Reyes v. Reid

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Reyes v. Reid

121 A.D.3d 664, 993 N.Y.S.2d 336

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 1, 2014

Docket2013-06346

StatusPublished

This text of 121 A.D.3d 664 (Reyes v. Reid) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Reyes v. Reid, 121 A.D.3d 664, 993 N.Y.S.2d 336 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the *665 plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated March 20, 2013, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of Reyes’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use category or the significant limitation of use category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz, 95 AD3d 950 [2012]).

The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.E, Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the *665 plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated March 20, 2013, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of Reyes’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use category or the significant limitation of use category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz, 95 AD3d 950 [2012]).

The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.E, Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

121 A.D.3d 664, 993 N.Y.S.2d 336, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reyes-v-reid-nyappdiv-2014.

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