NUMBER 13-23-00097-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
REYNALDO RIOS JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 117TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
A jury convicted appellant Reynaldo Rios Jr. of first-degree arson of a habitation,
a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02. The jury assessed punishment
for a period of fifty-five years of imprisonment. Appellant argues the State failed to prove
all the elements required to convict him of arson. We affirm. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable
based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The
fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d
321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d
at 240). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the
offense and those elements “as modified by the indictment.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d
394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As applicable here, the State had the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
2 started a fire by igniting a couch, (2) with the intent to destroy or damage a habitation,
and (3) knew that the habitation had located within it, property, namely furniture and
clothes, belonging to another. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(E). Appellant only
challenges the last element.
II. THE EVIDENCE
On August 2, 2019, the Robstown Fire Department responded to a call about a
burning house in Nueces County. When the firefighters arrived on the scene, the house
was in flames. Lupe Villarreal, a firefighter on the scene, testified that the fire must have
started around twenty or thirty minutes prior to his arrival. The house was “completely
destroyed” and “completely burned down” after firefighters spent several hours putting
out the fire. Dana Richardson, a sergeant and investigator with the Nueces County
Sheriff’s Office on the date of the incident, testified that when he inspected the house the
next day, it was “totally destroyed,” and the house next door was uninhabitable due to
smoke, fire damage, and water damage.
Rosa Anna Garcia, appellant’s wife, testified that her house destroyed in the fire
had been in her family for several generations, which her parents gifted to her in 2000.
Garcia stated that she met appellant in 2015, and the couple married in 2017. According
to Garcia, appellant did not purchase things in the house because he spent his money on
beer and child support. Garcia stated that appellant had problems with drinking that got
worse over time, and he was physical with Garcia on one occasion a few days before the
fire. Garcia testified that appellant was upset with her children, he threw her children’s
PlayStation on the floor, and he pushed Garcia to the wall when she questioned him about
3 what he had done. Garcia called the police to remove appellant from her house, and
according to Garcia, the police stated that they could not remove him because, due to
their marriage, the police considered the house as belonging to Garcia and appellant.
Garcia testified that after telling appellant it was her house, he refused to leave; therefore,
Garcia and her children spent the night next door at her parents’ house. Garcia stated
that the house contained all of her and her children’s belongings, including her furniture
and clothes, which were destroyed in the fire.
On the day of the fire, Garcia had the electricity, gas, and water turned off in her
house, which appeared to upset appellant. About thirty-four minutes before the firefighters
arrived at the scene, appellant sent Garcia a text message saying, “[h]opefully going to
burn it all down.” Garcia replied, “[w]hat are you going to burn down?” Appellant said,
“[m]y eyebrows.” Appellant then texted, “[y]our house is on fire.” Garcia soon arrived at
the scene to see her entire home engulfed in flames. Garcia testified that she lost
everything in the fire, including her clothes, her children’s clothes, furniture, and photo
albums; and all she had left were “the clothes on [her] back.” Evidence was also presented
that the family’s dog perished in the fire.
Appellant was arrested and taken to the criminal investigation division for a
custodial interview conducted by Richardson and State Fire Marshall, Greg Houston. 1
Richardson read appellant his Miranda rights and began the interview. Richardson
testified that appellant was not intoxicated and had “use of his mental and physical
capabilities.” During the interview, appellant admitted to starting the fire by lighting a
1 Houston was not available to testify at trial because he had unfortunately passed away.
4 couch on fire with a barbeque lighter. Appellant knew that the house was not insured.
Appellant then made statements referring to burning his property in the house by saying,
“I can burn my own stuff if I want to,” and, “today I just, you know what, I just burned up
all my stuff.” However, appellant also acknowledged that the house belonged to Garcia.
For example, when asked whose house it was, appellant said, “it’s hers,” and when
drawing a diagram of the house, he described one of the rooms as Garcia’s bedroom.
Appellant stated that Garcia and her ex-husband had taken out a mortgage on the house
before he met Garcia. Appellant also made statements regarding his motive when he
said, “well . . . all day today my wife kept picking at me,” and “what set me off, she just
went and turned off everything, no light, no water.”
The jury convicted appellant of arson of a habitation. This appeal followed.
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NUMBER 13-23-00097-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
REYNALDO RIOS JR., Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 117TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
A jury convicted appellant Reynaldo Rios Jr. of first-degree arson of a habitation,
a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02. The jury assessed punishment
for a period of fifty-five years of imprisonment. Appellant argues the State failed to prove
all the elements required to convict him of arson. We affirm. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable
based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The
fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d
321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d
at 240). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the
offense and those elements “as modified by the indictment.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d
394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). As applicable here, the State had the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
2 started a fire by igniting a couch, (2) with the intent to destroy or damage a habitation,
and (3) knew that the habitation had located within it, property, namely furniture and
clothes, belonging to another. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(E). Appellant only
challenges the last element.
II. THE EVIDENCE
On August 2, 2019, the Robstown Fire Department responded to a call about a
burning house in Nueces County. When the firefighters arrived on the scene, the house
was in flames. Lupe Villarreal, a firefighter on the scene, testified that the fire must have
started around twenty or thirty minutes prior to his arrival. The house was “completely
destroyed” and “completely burned down” after firefighters spent several hours putting
out the fire. Dana Richardson, a sergeant and investigator with the Nueces County
Sheriff’s Office on the date of the incident, testified that when he inspected the house the
next day, it was “totally destroyed,” and the house next door was uninhabitable due to
smoke, fire damage, and water damage.
Rosa Anna Garcia, appellant’s wife, testified that her house destroyed in the fire
had been in her family for several generations, which her parents gifted to her in 2000.
Garcia stated that she met appellant in 2015, and the couple married in 2017. According
to Garcia, appellant did not purchase things in the house because he spent his money on
beer and child support. Garcia stated that appellant had problems with drinking that got
worse over time, and he was physical with Garcia on one occasion a few days before the
fire. Garcia testified that appellant was upset with her children, he threw her children’s
PlayStation on the floor, and he pushed Garcia to the wall when she questioned him about
3 what he had done. Garcia called the police to remove appellant from her house, and
according to Garcia, the police stated that they could not remove him because, due to
their marriage, the police considered the house as belonging to Garcia and appellant.
Garcia testified that after telling appellant it was her house, he refused to leave; therefore,
Garcia and her children spent the night next door at her parents’ house. Garcia stated
that the house contained all of her and her children’s belongings, including her furniture
and clothes, which were destroyed in the fire.
On the day of the fire, Garcia had the electricity, gas, and water turned off in her
house, which appeared to upset appellant. About thirty-four minutes before the firefighters
arrived at the scene, appellant sent Garcia a text message saying, “[h]opefully going to
burn it all down.” Garcia replied, “[w]hat are you going to burn down?” Appellant said,
“[m]y eyebrows.” Appellant then texted, “[y]our house is on fire.” Garcia soon arrived at
the scene to see her entire home engulfed in flames. Garcia testified that she lost
everything in the fire, including her clothes, her children’s clothes, furniture, and photo
albums; and all she had left were “the clothes on [her] back.” Evidence was also presented
that the family’s dog perished in the fire.
Appellant was arrested and taken to the criminal investigation division for a
custodial interview conducted by Richardson and State Fire Marshall, Greg Houston. 1
Richardson read appellant his Miranda rights and began the interview. Richardson
testified that appellant was not intoxicated and had “use of his mental and physical
capabilities.” During the interview, appellant admitted to starting the fire by lighting a
1 Houston was not available to testify at trial because he had unfortunately passed away.
4 couch on fire with a barbeque lighter. Appellant knew that the house was not insured.
Appellant then made statements referring to burning his property in the house by saying,
“I can burn my own stuff if I want to,” and, “today I just, you know what, I just burned up
all my stuff.” However, appellant also acknowledged that the house belonged to Garcia.
For example, when asked whose house it was, appellant said, “it’s hers,” and when
drawing a diagram of the house, he described one of the rooms as Garcia’s bedroom.
Appellant stated that Garcia and her ex-husband had taken out a mortgage on the house
before he met Garcia. Appellant also made statements regarding his motive when he
said, “well . . . all day today my wife kept picking at me,” and “what set me off, she just
went and turned off everything, no light, no water.”
The jury convicted appellant of arson of a habitation. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction for arson because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he knew that the habitation contained property belonging to Garcia. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 28.02(a)(2)(E).
The evidence shows that Garcia lived in the house for approximately nineteen
years and that Garcia’s belongings, including furniture and clothing, were located there.
Evidence was presented that appellant moved into Garcia’s home in 2017, and continued
to live there until he started the fire in 2019, and Garcia testified that she paid for
everything in the house and appellant spent his money mainly on beer and child support.
Additionally, appellant acknowledged that the house belonged to Garcia, that she had a
5 bedroom in the house, and that Garcia and her ex-husband had acquired a mortgage on
the house. Appellant also stated that he started the fire in retaliation to Garcia turning off
the utilities in the home.
The jury was free to believe that Garcia’s belongings, including furniture and
clothing, were in the house, and it could have reasonably inferred that appellant—who
lived in the home for approximately two years—knew that Garcia’s property was in the
home when he started the fire. See Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016) (“The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony
of witnesses, and juries may draw multiple reasonable inferences from the facts so long
as each is supported by the evidence presented at trial.”). Accordingly, we conclude that
the jury could have rationally found the essential elements of the offense as set out in the
hypothetically correct charge for arson beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whatley, 445
S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAIME TIJERINA Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 15th day of August, 2024.