay motion that could be read to address the finding of
noncompliance, the government fails to grapple with the actual
basis for that finding.
- 25 - 2. The Remaining Stay Factors
Having determined that the government has failed to make
a strong showing of success on the merits, we turn to the remaining
three stay factors. The government's arguments as to these factors
fail to establish it is entitled to the "'extraordinary' relief"
it seeks. Rhode Island, 155 F.4th at 41 (quoting Somerville Pub.
Schs., 139 F.4th at 68).
We begin by considering the risk of irreparable harm to
the government in the absence of a stay. See id. at 47. The
government makes one argument: Dipping into the Section 32 fund,
it contends, will disrupt other federal nutrition benefits -- the
Child Nutrition Programs (CNP) -- that draw primarily from that
fund. According to the government, if $4 billion is drawn from
the Section 32 fund and Congress does not make any supplemental
appropriations for the fund or the CNP in Fiscal Year 2026, those
programs will run out of money sometime next calendar year.4 The
loss of federal funds can be irreparable harm.5 See Dep't of Educ.
v. California, 604 U.S. 650, 651-52 (2025) (per curiam). As the
4 The district court credited the plaintiffs' assertion that, if $4 billion were transferred to SNAP, the CNP would still be fully funded at least through May 2026 because CNP benefits amount to about $3 billion per month. 5 That said, we do not credit the government's argument that "[t]his concern will be paramount particularly if the district court were to conclude that USDA should be required to tap these funds again in December." The orders before us include no such requirement.
- 26 - plaintiffs point out, however, the government bears the burden of
demonstrating that it "will be irreparably injured absent a stay,"
Rhode Island, 155 F.4th at 41 (emphasis added) (quoting Nken, 556
U.S. at 434), and we cannot see how these speculative predictions
amount to making that showing, see New York, 133 F.4th at 72.
The third and fourth stay factors, which the government
does not address in any meaningful way, require us to consider any
substantial injuries to other parties from a stay and where the
public interest lies. The harm from a stay would be immense. The
government, understandably, makes no attempt to argue otherwise.
As we have already noted, tens of millions of Americans rely on
monthly SNAP benefits to pay for food. In support of their motion
for a TRO, the plaintiffs provided overwhelming evidence of the
harms that even a short suspension of benefits would cause,
including numerous declarations from SNAP beneficiaries and those
who serve them. Those declarations describe a pregnant mother in
Georgia forced to skip meals to feed her son; a working grandfather
in Massachusetts who would eat twice instead of three times a day
to feed his family; a mother in North Carolina who worries about
how feeding her three children less will affect their health; and
a nonprofit leader in Rhode Island whose clients will be forced to
choose whether to "heat or eat" as the holidays approach and winter
bears down on New England. These immediate, predictable, and
unchallenged harms facing forty-two million Americans who rely on
- 27 - SNAP benefits -- including fourteen million children -- weigh
heavily against a stay.
In reviewing the district court's balancing of the
equities, we also cannot ignore the particular events preceding
this litigation. As the district court found, "this is a problem
that could have been avoided." The record here shows that the
government sat on its hands for nearly a month, unprepared to make
partial payments, while people who rely on SNAP received no
benefits a week into November and counting. In light of these
unique facts, we cannot conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in requiring full payment of November SNAP benefits
to effectuate the October 31 TRO after the government had failed
to comply with it. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944) (explaining that courts sitting in equity "mould each decree
to the necessities of the particular case").
Taking the four stay factors together, the government
has failed to show it is entitled to the extraordinary relief of
a stay. It has not made a strong showing that it is likely to
succeed on the merits. Nor does it refute the extensive record
evidence of the enormous injury to individuals around the country
that a stay would cause. We do not take lightly the government's
concern that money used to fund November SNAP payments will be
unavailable for other important nutrition assistance programs.
But we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
- 28 - discretion in determining that the overwhelming evidence of
widespread harm that a stay would cause right now, by leaving tens
of millions of Americans without food as winter approaches,
outweighed the potential monetary harm to the government and CNP,
months into the future. Thus, we reject the government's stay
request as to the order granting the motion to enforce based on
noncompliance with the October 31 TRO.
C. Second TRO
That leaves the second TRO, issued on November 6. That
order granted the same relief as the enforcement order, and
plaintiffs requested the second TRO only in the alternative, if
the district court denied the motion to enforce. Thus, we stay
the second TRO so long as the enforcement order remains in full
force and effect.
III. Conclusion
For all these reasons, the government's motion for a
stay pending appeal is denied in part.6
6A number of local governments, states, and former governors have moved for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the plaintiffs-appellees. We grant the motions, and the proposed briefs are accepted as filed. We consider these briefs only insofar as they concern legal issues and positions raised by the parties. See Ryan v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 974 F.3d 9, 33 n.10 (1st Cir. 2020).
- 29 -