Reverdy Hilmar Gliddon v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 27, 1996
Docket03-94-00712-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Reverdy Hilmar Gliddon v. State (Reverdy Hilmar Gliddon v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reverdy Hilmar Gliddon v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

Gliddon

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



ON MOTION FOR REHEARING



NO. 03-94-00712-CR



Reverdy Hilmar Gliddon, Appellant



v.



The State of Texas, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 7440, HONORABLE CHARLES J. HEARNE, JUDGE PRESIDING



The State contends in two related arguments that this Court erred in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars appellant's prosecution. First, the State argues, the record does not establish that appellant owned the forfeited property; therefore, he could not have been punished by its forfeiture. See Ramirez v. State, Nos. 01-95-00636-CR and 01-95-00637-CR (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] December 14, 1995, no pet. h.) (absent indication in record of defendant's ownership interest in forfeited property, defendant is not punished by forfeiture of that property). The State claims in its second argument that Gliddon could not have been punished by the forfeiture because no record evidence shows that Gliddon lawfully acquired the forfeited property. See Ex Parte Ariza, 913 S.W.2d 215, 221-22 n.3 (citing Tilley v. United States, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 574 (1994), for proposition that owner of unlawfully acquired forfeited property is not punished by its forfeiture).

These issues were not presented in either the State's or appellant's brief, and they played no part in this Court's determination of this cause. Accordingly, these issues are not properly raised as points in support of the motion for rehearing, and we will not consider them. See Tex. R. App. P. 100(a). We point out, however, that the record before us does indicate that appellant owned the property forfeited. The named defendants in the forfeiture proceedings, appellant and Debra Faye Gliddon, admit in their Original Answer that they are the owners of the forfeited property. Additionally, appellant verified under oath the "Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Former Jeopardy," which stated that appellant was the owner of the forfeited property.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.



Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Dally*

State's Motion for Rehearing Overruled

Filed: March 27, 1996

Do Not Publish



* Before Carl E. F. Dally, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1988).

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Related

Ex Parte Ariza
913 S.W.2d 215 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1996)

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Reverdy Hilmar Gliddon v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/reverdy-hilmar-gliddon-v-state-texapp-1996.