Republic of Panama v. Citizens & Southern International Bank

682 F. Supp. 1544, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2959, 1988 WL 30445
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedMarch 22, 1988
Docket88-410-Civ
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 682 F. Supp. 1544 (Republic of Panama v. Citizens & Southern International Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Republic of Panama v. Citizens & Southern International Bank, 682 F. Supp. 1544, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2959, 1988 WL 30445 (S.D. Fla. 1988).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO INTERVENE

ARONOVITZ, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Banco Nacional de Panama’s (“BNP”) motion to intervene, and upon the ore tenus motion to intervene made on behalf of the government of Manuel Solie Palma (“Palma”) and General Manuel Noriega (“Noriega”).

THE COURT has considered the motions and the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

The background and procedural posture of this case are set forth in the Court’s Order Entering Preliminary Injunction entered under even date herewith. 1 In this Order the Court REAFFIRMS its ore ten-us ruling on March 16, 1988, which DENIED both BNP’s and Palma’s motions to intervene.

Political Question Doctrine

The Court’s preliminary injunction Order effectively decides the central issues presented in these motions to intervene. The Executive branch’s exclusive power to recognize and legitimize a foreign government is binding upon the courts and pre-eludes a suit in United States courts by an unrecognized government. See Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-20, 98 S.Ct. 584, 591, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410, 84 S.Ct. 923, 930, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964); and Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137, 58 S.Ct. 785, 791, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938).

This doctrine completely precludes the Palma government’s intervention and participation in this litigation. In Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F.Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd sub nom., 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1443, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974), the court rejected the intervention of an art museum performing a governmental function as an arm of the unrecognized government of Germany.

Given the Acting Secretary of State’s March 2, 1988 certification that the United States recognizes Ambassador Juan B. Sosa as the legitimate representative of the Republic of Panama, the Palma government’s motion to intervene be and the same is hereby DENIED. Under the political question doctrine, no other disposition is possible.

BNP

As the New York court stated, BNP’s motion to intervene is “somewhat more tenable.” Republic of Panama v. Republic National Bank of New York, et al., 88 Civ. 1427 (LFM) [Available on WESTLAW, 1988 WL 22084]. BNP sets forth two central arguments in an attempt to intervene. First, that it is not a central bank within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. sec. 632, and second, that most of the funds it holds are private funds. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that in addressing BNP’s motion to intervene, the Court is not guided by the ordinary principles governing intervention pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). If *1546 BNP were a private domestic depositor, there is little doubt that it would be entitled to intervene and assert its claim to funds held in its name in a United States bank.

The basis for denying intervention is instead the Elicofon rationale that an agent of an unrecognized government is not permitted access to United States courts. BNP argues, of course, that Elicofon, and section 632 are inapposite. Section 632 itself does not directly speak to the issue of whether an unrecognized government is procedurally permitted to intervene in litigation. What section 632 does do is to exonerate a bank from any liability associated with following the directions of a duly recognized representative of a foreign state with regard to funds held on the state’s behalf.

Yet section 632’s extraordinary exoneration from liability does seem to lead to the concomitant principle that only the duly recognized representative has authority or standing to contest funds held on behalf of a foreign state. From this perspective, section 632 is completely consistent with Elicofon and the political question doctrine. Indeed, section 632 is little more than a codification of the doctrine in the context of banking.

a. Central Bank

Section 632 states, in somewhat circular fashion, that a central bank “includes any foreign bank or banker authorized to perform any one or more of the functions of a central bank.” BNP argues that it is not a central bank under section 632 because as Panama’s currency is the United States dollar, the bank does not play the critical role of a genuine central bank in regulating the money supply and printing currency. Furthermore, BNP states that it does not regulate other Panamanian banks by setting reserve and margin requirements, typical central bank functions. Finally, BNP notes that the International Monetary Fund considers it a commercial bank.

But section 632’s definition of a central bank is helpful to the extent that it requires only the performance of “one or more” of typical central bank functions. To this extent, BNP’s emphasis on the alleged distinctions between it and a genuine central bank are unpersuasive. The true inquiry must be on the similarities, not the distinctions, between BNP and a typical central bank. Indeed, one possible construction of section 632 is that BNP will be treated as a central bank so long as it performs even a single function of a true central bank. But the Court need not rely upon such a thin thread, for BNP has many indicia of a central bank.

One central feature of a section 632 central bank is its status as the fiscal agency of a foreign government. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir.1953). In Panamanian legislation reorganizing BNP, the bank is established as the “primary financial organization of the State.” To this end, all government funds must be deposited in BNP. Furthermore, the government is responsible for all of BNP’s financial obligations. BNP is wholly owned by the government, and the government appoints all of BNP’s directors and the executive branch may remove BNP’s General Manager.

b. Private Funds

These factors amply suffice to establish BNP as a central bank under section 632. BNP next argues that even if it is a central bank or agency of the state, it must be allowed to intervene to represent the interests of its private depositors whose funds constitute 55 percent of its deposits. BNP argues “that what plaintiff attempts in this action is, in effect, to seize not public funds but the funds of private Panamanian citizens and entities.” In short, BNP asserts that it must be allowed to intervene to insure that the plaintiff does not confiscate private funds.

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746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Florida, 1990)
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745 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Florida, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
682 F. Supp. 1544, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2959, 1988 WL 30445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/republic-of-panama-v-citizens-southern-international-bank-flsd-1988.