Reynolds v. Washington Real Estate Co.

49 A. 707, 23 R.I. 197, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 116
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedJuly 15, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 49 A. 707 (Reynolds v. Washington Real Estate Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. Washington Real Estate Co., 49 A. 707, 23 R.I. 197, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 116 (R.I. 1901).

Opinion

Rogers, J.

This is a bill in equity brought by a lessee against his lessor, to enjoin the lessor from carrying out certain threats made by it as to shutting off power and steam from the premises hired by the lessee, the putting of which into execution would compel the lessee to close his establishment and deprive him of his business.

The lease under which the controversy arose was in writing, and leased to the complainant for five years from April 1, 1899, (in the words of the lease) the following described premises, viz.:

(1) “Store corner of Mason and West Exchange streets, also room in rear, and thirty foot front by seventy feet deep on second floor, together with power not exceeding six horse for the conduct of the lessee’s business — that of a steam laundry, also steam for washing-machines and dry-room, also all water for use in the business.
“ In case of any interruption or stoppage of power, the lessors agree to furnish steam sufficient, to run a small engine —to be furnished by the lessee — in lieu of the six horse above mentioned.
“All power furnished by the lessors in excess of six horse *199 power will be charged at the rate of seventy-five dollars per horse power, and the lessee hereby agrees to pay for any excess of said stipulated six horse power at the rate of seventy-five dollars per horse power at the time of payments provided for the rent agreed upon.”

The rent was $700 per annum in payments of .fifty-eight 33/100 dollars each on the first day of. each month successively, to the end of the term; and in case of failure of the lessee to pay any rent within ten days subsequent to the time as above specified, or in case of failure to conform to all the conditions of said lease, the lessor was at liberty to declare it at an end, and thereupon to take immediate possession of the premises, in which case the said lessee should be considered as a tenant holding over his term.

There were also various covenants contained in the lease which have no bearing on the point in controversy.

The bill, besides setting out the provisions of the lease, stated that the complainant had, upon the making, thereof, removed his business into said leased premises, that he had on his part complied with all the provisions of said lease, that he had never used power in excess of six horse power, notwithstanding which the respondent on November 15, 1900, wrote to the complainant as follows, viz.: “We will charge you for 14 (fourteen) horse power at $50 a horse, making $58.33 additional on your rent per month from November 1, 1900 that on January 15, 1901, the respondent threatened that if the complainant did not pay the. above amounts, he, the respondent, would, on January 21, 1901, turn off the power and steam the complainant was using which the complainant averred would compel him to close his establishment and which deprive him of his means of earning a livelihood; and that the complainant believed the respondent would carry its threat into execution.

The bill prayed for an injunction against the respondent from prosecuting its threat to discontinue the supply of power and steam which it covenanted to furnish the complainant, and for general relief.

The respondent’s answer admits the making of the lease *200 but denies the complainant’s allegation that in said lease the respondent agreed to furnish power with which to conduct the complainant’s business, not exceeding six horse power, together with steam for washing-machines and dry-room, but,' on the contrary, avers that under paid lease the respondent is obliged to furnish power, not exceeding six horse power, for the conduct of the lessee’s business, and that this provision is not limited to motive power for the running of the complainant’s machinery but that it embraces generallyall power furnished by the respondent for the conduct of the complainant’s business whether said power is transmitted by means of a shaft connected with the respondent’s engine, or by means of steam conducted through pipes. The respondent further averred that the steam furnished by it for the washing-machines and dry-room, is live steam with a pressure of ninety pounds to the square inch and is power for the conduct of the Complainant’s business within the meaning of said lease, for which under the provisions of said lease, the complainant agreed to pay for all power in excess of six horse power at the rate of $75 per horse power per annum at the-time of the payments provided for the rent agreed upon in said lease. The respondent denied that the complainant had never used power in excess of six horse power, but averred that the complainant had used power largely in excess of- six horse power, viz.: to the amount of seven horse power for the running of complainant’s machinery, and to the amount of thirteen and seven-tenths horse power, and at times in excess thereof, for. the washing-machines and dry-room by means of live steam furnished through pipes with a pressure of ninety pounds to the square inch. The respondent admitted that it threatened that if the complainant did not pay the rent reserved under said lease and did not pay for the power used by him in excess of six horse power at the rate of $50 per horse power (the reduction to $50 per horse power having been made, it claimed, by reason of the large excess used by said complainant), it would turn off the power and steam the complainant was using. Finally, the respondent denied that the complainant had at all times complied with the terms of the lease, but averred *201 that the complainant had not paid nor tendered payment of rent for the months of November and December, 1900, or any part thereof, under said lease, nor for the excess of said six horse power furnished during said period as provided for in and by said lease. Issue having been joined the suit comes before us now for disposition on the pleadings and proofs.

Unless the complainant has himself complied with the provisions of the lease he is in no position to demand compliance with it by the respondent, and the first question logically arising for consideration is, has the complainant paid or tendered the rent due for November and December, 1900 ? The complainant and one Dodd both swear most clearly and unequivocally, that early in December, 1900, and again early in January, 1901, and both times within the time limited in which rent was to be paid, they called on the respondent and saw its secretary, Mr. Isaac Hahn; that the respective calls were made for the purpose, and the sole purpose, of paying, or tendering payment of the monthly rent; that Dodd accompanied the complainant, at the latter’s request, for the express purpose of acting as a witness to the payment, or tender, and that such tender was made, the denominations of the currency in which it was made, being given. Said Hahn denies that any tender was made on either occasion, though he admits that the complainant and Dodd called and talked about rent, and about power and steam. Two or three witnesses, casually present, swore they did not see any tender made, but as the matter did not concern them at all, and they had no particular interest in, or occasion to observe, what was going on, their testimony is entitled to but little weight.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 A. 707, 23 R.I. 197, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynolds-v-washington-real-estate-co-ri-1901.