Reynoso, Juan Jose

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

WR-66,260-01 EX PARTE JUAN JOSE REYNOSO ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

IN CAUSE NO. 941651-A FROM THE

263^RD DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY

Per Curiam.

ORDER

On June 27, 2007, we entered an order dismissing the applicant's initial application for writ of habeas corpus as untimely under Article 11.071, Section 4 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ex parte Reynoso, 228 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We do not entertain rehearings from the denial of relief in writ applications, under Rule 79.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the applicant has filed, not a motion for rehearing, but a suggestion that we reconsider our initial disposition on our own initiative, which we are authorized under the rule to do.

In dismissing the applicant's initial writ application as untimely, our calculation was based upon a construction of Article 11.071, Section 4(b), which provides that a 90-day extension may be granted, to begin running "on the filing date applicable to the defendant under Subsection (a)." Even though the "filing date applicable to the defendant under Subsection (a)" fell on a Saturday, we held that the 90-day extension that the applicant obtained should begin to run on that date, according to the plain language of Subsection (a).

In his motion suggesting that we reconsider the case on our own initiative, the applicant argues that when one considers the application of Rule 4.1(a), his initial application was timely filed. This question was not briefed by the parties prior to our dismissal of the initial writ application.

We therefore grant rehearing on our own initiative of our order dismissing the applicant's initial writ application, limited to the issue of how Rule 4.1(a) should apply in this situation, and whether the applicant's initial writ application was timely filed in view of that rule. The parties should file their respective briefs with respect to this issue with the clerk of this Court no later than thirty days after the date of the entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 12^th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2007.

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