J-S16028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
EZRA REUVEN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
DARIUS MASON AND VENEZLA MASON
Appellants No. 1818 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered May 18, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 150202815
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2016
Darius Mason and Venezla Mason (Masons) appeal from the order
entered on May 18, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, denying their appeal of the Municipal Court’s denial of their motion
to open or strike judgment in favor of Ezra Reuven (Reuven). In this timely
appeal, the Masons claim the Court of Common Pleas erred in failing to
recognize the judgment was defective on its face due to lack of service of
the underlying complaint and lack of Municipal Court jurisdiction due to the
amount of damages sought. Additionally, the Masons argue the Court of
Common Pleas failed to recognize the underlying judgment should have
been opened because Reuven failed to present any evidence supporting the J-S16028-16
judgment. After a thorough review of the Appellants’ brief,1 the certified
record and relevant law, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion,
dated June 25, 2015, authored by the Honorable Nina Wright Padilla.
We glean the underlying facts from the certified record. The Masons
had an oral lease with Reuven regarding the property located at 537 N. 35 th
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, more commonly known as the Easy
Corner Bar. In 2013, the Masons fell behind on the rent and allegedly
caused damage to the property. Reuven filed suit against the Masons,
seeking a judgment of possession and a money judgment of more than
$9,000.00 in unpaid rent and more than $42,000.00 to repair the property.
The total amount of damages claimed was $52,568.18. This action was
brought as a landlord/tenant lawsuit in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The
Masons were served notice of the suit by posting the premises.
The Masons did not appear for trial and judgment was entered on
December 17, 2013, in favor of Reuven for $52,700.68.2 Reuven was also
awarded possession of the property. Eight months later, on August 26,
2014, the Masons filed a petition to open judgment, which was voided on
September 9, 2014, due to their failure to act. Four months later, on
December 30, 2014, the Masons filed another petition to open judgment, ____________________________________________
1 The Appellee, Ezra Reuven, did not file a brief. 2 The judgment represents the amount sought in damages plus $132.50 in costs.
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which was denied on February 6, 2015, in the Municipal Court following a
hearing. On February 25, 2015, the Masons filed an appeal of that denial
with the Court of Common Pleas. On March 27, 2015, the Masons filed a
motion to open or strike the Municipal Court judgment, claiming the
Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction due to a failure to serve original process
and because the amount sought exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the
Municipal Court. Additionally, the Masons claimed that Reuven had not
presented any admissible evidence to support the claim for damages.
Our standard of review regarding a petition to strike is:
A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record.... An order of the court striking a judgment annuls the original judgment and the parties are left as if no judgment had been entered.
Cintas Corporation v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 89-90, 700 A.2d 915, 917 (1997) (quoting Resolution Trust Corporation v. Copely Qu-Wayne Associates, 546 Pa. 98, 106, 683 A.2d 269, 273 (1996)). In determining whether fatal defects exist on the face of the record for the purpose of striking a judgment, a court may look only at what was in the record when the judgment was entered. Cintas Corporation, supra at 90, 700 A.2d at 917. We review a trial court's refusal to strike a judgment for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Frontier Leasing Corporation v. Shah, 931 A.2d 676 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Knickerbocker Russell Co., Inc. v. Crawford, 936 A.2d 1145, 1146-47
(Pa. Super. 2007).
Regarding the denial of a petition to open, we are required to,
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examine the entire record for any abuse of discretion, reversing only where the trial court's findings are inconsistent with the clear equities of the case. Moreover, this Court must determine whether there are equitable considerations which require that a defendant, against whom a default judgment has been entered, receive an opportunity to have the case decided on the merits. Where the trial court's analysis was premised upon record evidence, where its findings of fact were deductions from other facts, a pure result of reasoning, and where the trial court made no credibility determinations, this Court may draw its own inferences and arrive at its own conclusions. Finally, where the equities warrant opening a default judgment, this Court will not hesitate to find an abuse of discretion.
Reid v. Boohar, 856 A.2d 156, 159 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 3
As noted above, the trial court opinion ably discusses and disposes of
the Masons’ arguments. Our review of the certified record discloses no
abuse of discretion or error of law therein. Accordingly, we rely upon the
sound reasoning of the Honorable Nina Wright Padilla.4
Order affirmed. Parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court
opinion in the event of further proceedings.
____________________________________________
3 We join in the trial court reminding counsel for the Masons that a petition to strike and petition to open are distinct claims seeking “distinct remedies and generally are not interchangeable.” Aquilino v. Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, 884 A.2d 1269, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2005). 4 We note the Masons’ argument that while Reuven styled the action as landlord-tenant, “that action was actually one for damages arising out of [the Masons] claimed destruction of Reuven’s property.” The Masons’ Brief, at 13. However, Judge Wright Padilla determined the action was properly brought in the Municipal Court as a landlord/tenant action which does not have a jurisdictional upper limit to damages and the Masons have provided no case law that overcomes that determination.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2016
-5- Circulated Received 07/29/2015 Superior 05/23/2016 11:34 Court Eastern AM District
Filed 07/29/2015 Superior Court Eastern District 1818 EDA 2015 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EZRA REUVEN SUPERIORCOURTNo. 1818 EDA 2015 v. Civil Division February Term 2015, No. 28!5 DARIUSMASONand VENEZLAMASON
OPINION
Appellants, Darius and Venezia Mason, appeal from this Court's Order denying their Petition to ' Open Judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 25, 2015, Appellants commenced this action by appealing from a Municipal Court
judgment.
The underlying Municipal Court case was a landlord-tenant action filed November 13, 2013, in
which Appellee, Ezra Reuven, sought to recover $52,568.18 in damages and regain possessionof the
premises. Service was effectuated on Appellants on November 21, 2013, by posting the address of 537
N. 35th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Appellee obtained a judgment by default on December 17, 2013. Appellants filed a prose
Petition to Open Judgment in Municipal Court on August 26, 2014 which was voided on September 9,
2014, following their failure to act1 and a counseled Petition to Open Judgment by default on December
30, 2014.2 The second petition was denied February 6, 2015, following a hearing before the Municipal
Court. Reuven Vs Mason Etal-OPFLD
I I Ill I 11111111111111111 15020281500020 1 This information was obtainable only from the Municipal Court transcript. See, Notes of Testimony 2/6/15 at 6-7. 2 Counselentered his appearance October 9, 2014 but did not file his petition until December 30, 2014. 1
COPIES SENT PURSUANT TO Pa.R.C.P. 236(b) 06/26/2015 On March 27, 2015, Appellants filed a Motion to Strike/Open the Municipal Court judgment,
arguing that the Municipal Court was without jurisdiction to enter the underlying judgment as it was
not a landlord-tenant matter; that the judgment was defective as service had not been perfected on
defendants; that the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction because the matter in controversy exceeded
the Municipal Court's jurisdictional maximum; that the Municipal Court had failed to take admissible
and/or testimonial substantiating evidence; that Appellants had no notice of the hearing; and that the
complaint was defective as it had not attached the lease or other accompanying documents necessary
for a landlord-tenant complaint.
On April 20, 2015, Appellee filed an Answer in Opposition to Appellants' Motion to Strike,
arguing that neither the instant Petition nor any of Appellants' Municipal Court Petitions had been
timely filed, nor had Appellants offered a reasonable excuse for failing to attend the hearing in
Municipal Court. Further, Appellee argued that Appellants had not alleged that a review of the
Municipal Court record had demonstrated that the Court abused its discretion in denying the Petition.
Appellee denied all of Appellants' averments.
On April 22, 2015, Appellants filed a Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Strike, arguing
that Appellants had not been properly served as service was effectuated by posting a property that had
been vacated, and additionally arguing that Appellee's response should be stricken as non-Local Rule
compliant.
On May 18, 2015, following a review of the relevant pleadings as well as the record, this Court
denied Appellants' Motion to Strike.
On June 3, 2015, Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
On June 5, 2015, this Court issued its Order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), directing Appellant
to file his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one (21) days.
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On June 23, 2015, Appellant filed a timely Statement of Matters Complained on Appeal,
averring that this Court erred: in denying the motion to strike and/or open judgment; in not finding
that the judgment was defective on its face as the judgment had been entered in Municipal Court as a
landlord-tenant matter when the amount in controversy exceeded the Municipal Court's jurisdictional
limits; in denying the motion when the underlying judgment was "entered upon a hearing with no
evidence presented" and the complaint fails to conform to Municipal Court requirements; and in
refusing a requested evidentiary hearing.
DISCUSSION
This matter is an appeal from a lower court order denying Appellants' Petition to Strike and/or
Open Judgment.
A supplementary order granting or denying a petition to open a default judgment is appealable
to the Court of Common Pleas, but the appeal is limited to a review of the record. Phila.Civ.R.
1001(a)(3). The time to file an appeal from a supplementary order is within thirty (30) days after the
date of the entry of the order on the dockets of the Municipal Court. Phila.Civ.R. 1001(c)(5). Such an
appeal proceeds as a motion pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 208.1 et seq. and Phila.Civ.R. *208.2(c) et seq., and the appeal is limited to a determination by this Court whether the Municipal Court committed an
error of law or abused its discretion in ruling on the petition or motion which is the subject of the
appeal. Upon the issuance of a dispositive order by the Court of Common Pleas, the action shall be
remanded to the Municipal Court for further proceedings consistent with the Order. Phila.Civ.R.
1001(9)(2).
Appellants' Petition to Strike and/or Open Judgment was denied February 6, 2015, and their
appeal to this Court timely filed on February 25, 2015. On review, this Court is limited to a review of
the record and whether or not the Municipal Court committed an error of law or abused its discretion in
its Order denying Appellants' Petition.
3 To obtain relief from the entry of a default judgment, the law provides two distinct remedies -
an aggrieved party may file a petition to strike the default judgment and/or a petition to open the
default judgment. Mother's Rest. Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 2004 PA Super 411, 861 A.2d 327, 336 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004). They are generally notinterchangeable; a petition to strike does not involve the
discretion of the court but is a demurrer to the record. Id A petition to open judgment, on the other
hand, is an appeal to the equitable powers of the court. Id The standard of appellate review is that of
abuse of discretion with regard to the petition to open only; the court's decision will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion or error of law. Erie Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 2003 PA Super 448, 839 A.2d
383, 386 {2003).
I. DENIAL OF PETmON TO STRIKE
As noted above, a petition to strike is a demurrer to the record. Mother's Rest; Inc., 861 A.2d
at 336. Such a demurrer "admits all well-pleaded facts for the purpose of testing conclusions of law
drawn from those facts," and the court may only look at the facts of record at the time the judgment
was entered to decide if the record supports the judgment. Id A petition to strike may be granted only
if a fatal defect appears on the record. Id See also U.K. LaSalle/ Inc. v. tswtess. 421 Pa.Super. 496,
618 A.2d 447 (1992). "Importantly, a petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the
allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the validity of the
judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief." Oswald v. WB Pub. Square
Associetes. LLC, 2013 PA Super 289, 80 A.3d 790, 794 (2013). A petition to strike does not involve the
discretion of the court. Triangle Printing Co. v. Image Quest 730 A.2d 998, 999 (Pa. Super. 1999).
Appellants argue that this Court should have stricken the judgment of the record as defects
were evidence on the face of the record, namely: the amount in controversy exceeded the Municipal
Court's jurisdictional limits; because service was not made on Appellants; and that the Complaint failed
4 __________ . . . _, _.,"'_ -· __ ,_. __ _~"' .,. . . ,_,..;_ ~-·-e ( _,_. .,. . _.......,__._ '--···J,,.,. _._ . .._
to conform to Municipal Court requirements.3 They argue that this case was not a landlord-tenant
matter.
A review of the record showed that the filed complaint provides that Appellee noted that there
was a lease between Appellants and himself at 537 N. 35th Street, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 19104;
the lease was a non-residential oral lease that began June 1, 2012 for a term of a year or more.
The complaint averred that Appellants were in possession of the property and refused to surrender
possessionof the property. The Complaint included an attached exhibit containing itemization of
unpaid rent as well as other damages incurred by Appellee, an invoice of the damages, as well as a
police report filed by Appellee against Appellants. The case was docketed in Municipal Court as a
landlord-tenant action. A non-military affidavit was filed the same day as the Complaint, and affidavits
of service upon Appellants were filed November 27, 2013. Said affidavits indicated that service was
made on Appellants on November 21, 2013 at 537 N. 35th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, by
posting the property, pursuant to the Philadelphia Municipal Court rules which allow for landlord-tenant
complaints to be served by posting the leased premises. See Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. 111. A hearing was
scheduled for December 17, 2013.
From an examination of the record Appellants have pointed to no errors evident from the face
of the record that would justify granting their petition. A complaint was filed in a landlord-tenant
matter in Municipal Court, which allows for judgments of more than $5,000.00 in matters arising under
the subsection;4 Appellee averred that a lease was not attached because it was an oral lease, and
under the Landlord Tenant Act oral leases are permitted for leases less than three (3) years;5
Appellants were served at a Property where it was averred that they were in possession and refused to
surrender possession; as well as police reports and invoices of damages. Again, as noted above, a
3 In Appellant's original petition, the only defects Appellant challenged with regard to the Complaint were "it did not even attach the claimed violated lease nor other accompanying documents requisite to file a putative (denied) landlord-tenant complaint before the Municipal Court." See Appellants' Petition to Strike, ,i 7(f). 4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1123. 5 See 68 P.S. § 250.201.
5 Petition to Strike is limited to a review of the available record and is not within the discretion of the
Court. A review of Phila. M.C.R. Civ.P. 109 as well as the available record shows that the Complaint
was substantially in conformance with the Rules and that Appellants were properly served in
accordance with Phila M.C.R. Civ. P. 111.
Consequently, the Municipal Court did not err in denying Appellants' Petition to Strike, and
neither did this Court err in refusing to find an abuse of discretion in that decision.
II. DENIAL OF PETITION TO OPEN
Petitions to open judgment are appeals to the discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error of law. Erie Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 2003 PA Super
448, 839 A.2d 383, 386 (2003). Petitions to open judgment must show that: the petition was promptly
filed; the failure to appear or file a timely answer must be excusable; the party seeking to open the
judgment must show a meritorious defense. Mother's Rest./ Inc., 861 A.2d at 336. The Court may
consider facts not before it at the time judgment was entered. Id.
a. Prompt Filing
The timeliness of a petition to open is measured from the date that notice of the entry of
default was received; while there is not a specified time period, the court should consider the length of
time between discovery of the entry of default, and reason for the delay. Myers v. Wells Fargo Ban~
N.A., 2009 PA Super 241, 986 A.2d 171, 176 (2009). Appellants do not aver when they discovered the
default judgment. Judgment was entered December 17, 2013 and the first Petition to Open was filed
August 26, 2014. Thus, a time period of two hundred fifty-two (252) days passed between the entry of
Judgment and the first Petition to open. Appellant then filed a counseled petition on December 30,
2014, three hundred seventy-eight (378) days after the entry of the default judgment.
Again, as Appellants have not averred when they discovered the entry of judgment, this Court
cannot say with certainty whether the filing was prompt. However, from the docket alone, it appears
6 that the petition was not promptly filed and without further explanation, Appellant thus fails the first
prong.
b. Reasonable Excuse
Appellants claim that they did not receive service of the Complaint nor did they have notice of
the Court date. However, the record reflects that Appellants were served by posting of the Property of
which they had possession on November 21, 2013, almost a month prior to the court date. The
Complaint itself had notice of said Court date and, as noted above, the leased premises were posted by
a process server in accordance with the Philadelphia Municipal Court rules. Consequently, Appellants
have not plead a reasonable excuse.
c. Meritorious Defense
The requirement of a meritorious defense is only that a defense must be pleaded that if proved
at trial would justify relief. Smith v. Morrell Beer Distributor~ Inc., 2011 PA Super 183, 29 A.3d 23, 26
(2011). A defendant must set forth such a defense in "precise, specific, and clear terms." Id In their
counseled petition before the Municipal Court, Appellants aver simply that they are not liable in any
respect, that they are not in breach of the lease agreement but that Appel lee is in breach of the lease
agreement, and that Appellants were not the cause of the claimed damage. However, in their petition,
Appellants made no argument or averment as to why Appellee was in breach of the lease agreement.
Thus, Appellants are not entitled to open the default judgment as they have not met the
requirements of the tripartite test.
III. DEFECTS IN JUDGMENT
Appellants also aver that this Court erred in denying the motion when the "underlying judgment
was entered upon a hearing with no evidence presented." It is disingenuous of Appellants to argue that
no evidence was presented at the hearing considering that Appellants defaulted. As noted above at
length, when deciding a denial of a Petition to Strike and/or Open Judgment based upon a decision of
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the Philadelphia Municipal Court this Court's examination is limited to the record. From the record
alone, judgment was properly entered.
IV. HEARING
Finally, Appellants aver that this Court erred in refusing a requested evidentiary hearing.
However, Appellants did not request an evidentiary hearing anywhere within their Petition. Though a
petitioner may seek the issuance of a Rule to Show Cause with such a petition, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
206.S(b), Appellants did not attach a proposed order in the form prescribed by subdivision (d).
Consequently, this Court did not err in ruling upon Appellants' Petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above, this Court's decision should be affirmed and Appellants'
appeal dismissed.
BY THE COURT:
DATE: ~ c;l!f J ;}!) /5"°