Revels v. Marin County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 4, 2024
Docket4:22-cv-06723
StatusUnknown

This text of Revels v. Marin County Jail (Revels v. Marin County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Revels v. Marin County Jail, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TYLER REVELS, Case No. 22-cv-06723-JST

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF PARTIAL SERVICE; 9 v. DENYING REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 10 HALE, et al., Re: ECF Nos. 19, 20 Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at Marin County Jail, has filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. Now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is Plaintiff’s second amended 15 complaint. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff has also filed a renewed motion for appointment of counsel. 16 ECF No. 19. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 25 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 4 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 5 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 7 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 8 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 9 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 10 B. Second Amended Complaint 11 The second amended complaint names as defendants the following Marin County Jail 12 (“MCJ”) prison officials: Commander Captain Hale, Nursing Supervisor Aleksei Rajmachvili, 13 Mental Health Supervisor Kyle Hara, Psychiatrist Rebeca Quezada, and Nurse Practitioner Joseph 14 Bieleselo. ECF No. 20 at 1. 15 The second amended complaint makes the following relevant allegations. Plaintiff is 16 diagnosed with epilepsy and therefore prison officials are required to house him on lower tier, 17 lower bunk in order to supervise him. However, Plaintiff was housed in Marin County Jail’s 18 special housing unit, upper tier. Defendant Hale ignored Plaintiff’s request to be housed in a 19 lower tier, lower bunk cell, and defendants Rajmachvili, Quezada, and Kara failed to ensure that 20 Plaintiff was housed in a lower tier, lower bunk cell. On August 7, 2022, Plaintiff suffered a 21 grand mal seizure, followed by an asthma attack due to lack of oxygen. Medical care did not 22 arrive for 20 minutes. The asthma attack left Plaintiff unable to speak, get up, or walk. Deputies 23 had to sit Plaintiff up so that medical staff could administer breathing treatments. Defendant 24 Bieleselo refused to call an ambulance so that the hospital could perform diagnostics on Plaintiff. 25 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Hale, Rajmachvili, Quezada, and Kara violated the Eighth 26 Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act by housing him on the upper tier, and that 27 defendant Bieleselo violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to call an ambulance. 1 violation of the Eighth Amendment if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious 2 harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 3 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the 4 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw the 5 inference.” Id. “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities 6 regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 7 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, a showing of nothing more than a difference of medical opinion 8 as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 9 establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). A 10 claim of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth 11 Amendment. Id. at 1060. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants Hale, 12 Rajmachvili, Quezada, and Kara failed to house him on a lower tier, lower bunk as required to 13 monitor his epilepsy states a cognizable Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to 14 Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The allegations against defendant Bieleselo, however, do not 15 meet this standard. Jail officials treated Plaintiff’s asthma attack by providing breathing 16 treatments. Given that medical care, Plaintiff has not clearly alleged why the decision not to call 17 an ambulance was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances.” Id. at 1058 (quoting 18 Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Amendment claim against 19 defendant Bieleselo is therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend. 20 Plaintiff’s ADA claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. The elements of a cause of action 21 under Title II are that: the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; the plaintiff is otherwise 22 qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or 23 activities; the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the 24 public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the 25 public entity; and such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the 26 plaintiff’s disability. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff is not 27 alleging the denial of services, programs, or activities. 1 C. Request for Appointment of Counsel and to Proceed Before a Magistrate Judge 2 Plaintiff has filed a renewed request for appointment of counsel.1 Plaintiff seeks 3 appointment of counsel for the following reasons.

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Revels v. Marin County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/revels-v-marin-county-jail-cand-2024.