Reynolds v. United States ex rel. Dean

68 F.2d 346, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4867
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJanuary 6, 1934
DocketNo. 4991
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 68 F.2d 346 (Reynolds v. United States ex rel. Dean) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. United States ex rel. Dean, 68 F.2d 346, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4867 (7th Cir. 1934).

Opinion

PAGE, Circuit Judge.

The alien, Mohamed Mahfood, was charged under section 155, Tit. 8, TTSCA, which provides that “any alien who shall be found an inmate of or connected with the management of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution after such alien shall have entered the United States, or who shall receive, share in, or derive benefit from any part of the earnings of any prostitute; any alien who manages or is employed by, in, or in connection with any house of prostitution or music or dance hall or other place of amusement or resort habitually frequented by prostitutes, or where prostitutes gather, or who in any way assists any prostitute or protects or promises to protect from arrest any prostitute; * .* *” shall be deported, etc.

While alien was being held under the warrant of deportation, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. That eourt discharged alien on the ground that he had not had a fair hearing, because the inspector acted as investigator, prosecutor, witness, and judge, a practice that seems to be sanctioned by the law and the regulations of the Department of Labor.

All the formal requirements of the law were complied with. Upon the hearing before the inspector, alien was represented by two counsel, and witnesses were examined and cross-examined by them. At many places in the record of the hearing appear the statement “Attorneys object,” but nowhere is there stated any specific grounds for objection. The same counsel appearing here point out acts by the investigator that are claimed to be unfair and prejudicial to alien.

It is said that the inspector inserted a note to the effect that the police records show that Lizzie Dean, whose place it is charged was a house of prostitution with which alien had connection in violation of section 155, supra, had been convicted on the charge of keeping a house of prostitution, that no support is found for that charge in the record, but that, on the contrary, Lizzie Dean, who gave the only testimony on t|hat point, made denial thereof. Her testimony is at places inconsistent and evasive, but the record shows the following testimony by her: “It is not true that I have been arrested for keeping a house of ill-fame at least four times. The records of the Court do not show three times. Twice they got me only twice I was pinched.” In the face of this it cannot be said that 1ho statement charged to the investigator was to any substantial degree prejudicial or unfair to alien. There was much evidence in the record that Lizzie Dean’s place was a house of prostitution, and that alien was connected therewith.

The following instances are pointed out as evidence of unfair conduct on the part of the inspector: W. E. Bracken, a deputy sheriff, testified for alien. On cross-examination by the inspector, ho was told: “For your information I am going fo testify in a few minutes that I have seen such a rush of business there that the girls have had to wait their turn to get a room. * * * Explain that fact.” The answer: “Well, the only way I can explain it is tjhat they haven’t been raided. That’s all. The fact of the matter is the houses of prostitution in my end of the county haven’t much trouble.”

The suggestion did not seem to have intimidated this officer of the law, but brought out the fact from him that houses of prostitution in his end of the county did not have much trouble with officers of the law or any one else. The same character of observation was later made to the same witness, but did not bring out any testimony unfavorable to alien.

One Snook was called as a character witness. He testified that if the Dean place had been a house of prostitution he would have known it. He then disclosed that he lived in a house on the Dunes Highway, but did not [348]*348remember that it was formerly occupied by one George Gage. Probably to test his recollection, the inspector said: “For your information, that house * * * owned by yourself, is the place which operated as a house of prostitution and which I, myself, assisted the sheriff who apprehended George Gage and some girls there, and they plead guilty to the charge of prostitution. Do you remember the circumstances?” Witness’ answer was: “I believe I remember something of that kind, yes.” It does not seem that that could have been injurious to alien.

Some similar • observations were made to alien’s witness Sue Carter. It is not conceivable that alien was prejudiced thereby. The testimony of that witness is so contradictory that it is difficult to get a clear idea of what she did mean. The evidence indicates that she was an inmate of a house of prostitution and was there plying her trade.

It is complained that Inspector Goodall told one of the witnesses that she need not testify if she did not want to. He did say that, and at the same time said that applied also to questions by the government. Counsel for alien told witnesses the same thing. The suggestion was not harmful.

Some other matters are complained of; but it would be a great stretch of the imagination to assume that any harm could or did come therefrom to the alien. The contentions to effect that) the practice, pursuant to the regulations, is unfair, are met by the court in Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 157, 44 S. Ct. 54, 57, 68 L. Ed. 221: “Moreover, a hearing granted does not cease to be fair, merely because rules of evidence and of procedure applicable in judicial proceedings have not been strictly followed by the executive ; or because some evidence has been improperly rejected or received. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 681, 32 S. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606. To render a hearing unfair the defect, or the practice complained of, must have been such as might have led to a denial of justice, or there must have been absent one of the elements deemed essential to due process.”

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Bluebook (online)
68 F.2d 346, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 4867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynolds-v-united-states-ex-rel-dean-ca7-1934.