Reynolds v. CDOC

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 19, 2024
Docket24CA0271
StatusUnpublished

This text of Reynolds v. CDOC (Reynolds v. CDOC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reynolds v. CDOC, (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

24CA0271 Reynolds v CDOC 12-19-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0271 Fremont County District Court No. 24CV1 Honorable Patrick W. Murphy, Judge

Keith Reynolds,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE LUM Freyre and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024

Keith Reynolds, Pro Se

No Appearance for Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections ¶1 Plaintiff, Keith Reynolds, appeals the district court’s ruling

denying his petition for mandamus relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2).

We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 On July 16, 2018, Reynolds was paroled for several sentences

he began serving in 2017 (2017 sentences). On December 8, 2021,

Reynolds’ 2017 sentences were discharged.

¶3 Between December 2020 and December 2022, Reynolds

committed multiple new offenses in four counties. His judgments of

conviction related to those offenses entered between February 6,

2023, and August 11, 2023 (2023 sentences). A seven year

sentence that was entered in Douglas County Case No. 22CR370 is

designated as the maximum and minimum governing sentence with

a sentence effective date (SED) of February 6, 2023. The mittimus

for that offense — which Reynolds committed while he was on

parole for the 2017 sentences — indicates that the sentence should

run “concurrent to any remaining sentences or parole” on the 2017

sentences.

¶4 After a dispute with the Colorado Department of Corrections

(CDOC) regarding the calculation of his parole eligibility date (PED)

1 for his 2023 sentences, Reynolds filed a petition for relief under

C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2). Reynolds asked the district court to order the

CDOC to recalculate his PED based on a SED linked to his 2017

sentences. The district court denied the petition, and Reynolds

appeals.

II. Legal Principles and Standards of Review

A. C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2)

¶5 Relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) is an extraordinary remedy to

compel the performance of a nondiscretionary ministerial duty.

Jefferson Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 2016

COA 10, ¶ 10. “The burden on the plaintiff is heavy. The plaintiff

must show that (1) he has a clear right to the relief he seeks; (2) the

defendant has a clear duty to perform the act requested; and (3) no

other remedy is available.” Owens v. Williams, 2020 COA 177,

¶ 15, overruled on other grounds by Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33;

see also C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2).

B. Continuous Sentence

¶6 Section 17-22.5-101, C.R.S. 2024, provides that “when any

inmate has been committed under several convictions with separate

sentences, the department shall construe all sentences as one

2 continuous sentence.” “This ‘one continuous sentence’ rule

requires the [CDOC], among other things, to combine the inmate’s

sentences into one composite continuous sentence, and then

determine” the SED — the date when that continuous sentence

begins to run. Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70, ¶ 15 (quoting § 17-

22.5-101). When an offender is reincarcerated for a parole violation

and, while reincarcerated, is convicted of and sentenced for

additional offenses for conduct that occurred while he was paroled,

the continuous sentence begins to run at the beginning of the

mandatory parole period. Id. at ¶ 26.

III. Analysis

¶7 Relying on Diehl, Reynolds contends that the CDOC should

use a SED of either June 19, 2017 (the SED for his underlying 2017

sentences) or July 16, 2018 (the date he was paroled on his 2017

sentences) because he committed the offense underlying his

governing sentence while he was on parole for the 2017 sentences.

We aren’t persuaded.

¶8 The one continuous sentence rule applies only when the

defendant “has been committed under several convictions with

separate sentences.” Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting § 17-22.5-101). While

3 Diehl used the start of mandatory parole to calculate the beginning

of the defendant’s one continuous sentence for offenses committed

while paroled, the convictions for those offenses occurred while the

defendant was still serving his prior sentence. Id. at ¶ 3. Therefore,

the defendant was simultaneously “committed under” both his

earlier and later convictions.

¶9 In contrast, Reynolds’ 2017 sentences were discharged in

December 2021. The earliest conviction for his later offenses was

February 6, 2023. Thus, Reynolds was not “committed under” any

of the 2017 convictions at the time he became “committed under”

any of the 2023 convictions. And, therefore, the CDOC was not

required to include any part of the 2017 sentences when calculating

the SED or PED for his 2023 sentences.

¶ 10 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not

err by denying Reynolds’ petition.

IV. Disposition

¶ 11 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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Related

Diehl v. Weiser
2019 CO 70 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2019)
v. Williams
2020 COA 177 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Reynolds v. CDOC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reynolds-v-cdoc-coloctapp-2024.