IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM ) 2 ) VICTOR M. REYES, DOMESTIC CASE NO.e~:',l DMll4.68-07 ) Ik\ v'j'-" Ie 3 ) Plaintiff, ) f~"'",;-. "
4 ) FINDING'SOFcFACT AND vs. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5 ) AND INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT ) OF DIVORCE 6 DIANA M. REYES, ) ) 7 Defendant. ) ) 8 ) ) 9 --------------------------~) 10 This matter carne before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on October 19 and 24 11 2011 at bench triaL Attorney Leilani V. Lujan represented Defendant, who was present. 12 Attorney Joaquin C. Arriola Jr. represented Plaintiff, who was present. After having heard th 13 Parties' arguments, considering the Parties' pleadings and the record, the Court now issues th 14 following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 15 FINDINGS OF FACT 16 1. Any finding of fact is also a conclusion of law. Any conclusion of law is also a 17 finding of fact. 18 2. This matter arises out of a dissolved marriage between Plaintiff Victor M. Reyes 19 (hereinafter "Plaintiff') and Defendant Diana M. Reyes (hereinafter "Defendant"). 20 3. The Parties were married on November 26, 1993 in Saipan, CNMI. Defendant's 21 Exhibit A. 22 4. The Parties have no children. 23 5. The date of separation was sometime in 2005. Although Plaintiff stopped living with 24 Defendant sometime in 2002, the Parties formally separated with the intent to 25 permanently end the marriage in 2005. Plaintiffs Testimony. Some testimony has 26 been submitted to suggest the date of separation was near the end of 2007 when 27 parties last had intercourse in the Philippines. Plaintiffs Testimony. Yet, the Court 28
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page I of 16- finds that parties intended to pennanently end the marriage in 2005, the exact date of 2 which is not ascertainable. 3 6. The Parties met in 1992 when Plaintiff submitted his taxes to the Department of 4 Revenue and Taxation, where Defendant worked. The Parties lived together at 5 Apugan Villa Estates before being married. Plaintiff acquired Unit A-4 on November 6 5, 1993, but lived at the townhouse for more than a year before purchasing it. To 7 purchase Unit A-4, Plaintiff paid $20,000.00 down of his own personal funds and 8 secured the remaining costs through a mortgage from Bank of Guam. Plaintiff s Exh. 9 7. Although Defendant has remained in Unit A-4 beyond the date of separation, 10 Plaintiff has consistently paid the mortgage payments and common area fees. Many 11 of the monthly payments were made during the time of the marriage in which 12 payments where made with community income. 13 7. Plaintiff and Defendant created HELI-GUAM, INC., a Guam corporation (hereinafter 14 "Heli-Guam") in May 1994. Plaintiff owns 500 shares and Defendant owns 499 with 15 a single share going to William Joseph Cunningham. Both Parties worked for Heli- 16 Guam from 1994-2000. Heli-Guam obtained a loan from GEDA in the amount of 17 $184,400.24 in March of 1998. Defendant's Exhibit C; See Defendant's Testimony 18 Defendant owns an 49.9 (49911000) percent interest in Heli-Guam, its property and 19 liabilities while Plaintiff owns a 50 (50011000) percent share. Plaintiffs Exh. 9. 20 8. The Parties purchased a vacant lot in Talofofo for $45,000.00 which both Parties 21 agreed thereafter to deed to Plaintiffs father. 22 9. During a majority of the marriage, Plaintiff was away on fishing vessels. 23 10. Currently, Plaintiff works at PESKA HELICOPTERS, INC. (hereinafter "Peska") out 24 of Pohnpei, Federated State of Micronesia and he has worked there since 2009. 25 Plaintiffs Testimony. 26 11. Currently, Defendant works for the Department of Revenue and Taxation and has 27 worked there since 2004. Defendant's Testimony. 28
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 2 of 16- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 2 12. Plaintiff and Defendant have been residents of Guam for more than ninety (90) days 3 in satisfaction of 19 GCA § 8318(a). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 7 GCA § 4 3105 and § 4101 and 19 GCA Ch. 8. 5 13. The Divorce is granted to Plaintiff on the basis of irreconcilable differences. Based 6 on the evidence and record, Defendant is also granted Divorce based on willful 7 desertion and willful neglect. Adultery and cruel mistreatment and other grounds for 8 divorce were not present in the record or from the evidence presented by either Party. 9 14. The standard and law governing divorce is discussed in the section below. Separate 10 property means property acquired by either spouse before marriage or after entry of a 11 decree of dissolution of marriage or earnings of a spouse while living separate. 19 12 GCA § 6101. Property is classified as separate or community based upon when it is 13 acquired. Id.; In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal.3d 366, 370 (Sup.Ct.Ca1.l980); 14 Fisher v. Fisher, 383 P.2d 840, 842-43 (Id.Sup.Ct.1963); Hollingsworth v. Hicks, 258 15 P.2d 724, 729-30 (N.M.Sup.Ct.1953); Lawson v. Ridgeway, 233 P.2d 459, 464 16 (Ariz.Sup.Ct.1951); Smith v. Smith, 685 So.2d 649, 651-52 (La.Ct.App.lst Cir.1996); 17 In re Marriage of Harrington, 935 P.2d 1357, 1365 (Wash.App.Div.l 1997); and 18 Scott v. Estate of Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694, 695-96 (Tex.App.EI Paso 1998). Pursuant 19 to the Guam Supreme Court's ruling in Rinehart v. Rinehart, enhancement to separate 20 property or debt will allow the community to seek reimbursement for community 21 funds contributed during the marriage towards that asset. Rinehart v. Rinehart, 2000 22 Guam 14, ~~19-21 (Sup.Ct.Guam 2000). The Supreme Court of Guam has extended 23 the Rinehart ruling to apply to both assets and debt in Navarro v. Navarro, again 24 holding that "absent proof of the enhancement of a spouse's separate property, there 25 should be no reimbursement to the community." Navarro v. Navarro, 2000 Guam 26 31, ~16 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2000). The formula used by the Supreme Court of California 27 grants the non-owning spouse a pro tanto community share in the equity or capital 28 appreciation of the home as enhanced by community payments made to the principal
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 3 of 16- owed on the mortgage, based on the real property's appraised value. In re Marriage 2 ofMoore, 28 Ca1.3d 366,370-71,373-74 (Sup.Ct.Ca1.1980). 3 The formula used to compute the community pro tanto share in the 4 Moore case is called the Lucas/Aufmuth formula and requires the court to first 5 determine the separate property percentage interest by crediting the separate property 6 with the down payment and full amount of the loan or the original value of the 7 contributed separate property, minus the amount by which the community payments 8 reduced the principal balance of the loan. Under Guam law, community property is 9 different than community debt. Compare 19 GCA § 6101 with 19 GCA § 6102. 10 Loans acquired during a marriage constitute community debt. 19 GCA § 6102 states: 11 "(b) Community debt means a debt contracted or incurred by either or both spouses 12 which is not separate debt." The Supreme Court of Guam has determined that it is 13 not the burden of the trial court to find or show valuation, that burden lies with the 14 parties. Navarro v. Navarro, 2000 Guam 31, ,9 (Sup.Ct.Guam 2000). As aptly 15 stated by the Supreme Court of Guam, "[one party]" bore the burden of establishing 16 the value of community property at trial, where he failed to provide or contest 17 valuation, the trial court was well within its discretion to accept the values provided 18 by [the opposing party]." Id. at ,11. As stated by the Moore court, this method of 19 using capital appreciation and equity best credits the amount given from separate 20 property for the original contribution, and best credits the role the original separate 21 asset played in creating the equity in the horne/real property. In re Marriage of 22 Moore, 28 Ca1.3d 366, 374 (Sup.Ct.Ca1.1980). 23 Under 19 GCA §841l(b) and Sinlao v. Sinlao, 2005 Guam 24, ,23 24 (Sup.Ct.Guam 2005), the Court is required to strive to divide the community property 25 equally between the parties whenever possible. In this case, the Court was presented 26 with evidence of the existence of community property and community debt. 27 15. 19 GCA §8411(b) provides: "[i]f the decree be rendered on any other ground than 28 that of adultery or extreme cruelty, the community property shall be equally divided
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 4 of 16 - between the parties. Thus, the finding stated earlier that Plaintiff's complaint for 2 divorce is granted under 19 GCA §8203(g) and not under any other ground for 3 divorce requires that this Court ascertain all community property and divide it equally 4 among the Parties. During the marriage, Parties have acquired community property, 5 including the following vehicles: 6 A. Hyundai Acura, 1990;
7 B. Toyota Hilux, 1995; 8 C. Hyundai Sonata, 1998; 9 D. BMW, 2005; 10 E. Toyota Tocoma, 2007. 11 The vehicles names above are community property as determined by their respective 12 Auto Registration containing joint ownership. Defendant Testimony; See Plaintiff's 13 Exhs. 2-6. The matter that complicates the vehicle distribution is that two vehicles 14 are substantially more valuable than the remaining vehicles. According to the 15 testimony of both Parties, the 2007 Tacoma and the 2005 BMW are worth much more 16 than the remaining vehicles and both are in the possession of the Defendant. The 17 1995 Hilux and 1998 Sonata are in Plaintiff's possession. 18 16. Defendant has as her separate property a 1990 Nissan 300ZX. All other vehicles are 19 community property. 20 17. Apugan Villa Estates, Unit A-4 21 Unit A-4 is Plaintiff's separate property as it was purchased in Plaintiff's 22 name before the marriage. Plaintiff's Exh. 7; see 19 GCA § 6101. Yet, there is the 23 issue of the community funds used to pay down the mortgage. Defendant asked to be 24 reimbursed for her payments which come out to be half of all payments made during 25 marriage. 1 Defendant has lived in the townhouse throughout the marriage and made 26 use of it via possession long after the date of separation. Community property is a 27 28 1 The Rinehart decision allows for reimbursement for community funds spent to improve separate property.
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 5 of 16- gift when used to pay separate property without improvement. Navarro v. Navarro, 2 2000 Guam 31 at ~16. Here, the townhouse is clearly Plaintiffs separate property 3 due to date of acquisition and no improvements were made to the property, thus, no 4 reimbursement can be given. As a result, the Bank of Guam Loan is also Plaintiff s 5 separate property debt with no reimbursement to the community. 6 18. Bank of Guam Loan 7 The Bank of Guam Loan is a separate property debt belonging to the Plaintiff 8 paid down with at least some community property. The debt will remain with 9 Plaintiff alone until it is completely paid off. 10 19. Heli-Guam Inc. 11 Both Parties own, as community property, their shares of Heli-Guam as those 12 shares were acquired during the marriage. 2 All helicopters, parts or stocks still 13 retaining value belonging to Heli-Guam are divisible to the Parties according to their 14 share. 3 Defendant owns a 112 community interest in Plaintiffs 50% and Plaintiff 15 owns a 112 community interest in Defendant's 49% which equates on both sides to 16 approximately 49.5% interest in the business. The property of Heli-Guam, including 17 the helicopters and parts, has been valued by one Party to be at $220,000.00 18 currently.4 Yet, at the time Heli-Guam was dismantled, the property was worth far 19 less. However, in the time after Heli-Guam seized to operate, Plaintiff has used the 20 remaining Heli-Guam property to acquire lucrative contracts. With the Heli-Guam 21 helicopters and parts, Plaintiff obtained several contracts from 2002-2010 which 22 required the use of at least some of the parts owned by Heli-Guam. The Court finds 23 that Plaintiffs expertise, mechanic abilities and his labor made up the vast majority of 24 the contract receipts he obtained throughout the length of the contracts he received. 25 2 As a matter of stature construction, the Court is unable to deem the Heli-Guam stock anything but community 26 property. 19 GCA § 8401. 27 3 A one percent share must go the third investor upon dissolution of He Ii-Guam, 4 The Court may accept the values presented by Defendant where the Plaintiff failed to provide or contest said 28 valuation. Navarro v. Navarro, 2000 Guam 31 at '\Ill.
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 6 of 16- The estimation of the parts and helicopters value to these contracts is much harder to 2 ascertain. In any event, Defendant owns 49.5% of the helicopter and parts. Thus, 3 Plaintiff must pay Defendant for less than 49.5% of the value of the helicopters and 4 their parts at the date of separation to discount Plaintiff s skill, labor and expertise. 5 The helicopter valuation is tricky as Plaintiff used his separate funds obtained 6 after date of separation to greatly enhance the value of the remaining Heli-Guam 7 helicopter frames some time between 2008-2010. The Court finds that only one 8 helicopter is currently in use and valued at $220,000.00 according to the only 9 evidence presented to the Court, yet at date of separation the frames were estimated to 10 be valued at $15,000.00 for one helicopter and $10,000.00 for two others, which the 11 Court will take as fact under the Navarro case. 12 Testimony was given by the Parties that nine helicopters existed at one point. 13 The Court believes Plaintiff s statements that only three helicopter frames remain 14 viable presently. Yet, the only three helicopters being used for Peska currently were 15 worth a combined $35,000.00 at the time of the date of separation. Only after the date 16 of separation did Plaintiff take the helicopters and use them to obtain contracts with 17 fishing companies. Thus, Plaintiff must pay Plaintiff for her share of the $35,000.00 18 which is $17,500.00. No other evidence indicates that Plaintiff has sole possession or 19 sold any of the other Heli-Guam property. From the record and testimony, the Court 20 concludes that all property remains in the storage containers which are themselves 21 community property wherever they are located. Defendant will be assigned her 22 community interest in all of Heli-Guam property and debt, but, this Court will ensure 23 that she be reimbursed for her efforts during the marriage in which time Plaintiff had 24 income before the date of separation in 2005 and Defendant has not been provided 25 with an adequate amount of that income. 26 As to Defendant's interest in Plaintiffs current business ventures, clearly 27 Defendant does not maintain a 49% interest in Plaintiff s current business ventures as 28 Plaintiffs investment in his recent business, including labor and helicopter parts, was
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 7 of 16 - not 100% Heli-Guam assets. The Court finds that Plaintiffs current interest in the 2 Defendant's business is negligible as Heli-Guam's assets were only a small portion of 3 total investment Plaintiff made in the current business venture. As a whole, Defendant 4 owns roughly a $17,500.001 (50% of 3*$370,000.00). $17,500.00(Defendant's 5 investment in Plaintiff's current business) 1$555,000.00(which is Plaintiff's share in 6 the three year contract) equals .03%. Defendant owns a .03% interest in Plaintiff's 7 current business venture. Every year, Defendant earns roughly $5,550.00 of the 8 contract received by Plaintiff due to her .03% interest in Plaintiffs 50% of 9 $370,000.00 yearly income from the present contracts. 5 Defendant should be paid for 10 the use of her interest in Plaintiffs current endeavors. 11 As to Heli-Guam liabilities, Heli-Guam also obtained a GEDA loan to acquire 12 the original helicopters. That loan was secured in part with Defendant's Mother's 13 Yona property. Defendant's Exh. G. The Yona Property should be released upon 14 complete payment of the GEDA loan. Heli-Guam also acquired a debt of 15 approximately $14,266.00 for Pacific Care Insurance. Defendant's Exhibit P. The 16 Pacific Care debt is community debt. In addition and throughout trial on this matter, 17 it was mentioned that Heli-Guam has incurred unpaid taxes over the years. Both 18 parties are responsible for community debt. They must pay equal shares of the unpaid 19 taxes. 20 20. GEDA Loan 21 The GEDA loan itself was acquired for Heli-Guam and as such Heli-Guam 22 debt is community debt of both parties because the debt was obtained for a business 23 venture during the marriage. 19 GCA § 6102(b). 24 21. 2002-2005 Contract 25 5 Valuation ofthe helicopters and other Heli-Guam assets comes from the Court's review of Defendant's Exhibit D 26 (Taxes) in conjunction with Exhibit I (Contracts). From Exhibit D, the Court has seen Heli-Guam earn $2,275,833.00 in 1997. The Aircrafts in Heli-Guam's possession at that time amounted to roughly $1,676,825.00 27 with a 5 year depreciation of $1 ,51 0,792.00. Now after the date of separation, tI'1e Court is confident in its appraisal and valuation of He Ii-Guam assets as of2002. From Exhibit I, the Court is confident in its appraisal of Defendant's 28 interest in Plaintiffs current business ventures.
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 8 of 16 - Plaintiff obtained the contracted income during the marriage and income is 2 community property. The Court understands that Plaintiff's labor, expertise and skill 3 played a significant role in his obtaining the WinFar contract in 2002, yet, the Court 4 must follow the statute on community property. Regardless of what Plaintiff paid for 5 with this contracted income, he maid $1,080,000.00 over three years during the 6 marriage and before the date of separation. That entire income is community 7 property under 19 GCA § 6101(b). As a result, the Defendant is owed $540,000.00 8 as her share of the community property. This amount should be adjusted to include 9 the support Plaintiff provided to Defendant between 2002 and 2005. By providing 10 the Defendant with a place of residence and giving money to pay for bills related to 11 the marriage, the Court may conclude that Plaintiff supported his wife at the time 12 between 2002 and 2005. Defendant's Testimony on October 24, 2011 at 1O:40a.m.. 13 Therefore, the Court will reduce the $540,000.00 by what the Court determines the 14 rental value of the Unit A-4 to be during that three year span. The Count concludes 15 that the rental value of the Unit A-4 was $1,500.00 per month and other marriage or 16 utility costs that Plaintiff paid for carne to a total of $2,800.00 per month. During the 17 time of 2002 and 2005 Plaintiff should have given Defendant her community share of 18 $540,000.00 but only provided about $2,800.00 a month in support. ($2,800.00x 36 19 months)= $100,800.00. Therefore, Plaintiff should pay to Defendant $439,200.00 for 20 his earnings from 2002 to 2005 where Defendant provided very little support to his 21 wife compared to his great annual income. 22 There was some evidence put on that Plaintiff no longer lived with Defendant 23 as of 2002 which would have ended the community status of Plaintiffs earnings. Yet, 24 there were still attempts made to reconcile and Plaintiff admits to have stayed with 25 Defendant at the family horne and no intent to end the marriage was evident. As 26 such, no argument would stand that the 2002-2005 contract was after the marriage 27 pursuant to 19 GCA § 6101(a)(2). The Plaintiff shall pay Defendant half of all 28 income earned during the marriage and while the Parties were still living together.
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 9 of 16 - 22.2005-2010 Contracts 2 Plaintiff obtained these contracts after the date of separation and they are his 3 sole separate property, but Defendant had a .03% interest in these annual salaries 4 from the contracts due to the unconsented to investment of her portion of the 5 remaining helicopter parts. Defendant shou1d also receive $5,550.00 a year until the 6 Heli-Guam helicopter parts are no longer used by Plaintiff. Starting from 2005, the 7 total to present is $33,300.00 which comes from $5,550.00 a year from 2005-201l. 8 Plaintiff should payout this sum plus the future .03% interest in any Contract 9 involving Heli-Guarn parts. If Plaintiff chooses to continue utilizing Heli-Guam 10 frames in his current businesses, then he must continue to pay according to 11 Defendant's .03% interest. If Plaintiff desires to remove Defendant's interest in his 12 future business, then he must return her share of the helicopter parts or buyout her 13 half of the $220,000.00 helicopter being used today. Plaintiff can pay Defendant 14 about $5,550.00 per year or he can pay Defendant $110,000.00 now to forever 15 remove her interest in the his current and future use of the Heli-Guam parts. 16 23. Talafofo Property 17 The Talafofo property was community property when purchased, but was 18 gifted via deed to Plaintiff's father and that deed was acknowledged by Defendant. 19 Both Parties agreed to the transfer of title. The Court is unable under the law to force 20 a non-party to transfer the deed back to the Parties to allow property division. The 21 Court also has no evidence other than mere suggestion that the property was intended 22 to remain with the Parties but given away in an attempt to hide the property for tax 23 purposes. The Court finds that sufficient evidence has been put forth that Parties 24 deeded over the property as appreciation for the prior financial assistance provided by 25 Plaintiffs father. Therefore, the Talafofo property will not be divided by this Court as 26 it is not a community or separate property belonging to either Party. 27
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 10 of 16- 24. UOG Tuition 2 Defendant asks the Court to force Plaintiff to pay for her tuition at UOG or in 3 lieu of the tuition and other concerns, increase spousal support. The Court will not 4 require Plaintiff to pay for Defendant's future expenses for continued education 5 without a sound basis in case law or statute. Plaintiff will not be required to pay for 6 Defendant's tuition directly or by an increase in spousal support. 7 25. Life Insurance Policy 8 Defendant claims that she pays for the Life Insurance Policy on Plaintiff and 9 wants Plaintiff to take over payments. Even if the Court finds this to be true, the 10 Defendant is the named beneficiary and the term insurance policy originated on 11 December 28, 2005 which the Court must assume is after the date of separation which 12 occurred sometime earlier in 2005. Defendant's Exh. N. The insurance policy is not 13 for the Plaintiff s benefit. Plaintiff has no obligation to continue or take over ]4 insurance premiums for Defendant's benefit that Plaintiff did not provide for during 15 the marriage. If Defendant so desires to continue the life insurance policy, she can do 16 so from her own personal funds. 17 26. Utility Bills ]8 All utility bills associated with Unit A-4 are Plaintiffs responsibility as the 19 townhouse is his separate property and any costs accruing over the pendency of this 20 divorce will be deemed as his continued support of Defendant. 21 27. Spousal Support 22 It is clear that Plaintiff was the breadwinner of the marnage. Although 23 Defendant continually earned a decent income throughout the marriage, it was 24 Plaintiffs special skills that allowed the family to make a great income for at least 25 some of the years during the marriage. Due to the great difference in earning power 26 among the Parties, the Court finds that Defendant should receive spousal support. 27 After reviewing the tax documents and Peska income statements admitted into 28 evidence and after reviewing the testimony on Plaintiff s current and expected
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 11 of 16 - income, the Court is confident that Peska will pay Plaintiff about $120,000,000 a year 2 after 2010 that he can spend freely. The Court came to this number from the 3 contracted yearly salary of $370,000.00 discounted by the fees, costs and other 4 arrangements explained by Plaintiff to exist such as sharing with the other owner of 5 Peska. Plaintiff explained that he only has about $2,000.00 of usable income each 6 month after all costs associated with running the helicopters and complying with the 7 contract. Yet, Plaintiff also explained that a big cost is the loan he took out with 8 WinFar to finance the helicopter parts such as expensive rotors and electronics. 9 Eventually that loan will be paid down and Plaintiff will make significantly more per 10 year. In any event, Plaintiff has a much greater earning capacity than Defendant due 11 to his unique set of skills. 12 Absent some other showing of the actual net earnings Plaintiff makes from his 13 contracts and business with Peska, the Court finds that Plaintiff earns roughly 14 $10,000.00 every month as explained above. The Court finds that the valuation 15 presented by Plaintiff coinciding with the Parties' testimony Defendant earns roughly 16 $2,600 a month or $31,600.00 a year. The Court finds that $1,500.00 every month in 17 spousal support is reasonable. 18 ORDER 19 28. It is hereby ordered that the following distribution occur. 20 A. All Other Vehicles Other than the Nissan 300 ZX: are deemed to be 21 community property regardless of whose possession they are in. The Court 22 will give the Parties the option of choosing between a Court forced sale of the 23 vehicles or allowing the parties to buy each other's share in the vehicles. If 24 the Parties opt with the forced sale or cannot come to an agreement, the Court 25 will order that all community property vehicles be sold and all proceeds be 26 divided evenly. 27 B. Nissan 300 ZX: is deemed to be separate property belonging to the Defendant 28 and it will remain with the Defendant.
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 12 of 16- C. Apugan Villa Estates, Unit A-4: is deemed to be separate property of the
2 Plaintiff as it was purchased in Plaintiff's name alone before marriage. As the
3 community property used to pay down the mortgage did not go to improve the
4 value of the property, the Plaintiff owes no reimbursement to Defendant for
5 the townhouse.
6 D. Bank of Guam Loan: is deemed Plaintiffs separate debt.
7 E. Heli-Guam Assets and Debts: are deemed to be community property of each
8 spouse according to the 49.5% share mentioned above.
9 a. Tax Debts: are deemed community debts and must be paid off evenly
10 by both Parties.
II b. GEDA Loan: is deemed community debt and must be paid off evenly
12 by both Parties. If Plaintiff is currently paying the loan down without
13 assistance from Defendant, he should stop paying the whole price and
14 should only pay half and the same is true if Defendant is the Party
15 paying on the GEDA loan without help. Yet, the Parties should
16 recognize that both Parties are accountable on the loan should the
17 other Party stop paying.
18 1. Yona Property: is deemed not a property of any Party. No
]9 reimbursement will be given to either spouse and that Property
20 should be immediately released back to Defendant's mother
21 upon complete payment. Both Parties are obligated to pay the
22 remaining loan balance.
23 c. Helicopters: are deemed community property. In ascertaining their
24 value for distribution, the Court considered the value of the property at
25 the date of separation. Plaintiff must pay Defendant for her investment
26 of her share of the remaining Heli-Guam property into Plaintiffs
27 current business ventures in the amount of $5,550.00 a year. Plaintiff
28 owes Defendant $33,300.00 for the last six years. Plaintiff maintains
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 13 of 16- the option to buyout Defendant or continues to pay her according to 2 her .03% interest for using Heli-Guam frames. 3 d. Storage Containers: are deemed community property and will be 4 sold with their contents and the proceeds divided among the Parties 5 evenly. This should be done as soon as possible as the containers are ,6 not located on land owned by the Parties. 7 e. Remaining Value or Property: is deemed community property and 8 anything relating to Heli-Guam not distributed by this agreement shall 9 be divided evenly among the parties including all remaining debts. 10 F. 2002-2005 Contract: is deemed community property and Plaintiff must pay 11 Defendant $439,200.00 as explained above. In addition to the $33,300.00 12 owed for the previous years of Defendant's investment of her share of the 13 Heli-Guam assets, Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $3,000.00 a month until 14 repayment is complete. Plaintiff has the option of paying the entire sum at 15 one time or paying more than the $3,000.00. This payment shall be in 16 addition to spousal support. The total amount owed for all of Plaintiff's 17 previous obligations to Defendant during marriage and up until this Decree of 18 Divorce is $472,500.00 19 G. 2005-2010 Contracts: is deemed separate property, but Plaintiff is obligated 20 to pay to Defendant her interest in the Contracts using Heli-Guam assets. This 21 sum comes to $33,300.00. 22 H. Talafofo Property: is deemed gifted to Plaintiff's father and the property will 23 not be divided or assigned to any Party to this case. 24 I. UOG Tuition: is deemed the separate debt of the Defendant and Plaintiff will 25 not be required to pay for any past or future tuition costs. 26 J. Life Insurance Policy: is deemed the separate property of the Defendant and 27 the Court will not require Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for payments or to 28 take over payments on the policy.
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 14 of 16- K. Utility Bills: is associated with Unit A-4 and Unit A-4 is adjudged to be
2 Plaintiff's separate property. As a result, Plaintiff is responsible on making
3 all utility payments on the townhouse.
4 L. Spousal Support: The Court will require that Plaintiff pay $1,500.00 a month
5 in spousal support for six years following final decree of divorce. If 6 Defendant remarries, that support shall end. This support order shall release 7 Plaintiff of any further obligation to provide medical bills, insurance 8 premiums, tuition or any other continuing costs associated with Defendant in
9 excess of the $1,500.00 a month in spousal support. 10 M. Payments in Sum: Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant $1,500.00 a month for six 11 years in spousal support and $3,000.00 a month until the $472,500.00 is
12 entirely paid. 13 N. All debts in a spouses name alone are separate debts. All miscellaneous 14 property items in the possession of a Party shall remain their respective 15 separate property. All other property not mentioned in this section is assumed 16 to be the separate property of the spouse currently with possession or as
17 discussed above. 18 29. On evidence presented to the satisfaction of this Court, Plaintiff's Complaint for
19 Divorce should be granted to Plaintiff. It is ORDERED and DECREED as an
20 Interlocutory Judgment that Plaintiff is entitled to Divorce from Defendant on the
21 above stated grounds. Within six(6) months of this Interlocutory Judgment, the
22 Parties or the Court may move the Court to enter a Final Judgment granting divorce
23 and restoring the Parties to the status of single persons, and permitting either Party to
24 marry after the entry thereof.
26 27
Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 - Page 15 of 16 - 1 30. This is not a final judgment of divorce, the Parties are still husband and wife and 2 neither can remarry in Guam or anywhere else until a Final Judgment of Divorce is
3 entered. 4 So ORDERED this _ day of May, 2012.
S
6 HON~BLE VERNON P. PEREZ 7 JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 8
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Victor M. Reyes v. Diana M. Reyes, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Domestic Case No. DM0468-07 16 ofI6-