Republic Steel Corp. v. United States

159 F. Supp. 366, 141 Ct. Cl. 499, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1083, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 4
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 5, 1958
DocketNo. 49535
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 159 F. Supp. 366 (Republic Steel Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 366, 141 Ct. Cl. 499, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1083, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 4 (cc 1958).

Opinion

JoNES, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for an income tax refund. The primary issue is whether at the time of the dissolution of a wholly-owned corporation the book indebtedness of such corporation owing to the plaintiff should be reduced by $1,250,000, being the amount represented by a promissory note. Disposition of this issue hinges on the promissory note’s validity as indebtedness for purposes of bad debt and worthless stock loss deductions.1

The facts are set out in detail in the findings. Briefly they are as follows: As of January 1, 1980, The Berger Manufacturing Company, herein referred to as “Berger of Ohio”, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Central Alloy Steel Corporation, from which it purchased raw materials used in its business of manufacturing, selling, and distributing steel desks, file cabinets, and other steel products.

Berger of Ohio, on January 7, 1930, formed a new corporation of the same name — The Berger Manufacturing Company — a New Jersey corporation (hereinafter called “Berger of New Jersey”). It was agreed on that date that [501]*501Berger of New Jersey would carry on the manufacturing business previously conducted by Berger of Ohio, while the latter would continue with its sales and distribution business.

Under the agreement, Berger of Ohio transferred to Berger of New Jersey its manufacturing and fabricating plant near the city of Canton, Ohio, consisting of a tract of land and various factories, buildings, and structures situated on the land, and the machinery and equipment located in the plant, and the raw materials, materials in process and the finished products then in the plant.

Berger of Ohio also executed a promissory note in the amount of $1,250,000 “to be paid without interest when and as collected from accounts receivable.” The note was made payable to Berger of New Jersey. The above-mentioned transfers were made effective as of January 1, 1930. By the terms of the agreement, Berger of New Jersey assumed part of the indebtedness of Berger of Ohio and issued to that company all of its capital stock. Central Alloy Steel Corporation became the sole stockholder of the new Berger Company and thus of both Berger companies when these newly issued shares were distributed to it by Berger of Ohio.

A single set of books for both Berger companies was maintained during J anuary and February 1930, by the same individual who was treasurer and chief accounting officer of each of the companies. No intercompany accounts were kept, and sales and payments were entered on this single set of books monthly. However, in March 1930, the items were segregated and a separate set of books was established for Berger of New Jersey. These accounts for Berger of New Jersey were established retroactive to January 1, 1930.

On April 8,1930, the plaintiff, Republic Steel Corporation, acquired as of April 1,1930, in one transaction substantially all the property of Berger of New Jersey and Central Alloy Steel Corporation, paying therefor in the common stock of the plaintiff corporation. In the same transaction the plaintiff acquired all the capital stock of Berger of Ohio. Thereafter, Berger of New Jersey, redesignated as the Berger Division of the plaintiff, continued to do business with Berger of Ohio. At all times after that date, April 8,1930, Republic [502]*502Steel Corporation owned all the outstanding stock of Berger of Ohio until the dissolution of the latter company on November 10,1937.

Upon the establishment of intercompany accounts in March 1930, the promissory note in the amount of $1,250,000 was retroactively entered as of January 1,1930, in the books of Berger of New Jersey under “Notes Receivable”. The books of Berger of Ohio reflected the note under the account “Notes Payable”, also effective as of January 1, 1930. Amounts paid by Berger of Ohio to third persons on behalf of Berger of New Jersey during the months of January and •February 1930, were debited and credited in the new inter-company accounts captioned “Accounts Receivable” and “Accounts Payable”. Similar payments in March were also treated in this manner. On March 31, 1930, the “Notes Receivable” and “Notes Payable” accounts indicated the promissory obligation as being outstanding to the extent of $1,250,000. And from April 1, 1930, to December 31, 1932, the accounts relating to the promissory note in the amount of $1,250,000 remained unchanged, notwithstanding a continuation of payments to third persons, now on behalf of the Berger Division of Republic Steel Corporation, by Berger of Ohio,-these payments being entered in the Berger Division’s account captioned “Accounts Payable — Berger of Ohio”.

On December 31, 1932, an agreement, was made between the plaintiff and Berger of Ohio, by the terms of which it transferred to Berger of Ohio the business of its Berger Division. At this time there was a setoff of intercompany accounts (see finding 33) which had the effect of covering the note in the amount of $1,250,000 into the total book indebtedness owing by Berger of Ohio to Republic Steel 'Corporation. The note thereafter remained a part of such book indebtedness.

As of October 30 and November 1, 1937, Berger of Ohio transferred its assets, subject to its liabilities, to the plaintiff and Berger of Ohio was dissolved on November 10,1937.

An assessment for additional income taxes was levied by the Collector of Internal Revenue against the plaintiff in 1943 for the taxable year 1937. The plaintiff paid such [503]*503additional assessment and later filed a timely claim for refund of part of the taxes paid for the year 1937, basing its claim partially on the following grounds:

(1) that the plaintiff was entitled to a bad debt deduction of $1,160,085.88 by reason of the book indebtedness owed to the plaintiff by Berger of Ohio, which allegedly became worthless in the year 1937; and

(2) that the plaintiff was entitled to a deduction for a worthless stock loss of $1,538,998.02 by reason of its stock investment in Berger of Ohio, which allegedly became worthless in the taxable year 1937.

The bad debt loss asserted by the plaintiff was computed by subtracting the net value of the assets that were conveyed to the plaintiff by Berger of Ohio on the dissolution of the latter company from the amount of the book indebtedness of Berger of Ohio to the plaintiff, such indebtedness including the amount of the note which Berger of Ohio in 1930 made to Berger of New Jersey in the amount of $1,250,000.

According to the plaintiff’s computations, Berger of Ohio at the time of its dissolution owed the plaintiff $3,361,801.03, and the value of Berger’s assets less its liabilities to third persons as of that date was $2,201,715.15. It is the difference between these two figures, that is, $1,160,085.88 which the plaintiff claims as a bad debt deduction.

If the Collector of Internal Revenue was correct in refusing to allow a deduction on account of the note in the sum of $1,250,000, then the book indebtedness reduced by that amount would be $2,111,801.03, which is less than the value of the assets at the time of the dissolution of Berger of Ohio on November 10, 1937. Under those circumstances the plaintiff would not have suffered a bad debt loss and the stock of Berger of Ohio would not have been worthless at the time of its dissolution.

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159 F. Supp. 366, 141 Ct. Cl. 499, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1083, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 4, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/republic-steel-corp-v-united-states-cc-1958.