Resnick v. Joline

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

Resnick v. Joline

113 N.Y.S. 918

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedJanuary 8, 1909

StatusPublished

This text of 113 N.Y.S. 918 (Resnick v. Joline) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Resnick v. Joline, 113 N.Y.S. 918 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1909).

Pincite

Opinion

BISCHOFF, J.

The plaintiff called two disinterested witnesses, ' who testified to the happening of the accident under circumstances, which clearly imported negligence of the car driver as the sole cause. We fail to find that the testimony of these witnesses was in any sense contradictory upon a reasonable construction, and this court would not be justified in directing a new trial upon the theory that the preponderance of evidence was with the defendants, merely because a disinterested witness corroborated the driver and conductor in their account of the accident itself. Neither story was inherently improbable, and the issue was distinctly one of simple credibility.

Upon the question whether the child’s parents used due care in guarding him, the proof supports a reasonable inference that his momentary escape from control was due to no lack of ordinary vigilance upon their part in causing him to be guarded and attended; and, so far as error is asserted in the reception of evidence of the causal connection between the accident and the injuries, the objection taken to the hypothetical question was too general in form to present the point now sought to be raised, and, indeed, the expert evidence referred to, as to the probable causal connection, was competent. Wagner v. Railway Co., 79 App. Div. 594, 80 N. Y. Supp. 191; Bruss v. Railway Co., 66 App. Div. 559, 73 N. Y. Supp. 256.

Judgments affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

BISCHOFF, J.

The plaintiff called two disinterested witnesses, ' who testified to the happening of the accident under circumstances, which clearly imported negligence of the car driver as the sole cause. We fail to find that the testimony of these witnesses was in any sense contradictory upon a reasonable construction, and this court would not be justified in directing a new trial upon the theory that the preponderance of evidence was with the defendants, merely because a disinterested witness corroborated the driver and conductor in their account of the accident itself. Neither story was inherently improbable, and the issue was distinctly one of simple credibility.

Upon the question whether the child’s parents used due care in guarding him, the proof supports a reasonable inference that his momentary escape from control was due to no lack of ordinary vigilance upon their part in causing him to be guarded and attended; and, so far as error is asserted in the reception of evidence of the causal connection between the accident and the injuries, the objection taken to the hypothetical question was too general in form to present the point now sought to be raised, and, indeed, the expert evidence referred to, as to the probable causal connection, was competent. Wagner v. Railway Co., 79 App. Div. 594, 80 N. Y. Supp. 191; Bruss v. Railway Co., 66 App. Div. 559, 73 N. Y. Supp. 256.

Judgments affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

113 N.Y.S. 918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/resnick-v-joline-nyappterm-1909.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack