Retailers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Jackson Gin Co.

10 S.W.2d 799
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 10, 1928
DocketNo. 3084.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 10 S.W.2d 799 (Retailers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Jackson Gin Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Retailers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Jackson Gin Co., 10 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

HALL, C. J.

The appellee in this case has not favored us with a brief, and under Court of Civil Appeals rule No. 41, we will adopt the statement of the nature and result of the suit made by appellant, which is as follows:

By its original petition, the Jackson Gin Company alleged that on October 20, 1926, it was, and for some time had been, the owner of a certain gin situated in Groom, Tex.; that at all of such times, the defendant maintained an insurance agency in Shamrock, Tex., known as the Sherwood Agency, of which one Ben Wooten was a partner and was the duly authorized agent of the defendant to enter into contracts of insurance against loss by fire; that the defendant, through such agency, carried a policy on' plaintiff’s property in the amount of $3,000 for the year, which ended on October 20, 1926; that a short time before this policy expired, the plaintiff, acting through J. H. Jackson, its president, entered into an oral contract with the defendant, through its agent, Ben Wooten, by the terms of which the defendant agreed to insure the gin property for a period of one year from October 20, 1926, against loss by fire, in the amount of $3,000, so that if the property were burned during the year the plaintiff would receive $3,000, according to the stipulations and conditions contained in the policy, which was in force during the year ending on October 20, 1926, by reason of which the defendant became bound to pay such sum in the event the plaintiff’s property was destroyed by fire during the time mentioned.

The defendant failed to issue this policy, though it had promised plaintiff so to do, and represented to plaintiff during the year 1927 that the policy had been issued and was in force and effect until October 20, 1927; that the insurance agency and Wooten had, for many years, retained the plaintiff’s policies; that the plaintiff relied upon the promises of the defendant through said agent to renew the policy, and relied upon the representations that the policy had been renewed; that said agent failed to issue any policy for the year beginning October 20, 1926; that the statements made to the plaintiff that this policy had been issued were untrue; that by reason of the facts alleged, a valid, oral contract was entered into between plaintiff and defendant to the effect that the defendant, in consideration of the premium charged, would pay plaintiff $3,000 in the event his property was destroyed by fire at any time up to October 20, 1927, according to the terms of the policy which expired on October 20, 1926; that on July 31, 1927, all of this gin property was destroyed by fire, as a result of which plaintiff sustained a loss of $3,000; that under the contract of insurance entered into verbally between the plaintiff and defendant by reason of the destruction of this property by fire, the defendant became bound to pay plaintiff' this sum of $3,000, which it has refused to do, for which plaintiff prayed judgment.

The defendant answered by general denial, *800 and specially pleaded that portion of the policy relating to a cancellation of it, providing that it might be canceled by giving notice. ; that it never had any contract or agreement or policy outstanding or in force or delivered to the plaintiff at the time of the fire complained of by plaintiff, and, if it should be mistaken in this, that any contract or agreement or policy that it might have had with the plaintiff was canceled before the fire complained of by the plaintiff, or expired according to its terms before the fire; and that, at the time of the fire, it did not have in force or effect any such contract or agreement or policy as insures the property against the loss or damage by fire for which plaintiff sues.

Defendant further pleaded in the alternative that if it had any such policy as the plaintiff claimed, its liability thereunder would be no more than that proportionate part of the loss sustained as a result of the fire than its policy bears to the total insurance held by the plaintiff at the time of the fire, and that if any liability should be found to exist against it that liability should be limited to its pro rata part of the same, applying to.each of the items upon which the plaintiff claims a loss and damage; that Ben Wooten named .as its agent by plaintiff was not its agent, and had no power to do or perform the things mentioned by plaintiff in plaintiff’s petition.

Special issues were submitted to the jury, which, together with their answers, we state as follows: ' •

(1) J. H. Jackson had an agreement and understanding with Wooten that he (Wooten) would renew the $3,000 policy in question in this case in the Retailers’ Eire Insurance Company.

(2) Wooten had apparent authority as agent for the defendant company to make such an agreement.

(3) That Jackson relied upon the statements of Wooten, if any were made, that such insurance policy would be issued.

The court instructed the jury that the phrase “apparent authority of an agent” is that which, though not actually granted,‘the principal knowingly permits the agent to exercise or hold him out as possessing.

Based upon this verdict, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $2,700, with interest from August 1, 1927, at 6 per cent.

Numerous propositions are urged by the appellant, but m order to dispose of the case it will not be necessary for us to consider them in detail.

The first contention is that Wooten, the agent who appellant claims promised to renew the policy theretofore existing in the Retailers’ Fire Insurance Company, was the agent ,of the gin company, or at most was, as to the appellee company, a broker or the joint agent of appellant and appellee. The testimony in the record with relation to this matter is shown by the evidence of Wooten and of Jackson. Wooten testified in part as follows:

“My name is Ben Wooten. I live at Shamrock, Texas, where I have lived for 17 years. I am in the insurance business. The name of that business is W. J. Sherwood Agency. I have owned it since January 1st, 1927. * * * The agency carried insurance for J. H. Jackson and the Jackson Grin Company. Mr. Sherwood, when he was in the business, handled the transactions with the Jackson Gin Company and Mr. J. H. Jackson. After Sherwood got sick, I did. The Retailers Fire Insurance Company had insurance on the Jackson Gin Company’s gin at Groom, Texas, for the year beginning October 20th, 1925; the policy was originally for $3,-000.00 and was reduced to $2,500.00. * * * The Sherwood Insurance Agency had the blank policy in its possession, countersigned by the officers of the Company. We wrote this policy by application. The Company had an applica- ' tion on this policy. The policy was issued. I can not say whether I wrote it or the girl in the office wrote it, but the Sherwood Agency issued it. * * *
“I was trying to keep $17,000.00 on this gin. I got this figure of $17,000.00 from the values of the gin. Mr. Jackson told me that he wanted that much insurance. One of the applications said $17,000.00 total insurance schedule. All the Companies required an application in connection with the policies on the gin. They required these applications on gin risks only, but all Companies require an application on gin risks. I could not say whether Mr. Jackson signed the application that was made to the Retailers Fire Insurance Company in 1925 for this $3,000.00 policy, we might have signed one for him.

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10 S.W.2d 799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/retailers-fire-ins-co-v-jackson-gin-co-texapp-1928.