Reser's Fine Foods, Inc. v. United States

29 Ct. Int'l Trade 413, 2005 CIT 47
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedApril 12, 2005
DocketCourt 00-00021
StatusPublished

This text of 29 Ct. Int'l Trade 413 (Reser's Fine Foods, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Reser's Fine Foods, Inc. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int'l Trade 413, 2005 CIT 47 (cit 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

EATON, Judge:

This case is again before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to USCIT R. 56. Previously, both parties made similar motions, each of which was denied because there remained questions with respect to material facts. See Reser’s Fine Foods, Inc. v. United States, 27 CIT_, slip op. 03-117 (Sept. 5, 2003) (“Reser’s F). Now, following renewed discovery and the filing of new affidavits, interrogatory responses, deposition transcripts, and physical and documentary evidence, each party has renewed its motion. Plaintiff Reser’s Fine Foods, Inc., d/b/a Sidari’s Italian Foods (“Reser’s”) again challenges the United States Customs Service’s (“Customs”) 1 classification of its entries of artichokes as “Other vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, not frozen, other than products of heading 2006 . . . Other vegetables and mixtures of vegetables . . . Artichokes,” under subheading 2005.90.80 of the Harmonized Tariff *414 Schedule of the United States (1998) (“HTSUS”) and subject to a tariff rate of 15.8% ad valorem. Plaintiff argues that the merchandise is properly classifiable under HTSUS subheading 0711.90.60 as “Vegetables provisionally preserved (for example, by sulfur dioxide gas, in brine, in sulfur water or in other preservative solutions), but unsuitable in that state for immediate consumption . . . Other vegetables; mixtures of vegetables . . . Other vegetables; mixtures of vegetables,” subject to a tariff rate of 9.1% ad valorem. By its cross-motion, defendant United States, on behalf of Customs, again maintains that the merchandise is properly classifiable under HTSUS subheading 2005.90.80, and asks the court to deny plaintiff’s motion and dismiss this action. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000).

This court may resolve a classification issue by means of summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. ...” USCIT R. 56(c). Summary judgment of a classification issue “is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to the underlying factual issue of exactly what the merchandise is.” Bausch & Lomb, 148 F.3d at 1365 (citing Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v. United States, 143 F.3d 1470, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998); IKO Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 105 F.3d 624, 626-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1), Custom’s classification of merchandise is presumed to be correct. In the context of summary judgment, however, since there are no disputes with respect to the material facts, the presumption does not shift the burden to the plaintiff. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (where court determines that there is no dispute of material facts, its “review of the classification of goods collapses into a determination of the proper meaning and scope of HTSUS terms, which, as a matter of statutory construction, is a question of law.”). For the reasons set forth below, the court denies plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, and grants that of defendant United States.

Background

In the context of their first cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties agreed that (1) “The merchandise . . . was imported from Spain [and] consists of 88-1/5 ounces of quartered artichoke hearts in a solution of water and acetic acid (0.1%), salt (1.2%) and citric acid (0.6%) packaged in No. 10 cans. The pH of the liquid solution in the imported cans is 3.97”; (2) “Citric acid is used to enhance flavors, increase preservative effectiveness, retard discoloration and conserve energy by reducing heat-processing requirements in vegetable processing”; and (3) “In Spain, the merchandise ... is packed in cans which are [then] subjected to a thermal process which expels air, *415 then hermetically sealed and further heated for the purpose of rendering the product commercially sterile.” Parties’ Joint Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Are No Genuine Issues to be Tried ¶¶ 6-8 (“Parties’ Joint Statement”). The evidence submitted in connection with the instant motions, as well as the parties’ stated agreement with respect to certain other material facts, will be discussed in the context of the issues presented.

Discussion

Classification of merchandise under the HTSUS is governed by the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRI”). See Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. of P.R. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (noting that the HTSUS General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) and the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (U.S. GRI) govern the proper classification of all merchandise and are applied in numerical order). GRI 1 states that “for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes. ...” GRI 1. GRI 6 states that “the classification of goods in the subheadings of a heading shall be determined according to the terms of those subheadings and any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis to the [General Rules of Interpretation] on the understanding that only subheadings at the same level are comparable.” GRI 6. Furthermore, “[w]hen ... a tariff term is not defined in either the HTSUS or its legislative history, ‘the term’s correct meaning is its common meaning.’ ” Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”). In ascertaining the meaning of undefined terms, “the court may rely upon its own understanding, dictionaries and other reliable sources.” Medline Indus., Inc. v. United States,

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