Revolorio-Valdez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 2, 2026
• Docket: 22-1146
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 2 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SALVADOR BERNARDO REVOLORIO- No. 22-1146 VALDEZ, Agency No. A205-388-103 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 17, 2025**

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Salvador Bernardo Revolorio-Valdez, a native and citizen of Guatemala,

petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for

cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Arrey v. Barr,

916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019), and whether the agency erred in applying the

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts,

Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We review de novo

questions of law. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005).

We deny the petition for review.

As to cancellation of removal, substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Revolorio-Valdez has not shown exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to qualifying relatives. See Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006

(petitioner must show hardship “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that

would be expected when a close family member leaves the country” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

As to asylum, the agency did not err in concluding that Revolorio-Valdez

failed to show changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse the untimely

filing of his application. See, e.g., Alquijay v. Garland, 40 F.4th 1099, 1100 (9th

Cir. 2022) (petitioner’s circumstances, including ignorance of the law and young

age at time of arrival, were not extraordinary); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)-(5)

(examples of changed and extraordinary circumstances).

2 22-1146 As to withholding of removal, we do not disturb the agency’s determination

that Revolorio-Valdez failed to show he suffered harm that rose to the level of

persecution. See Mendez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 865, 869 n.6 (9th Cir.

2003) (unspecified threats were insufficient to rise to the level of persecution); see

also Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633 n.2 (9th Cir. 2022) (court need

not resolve whether de novo or substantial evidence review applies, where result

would be the same under either standard). Substantial evidence supports the

agency’s conclusion that Revolorio-Valdez failed to show a clear probability of

future persecution. See, e.g., Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)

(feared persecution “too speculative” to support asylum claim).

As to CAT protection, substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Revolorio-Valdez failed to show it is more likely than not he

will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if

returned to Guatemala. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

Revolorio-Valdez’s request for remand for the agency to consider

prosecutorial discretion is denied. See Morales de Soto v. Lynch, 824 F.3d 822,

826-27 (9th Cir. 2016) (government’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion not

subject to judicial review, and remand not warranted based on changes in policy).

Revolorio-Valdez does not challenge the agency’s determinations that the

immigration court properly exercised jurisdiction over his case, that the IJ did not

3 22-1146 violate due process or improperly weigh discretionary factors, and that Revolorio-

Valdez did not show eligibility for humanitarian asylum, so we do not address

them. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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