Reyes-Alfaro v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 7, 2025
Docket23-3777
StatusUnpublished

This text of Reyes-Alfaro v. Bondi (Reyes-Alfaro v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reyes-Alfaro v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSCAR ALEXIS REYES-ALFARO, No. 23-3777 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-367-387 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 4, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Oscar Alexis Reyes-Alfaro (Reyes-Alfaro) petitions for review of

a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the immigration judge’s

(IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the petition.

“We review the BIA’s decision and those parts of the IJ’s decision that the

BIA expressly adopted.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir.

2023) (citation omitted). “We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo,”

and we “review the BIA’s factual determinations for substantial evidence, meaning

we may reverse only if the evidence compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s.”

Id.

1. The BIA did not err by denying Reyes-Alfaro’s asylum and

withholding of removal applications because he failed to “prove a causal nexus

between one of [his] statutorily protected characteristics and either [his] past harm

or [his] objectively tenable fear of future harm.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69

F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). Because Reyes-Alfaro

alleged persecution based on political opinion, he had to show that (1) “he held (or

that his persecutors believed that he held) a political opinion” and (2) “his

persecutors persecuted him (or that he faces the prospect of such persecution)

because of his [actual or imputed] political opinion.” Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646,

656 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482–84 (1992)).

The BIA did not err by finding that Reyes-Alfaro’s refusal to join MS-13 did not

establish the first element because this “act was not a ‘sufficiently conscious and

deliberate’ expression of a political opinion.” Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1017

2 23-3777 (quoting De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Santos-

Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds

by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); Elias-Zacarias, 502

U.S. at 482.

Furthermore, the agency’s finding that MS-13 did not harm Reyes-Alfaro on

account of any actual or imputed political opinion is supported by substantial

evidence. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding

that a petitioner failed to establish nexus by failing “to present evidence that he

was politically or ideologically opposed to the ideals espoused by the gang that

recruited him (or to gangs in general), or that the gang imputed to him any

particular political belief”). We therefore deny Reyes-Alfaro’s petition as to his

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th

at 1018 (citing Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 2021))

(requiring a showing of nexus for both asylum and withholding claims based on

political opinion).

2. To gain CAT relief, a petitioner must “prove that it is more likely than

not that (1) [he], in particular, would be (2) subject to harm amounting to torture

(3) by or with the acquiescence of a public official, if removed.” Garcia v.

Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted); see also

8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). “Torture is an extreme form of cruel

3 23-3777 and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(2). “Relevant considerations for a CAT claim include evidence of

past torture inflicted upon the applicant, evidence of safe internal relocation,

evidence of mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, and

other pertinent country conditions.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir.

2019); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(3).

Because the BIA adopted the portion of the IJ’s decision denying CAT

relief, we review that part of the IJ’s decision. See Umana-Escobar, 69 F.4th at

550. The IJ’s finding that Reyes-Alfaro failed to show that he will more likely

than not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the Honduran government

upon removal is supported by substantial evidence. Reyes-Alfaro testified that

members of MS-13 beat him three times over a five-year period and that one of the

beatings broke his nose. This testimony does not show past harm rising to the

level of torture. See, e.g., Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013);

Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007).

Also, Reyes-Alfaro’s testimony that the Honduran police would not protect

him from MS-13 in the future was “unsupported and speculative,” as he did not

report the past threats or beatings to the police, and thus does not establish

government acquiescence. Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 748; 8 C.F.R.

4 23-3777 § 1208.18(a)(7). Finally, the country reports showing sporadic instances of torture

by “security forces” do not compel a contrary conclusion. See also Dawson v.

Garland, 998 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that evidence of “generalized”

violence does not compel the conclusion that a petitioner will more likely than not

be subjected to such violence). We reject Reyes-Alfaro’s argument that the agency

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Related

Cole v. Holder
659 F.3d 762 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Rocio Henriquez-Rivas v. Eric Holder, Jr.
707 F.3d 1081 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Vitug v. Holder
723 F.3d 1056 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Barrios v. Holder
581 F.3d 849 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Ahmed v. Keisler
504 F.3d 1183 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey
542 F.3d 738 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Narinder Singh v. Matthew Whitaker
914 F.3d 654 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Alicia Naranjo Garcia v. Robert Wilkinson
988 F.3d 1136 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Maria Rodriguez-Tornes v. Merrick Garland
993 F.3d 743 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Karlena Dawson v. Merrick Garland
998 F.3d 876 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Josue Umana-Escobar v. Merrick Garland
69 F.4th 544 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)
Doris Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Merrick Garland
69 F.4th 1012 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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