Reyes, Jose Julian
Opinion
JOSE J. REYES
TDC No. 821821
McConnel Unit
3001 s. Emily Dr.
Beeville, Texas 78102
March 2, 2015
Mr. Abel Acosta, Clerk COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS P. o. Box 12308 Capitol Sllation Austin, Texas 78711
RE: Cause No.· 752079-A(Count 2)
writ Of Mandamus
Dear Mr. Acosta, Clerk:
Encl·osed p'lease find Relator's Original copy of his Writ of Mandmaus.
Thank you for your time and consideration in this ma-tter.
RECEIVE'D IN
Sincerely, COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
MAR 06 2015
JOSE J. REYES
files Abel Acosta, Clerk
CAUSE 110.-· 752079-A (Count; 2}
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN TE_XAS
JOSE J. REYES
Relator,
vs.-
THE 283th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF ~ARRIS COUN~Y, TEXAS
Respondent,
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAUMS, PURSUANT TO RULE 52.8(c), TEX. RULE APPELLATE PROCEDURE, DIRECTING THE 283th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TO PROCESS RELATOR'S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO V. A; C. C. P., ART. 11. 0 7
TO THE HONORABLE J~DGES OF SAID APPEAL COURT:
COMES NOW, JOSB J.·· RBYBS, TDC Ro.· 821821, Relator, and files this his Application for Writ of Mandmaus re- questing this court to direct the 283th Judicial District Court of: .HJ;Jrris county, Texas, to process his application for writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to v.-A.c.c.P., art. 11.07 in the above number and cause, presently pending before the Respondent. In support thereof, Relator will show the following:
I.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to issue a "Wr~f of Mandamus in this case pursuant to article 5 § v of the Texas Constitution,
Landford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 s.w. 581 (Tex. Cir. 1993). Moreover, purpose of (1978) Amendment to prov-
ision of Texas Constitution governing power of Court of Criminal appeals to issue extrraordinary writs; was to confer upon the Court of Criminal Appeals additional power to grant e~tra~rdinary WE1ts in cases regarding "Criminal matters."
Vernon 's Ann. Cons t. , Art. I § v., State ExRel. Vance .v. Routt, 571 s.w. ~8.' 903 (Tex. Crim. App.·1978).
II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon receipt of an application for writ of Habeas Corpus challenging a final felony conviction, the attorney represent- ing th~ State has (15) days to respond. See, Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 11.07, § (b). After the expiration of the time allowed for the State to respond, the trial court is allowed (20) days to determine whether the application contains allegations of controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of ~he applicant's c~nfinement.
Art. 11;07, § 3(c). If the trial court determine that the application for writ of Habeas Corpus presents such issues it "shall enter .an order within 20 days of the expiration o£ the time allowed for the state to reply, designating
issues of fact to resolved~ Id. Thus,the trial court has (35) days to enter an order designating issue after the filing date of an 11.07 application for writ of Habeas Corpus. Article 11.07 does not authorize the trial court ttO extend the time limitation imposed by the statute, other than by a "timely" entry of an ord~r designating issues. McCree v.
Hampton, 824 s. w. 2d• 578, 579 (Tex. Crim.· App. 1992) (emphasis added). Without a timely entry of an order designating
issue, article 11.07 imposed a duty upon the clerk of the trial court to immediately transmit to this court the record from the application for a writ of Habeas Corpus, deeming the trial court-'s inaction a finding that no issue of fact require further resolution. Article 11•07 § 3(c).
In this case, In November 2014, Relator filed his writ of habeas corpus in the trial court• On December 12, 2014, the Court filed a Affidavit of JJJJDITH JOHNSON dated December 10, 2014. On January 5, 2015 the State filed their State's Proposed Findings of fact, Conclusion of law, and Order. On January 15,' 2015, Relator filed his Objection to State:, s
Proposed Finding of fact, conclusion of law' and Order-.· In • r ~ , • • • . . •
Relator's objection, he clearly showed the court that they
cannot finds, based on the credible affidavit of Johnson, . . --
that due to the Relat,or being convicted to of the two afore-
- .
mentioned offense he was not enti'tled to a Preliminary Hearing
as P.rovided by Tex;~• Gov'•t Code § 508.· 2811, BECAUSE HE DID ROT SIGN A WAIVED.· "See, Tex.· Gov·•t Code § 508.2811, which
clearly states that a Parole Panel or a des1gnee of the Board shall prov1de w1th1n a reasonable t1me to ~ 1nmate ~person descr1bed !!f. sect1on 508.·281 (a), !!. Prel1m1nary
Hear1ng to determ1ne whether probable cause ~ reasonable . . . - . .
grounds ex1st to bel1eve that the t1me ~ person has comm1tted - ,.
an act that would const1tute a v1olat1on of a cond1t1on of release, "UNLESS" the 1nmate person comm1tted the follow1ng:
a) wa1ves the prel1m1nary Hear1ng b)
Relator never signed a waived, waives his Prel i11.:Jnary
Hearing. See, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471, 484 (1972).
The "State's Propsed Findings of Fact, Conclusi6n of law,
and Order was filed on January 5, 2015." It being over (35) days after the filing of the "STate's Propsed Finds of Facts Conclusion and Order.
On February 23, 2015, Relator wrote a letter of delay to the Court explaining to the Court i f :jhey selects addition time but failed to notify the Court of Criminal Appeals and enquiry is made to the Court .. _,'without mention of the previously entered order designating issue a "delay Writ leter" may well be sent :td'-the -·1:~11!'1 court. SEE EXHIBIT u A • ATTACHED.·
These untimely orders interferred with the District Clerk's duty to transmit these writ to ~h$§ Court and are therefore without effect. See, Martin v. Hamlin, 25 s. W• 3d. 718 (Tex. Crim; App. 2000). The District Clerk has rio authority to continue to hold Relator's application for writ of Habeas corupus, and is under a ministerial duty to immediately forward the application and related reocrd in the above number and cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the record. See, Dejean v.District Clerk, Dallas County, 159
s.w. 2d. 183 (Tex.Crim. 2008).
Relator alleges bh~t the Respondeat has a clear "ministerial
duty" prescribed by v.A.C.C.P., article 11.07, to make a finding of fact, conclusion of law, and recommendation on his writ within a reasonable period of time and fo~ward
the same to this court. See, Dejean, supra.
III.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
Act is ministerial for purpose of request for writ Mandmaus, i f it cgnst.!tute duty clearly fixed and required -by law, without exercise of discretion or judgment. Engle
v. Locker, 820 S.W. ell. 47 (1991); Curry v. Gray, 728 S.W. 2d. 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).While it is b~e general rule
that a mandamus will not be issue to control b~e action of an inferrior court or Public Officer in a matter in- volving discretion. HOwever, the writ may issue "in a proper case" to correct a clear abuse of discretion;" See, Crane v. Turnks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 s.w. 2d. 434, 440 (1959).
The Supreme Court ~as recognized that adaption of this exception is particularly important "where f:he remedy by
way of appeal 1s 1nadequaf:e •.· west v. Soli tos, 56 3 s. w. 2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1978). In re-iterating this standard,
in Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 s. w. 2d. 916, 917 (Tex. 1985 ). The Supreme Court stated, "Mandamus 1ssues
only f:o correct: clear abuse of d1scref:1on or f:he v1olaf:1on of a duf:y 1mposed by law when there 1s no of:her adequate remedy by law. Id~ af: 917.
IV.
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
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