Revel v. State

26 Ga. 275
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJune 15, 1858
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 26 Ga. 275 (Revel v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Revel v. State, 26 Ga. 275 (Ga. 1858).

Opinion

[277]*277 By the Court.

Lumpkin J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] Was the Court right in overruling the plea to the jurisdiction of the Court in this case ?

The regular Terms of Crawford Superior Court are on the first Mondays in March and September. To accommodate the bar, who were in attendance on the Supreme Court at Macon, Judge Lamar determined to adjourn over Crawford Court. He first acted under the statute of 1823, (Cobb, 460,) as amended in 1837, (Cobb, 461,) that is, through the agency of the Clerk. But reflecting that he could not order an adjournment through this officer, except on account of the sickness of himself or his family,or some other Providential cause, which cause the law required to bo expressed in the order of adjournment, he attended in person, at the regular Term for holding the Court; opened the Court; offered to hear motions, &c., and then adjourned over the Court till the Monday following. I confess I am unable to comprehend the objection to the regularity of this proceeding.

If the Court that tried the prisoner during the second week was not legally constituted, then no adjourned Court ever held in this State was. The Courts have the power, and they have uniformly and universally exercised it for three score years, when once organized, of adjourning from day to day, or from week to week, even passing over intervening sessions in other counties, until they have completed the business of the Term; and we know of no limitation or restriction upon this right. The Acts cited have no application to a Court which has been properly organized, and which has entered upon the duties of the Term.

[2.] Ought the continuance to have been allowed ?

The showing is made up of several distinct grounds. As to the public excitement, there is nothing in that. The of-fence had been committed five months before the prisoner was put upon his trial. Surely, this was sufficient time for the mind of the comunity to become tranquilized, if it ever was [278]*278unduly excited. It is manifest, that such inde- á was the fact. Seven impartial jurors were selected and sworn out of the first panel of forty-eight; and the remaining five out of the next. And it does not appear that the whole of this second panel was exhausted. No public passion, which would prevent a fair trial, could have prevailed under such circumstances. The prisoner was mistaken if he thought so.

And then, as to his want of opportunity to prepare for his defence, by reason of the recent finding of the bill; that does not meet the truth of the case. The accused had been arrested for this offence, and committed to jail five months before. What prevented him from setting about at once to hunt up his testimony, if he had any ? He might have applied for compulsory process to coerce the attendance of witnesses. If this had been denied, his application would have seemed more reasonable. The transaction was not complicated, involving any mystery to be unraveled; there were but few persons present when the homicide was committed. They were doubtless all known to the defendant. Most, if not all of them, have been examined on the trial. True, the accused could not anticipate with certainty, whether the grand jury would find a true bill for murder or manslaughter. He could but foresee, however, that the same proof would be required in either event. Indeed, it would readily occur to him, that his main purpose would be to mitigate the crime from murder to manslaughter.

If the fact of his imprisonment hindered him from doing any thing for five months, how much better off Would he be were the time prolonged. He would not have been bailed after the true bill for murder was found. One witness, Elizabeth Bundrick, was subpoenaed and did not attend. Was her testimony material, or even relevant? Whether Adams was killed by Revel, or died under the want of skill in the surgeon, in attempting to extract the ball from the wound, is a matter of little or no consequence in the present issue. Revel admits, in his affidavit for a continuance, that he shot [279]*279both Adams and Hammock, True, he says it was in self-defence. He does not dispute intending to kill Adams. If he was- not justifiable, then, he was guilty of an assault with intent to kill Adams, It follows, therefore, that the degree of criminality between the two cases, as to Adams, was too slight to make any perceptible difference on the trial for killing Hammock. And that, consequently, the evidence of Mrs, Bundrick was quite immaterial. It could not have affected the verdict of the jury.

[3.] The next objection is, as to.the-mode of selecting the jury.

The first panel of forty-eight was made up by adding to the twenty-four jurors in attendance upon the Court, a like number of talesmen, to which no exception was taken. Seven jurors having been selected and sworn out of this panel, forty-eight more were summoned and presented to the pris-' oner who, through his counsel, objected to this second panel, •on the ground that it was not authorized by the Act of 1856, -regulaling the manner of empanneling a jury in a criminal case.

It is" true, that the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th sections of that Act refer only to new panels of forty-eight, Where the former have been set aside by challenges to the array 5 and no part of the Act makes provision, in so many words, for summoning additional panels, where the former have been exhausted by challenges to the polls, Still, it may be inferred from several expression's in the Act, that the Legisla; ture did not intend to change the old law in this respect. In •section 10 it is said, that the Court shall proceed to apply the tests furnished by the Act to secure an impartial jury, “until a jury be empanneled to try the accused.” Now, this •requirement is impracticable, unless new panels are summon; ed. Again, in the 11th section, until a jury is empanneled to try said case”. Pamphlet Acts, 229, 230.

But suppose the Act was defective in this particular, it does not, like the attachment and garnishment law of that [280]*280session, repeal most unvriely all other laws in the State upon the same subject; but such only as are in conflict with it. Of course, then, the old law would supply the remedy.

[4.] The Solicitor General proposed proving, that cotemporaneously with the killing of Hammock, prisoner shot one Adams, who died of the wound; and strapped his pistol at two other persons, to-wit: Smithson and Clay. Counsel for the accused objected to this testimony on the ground of irrelevancy. It was admitted that prosecutions Avere pending against Revel for each of these other offences. The merits of this case are materially involved in this exception.

Without adverting-to all the facts contained in this record, it is sufficient to say, that these four men, Hammock and Adams, Smithson and Clay, were all at Revel’s grocery on that occasion. The parties had been engaged in shooting for beef. There was some political animosity between them. And most, if not all of them, were excited by liquor. Hammock had, a short while before the killing, insulted Revel. But beingput right as to the mistake under which he labored, he made prompt and ample apology, which Revel accepted as satisfactory. They conversed together in private.

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Bluebook (online)
26 Ga. 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/revel-v-state-ga-1858.