Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess

859 F. Supp. 1411, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11433, 1994 WL 440727
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJuly 19, 1994
DocketCiv. No. 92-C-141G
StatusPublished

This text of 859 F. Supp. 1411 (Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 859 F. Supp. 1411, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11433, 1994 WL 440727 (D. Utah 1994).

Opinion

ORDER

J. THOMAS GREENE, District Judge.

This matter came before the court on July 6 and July 14, 1994, on defendants’ Motion for Order Staying Disclosure of Defendants’ Personal Financial Information. Plaintiff was represented by Jathan Janove, Suzanne Rigby and Monica Pace. Defendants were represented by John Gordon, III, James Jar-[1412]*1412dine and John Adams. Legal memorandums and other papers were filed by the parties, and the court heard oral argument on the motion.

Defendants seek to prevent disclosure by the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) of financial statements, copies of income tax returns, and other financial information of the defendants as defined in Paragraph 7.1 of the May 25, 1994 Settlement Agreement (“financial information”) until the parties’ settlement has been approved by the Surrogate’s Court of New York County, New York. The RTC seeks to disclose the financial information in response to a request, on Senate stationary, of Senator Reigle, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban affairs, and Senator Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in a letter dated June 10, 1994.

The issue was first raised before Judge Stephen H. Anderson of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, who was serving as a settlement judge on this and another case pending in the District of Arizona involving some of the same individual defendants.1 Judge Anderson referred the cases back to the respective courts on June 24, 1994 and entered a ten day Stay Order to allow the parties to brief and argue the issue. This court has extended the Stay Order as to the Utah case until 5:00 p.m., Mountain Daylight Time, July 19, 1994. In the meantime, hearings have been held in the case pending before the United States District Court in Arizona, and Judge Carroll of that court has issued an Order dated July 18, 1994, prohibiting disclosure of the financial records pending further order of the court. The factual findings and matters set forth in that Order are incorporated into this Order, and made a part hereof, attached as Exhibit A.

In Section 7.2 of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed that the financial information in question should be treated as confidential. It was further agreed that the RTC shall not produce it to anyone except pursuant to 12 CFR Part 1625 (and partieu-larly section 1625.6). Section 1625, including 1625.6, applies only to information and documents obtained in the course of an RTC investigation, and thus technically the regulation does not embrace the documents at issue. Clearly, the financial information at issue in this case was given to the RTC as a result of and pursuant to settlement negotiations in the pending litigation. Whatever the parties may have intended in referring to a regulation which literally could not apply to the voluntarily transmitted settlement documents, disclosure or nondisclosure of the financial information placed in the possession of RTC is not controlled by the regulation if disclosure “is otherwise required by law,” or if voluntarily permitting disclosure “is otherwise prohibited by law.” (12 CFR § 1625(g)).

It does not appear from any authority presented to the court that production to the congressional committees by the RTC is “required by law.” On the other hand, such production would be prohibited by law if the intent were “to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way.” United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871). No purpose or reason was given to the RTC in the informal request by the Honorable Chairmen of the congressional committees for production of the settlement documents in question. Yet, the request is for production of the very documents which are to be reviewed by the Surrogate Court in New York as the basis for its determination whether to approve the settlement already entered into by the RTC and the defendants. In this regard, the court is cognizant that public policy considerations militate in favor of preventing access to settlement negotiations when such access would undermine the amicable resolution of disputes. City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.1991).

Both parties recognize that the information in question is confidential and must remain so at least until the settlement has been reviewed and approved (or disapproved) by the court in New York. In this regard, both [1413]*1413parties have tendered to the court a form of protective order under which the documents could be transmitted to the congressional committees voluntarily with provisions to safeguard confidentiality. However, the parties have notified the court that they disagree as to the terms necessary to achieve such confidentiality, and have reached an impasse. The fundamental problem seems to be how to implement the understanding which the RTC represented to this court was given to it by the congressional committees that the financial information would be kept confidential, with no unauthorized “leaks” or disclosures. However, no assurances from the said committees to this court have been submitted by the RTC. The court requests counsel to continue to attempt to develop a stipulated protective order and lodge the same with the court.

In addition to the factual findings set forth in Judge Carroll’s Order, this court makes and enters the following additional findings based upon the record before it:

1. Defendants will be irreparably harmed if the stay is not continued.

2. The damage to defendants in the absence of the stay outweighs the damage, if any, which the RTC would suffer.

3. The public interest in preserving the independence and integrity of the judicial process, and in the promotion of judicially supervised settlement of litigation, would be served by maintenance of the stay.

4. In lieu of a specific finding that defendants will probably prevail on the merits, the court finds that defendants have raised questions going to the merits that are so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair game for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the financial information of defendants in the possession of the Resolution Trust Corporation shall be maintained and kept confidential and shall not be disclosed or produced to any person or entity pending further order of this court.

EXHIBIT A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Resolution Trust Corporation, in its corporate capacity, Plaintiff, v. Clayton Dean, et al., Defendants.

CIV 91-2026-PHX-EHC (LEAD)

CIV 92-0304-PHX-RCB

ORDER STAYING DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION

In a motion dated June 28, 1994, Defendants Dean, Fannin, Hess, Kerr, Needham and Newell1 requested an order staying disclosure by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) of defendants’ personal financial information submitted to the RTC as a condition of settling this lawsuit and another case pending in the District of Utah, BTC v. Hess, et al., No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Klein
80 U.S. 128 (Supreme Court, 1872)
City of Hartford v. Chase
942 F.2d 130 (Second Circuit, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
859 F. Supp. 1411, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11433, 1994 WL 440727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/resolution-trust-corp-v-hess-utd-1994.