Rexford G. Casey v. Corson and Gruman Company, a Corporation

D.C. Circuit

Rexford G. Casey v. Corson and Gruman Company, a Corporation

221 F.2d 51, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 178, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3475

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJanuary 13, 1955

Docket12160

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 221 F.2d 51 (Rexford G. Casey v. Corson and Gruman Company, a Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rexford G. Casey v. Corson and Gruman Company, a Corporation, 221 F.2d 51, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 178, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3475 (D.C. Cir. 1955).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The District Court directed a verdict for the defendant on the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiffs, who appeal. It is clear from the opening statement that plaintiffs rely upon alleged negligence of defendant in leaving a truck it owned parked on its business lot in the District of Columbia with the key in the ignition switch. But the statement, also placed the collision, which resulted in the injuries for which damages are sought, on a highway fifteen miles south of Petersburg, Virginia. The truck was being negligently operated at this point by a person who fled the scene of the accident and who without authority had driven it away from defendant’s parking lot in the District of Columbia. The truck apparently had been stolen many hours prior to the collision. The negligence thus sought to be charged to defendant under the principles of Ross v. Hartman, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370, certiorari denied, 321 U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed. 1080, was too remote from the collision in time, place and circumstances to be a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries; and the law of Virginia, assuming it applies, imposes upon plaintiffs no lighter burden than the case cited in order to attach- legal responsibility to defendant.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

The District Court directed a verdict for the defendant on the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiffs, who appeal. It is clear from the opening statement that plaintiffs rely upon alleged negligence of defendant in leaving a truck it owned parked on its business lot in the District of Columbia with the key in the ignition switch. But the statement, also placed the collision, which resulted in the injuries for which damages are sought, on a highway fifteen miles south of Petersburg, Virginia. The truck was being negligently operated at this point by a person who fled the scene of the accident and who without authority had driven it away from defendant’s parking lot in the District of Columbia. The truck apparently had been stolen many hours prior to the collision. The negligence thus sought to be charged to defendant under the principles of Ross v. Hartman, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370, certiorari denied, 321 U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed. 1080, was too remote from the collision in time, place and circumstances to be a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries; and the law of Virginia, assuming it applies, imposes upon plaintiffs no lighter burden than the case cited in order to attach- legal responsibility to defendant.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

221 F.2d 51, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 178, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3475, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rexford-g-casey-v-corson-and-gruman-company-a-corporation-cadc-1955.

Opinion

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