Republic Life Insurance v. Pollak

75 Ill. 292
Illinois Supreme Court·Decided September 15, 1874·Published·Cited by 26 cases

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Walker

delivered the opinion of the Court:

We are asked, in this case, to review the case of Porter v. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis R. R. Co.;* but after a careful reconsideration of the rules there announced, in the light of appellant’s argument in this case, we perceive no reason to overrule or even modify any thing that was said in that and other cases decided at the same time, involving questions relating to the taxation of the property and franchises of corporations. Most of the questions presented by this record are discussed in those decisions, and being satisfied with these decisions, and what we there said, we have no inclination to again discuss the questions.

It is urged that the board of equalization has overvalued the property assessed, and adopted a false rule for ascertaining such value. Even if it were true that there was too great a value, placed on this property, counsel mistake the power of the court to afford relief for that reason. Our constitution, article 9, section 1, provides that “the general' assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needed, by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property; such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, and not otherwise.” Thus it will be seen that all power to fix a valuation is taken from each of the departments of the government. It is unmistakably vested in the persons elected under the requirements of the statute, and it can only be fixed by them, and not otherwise. The legislative branch of government could not exercise this power, nor could the executive, because the constitution has not only vested it in the persons elected, as directed by the general assembly, but all other persons, bodies, departments, or such bodies combined, are expressly prohibited from performing that duty.

Nor is there any power, expressed or implied, by which the courts can fix a valuation, or review the action of the assessors. They are invested with the sole power, and we are aware of no authority to review their action. The law has not, nor can it, in view of this constitutional provision, empower the courts to fix the valuation of property for taxation. We regard no proposition clearer. If the courts may hear evidence and change the valuation fixed by the officers elected under the law to perform that duty, then it is the courts, who are not elected or appointed for the purpose, who fix the value, and that would be to make the valuation otherwise than is peremptorily required by the constitution. For the courts to hear evidence and change the valuation fixed by the assessors would be in direct and palpable violation of the constitution. When those officers have acted it is final, and the tax payer must submit to the action of the officer who is clothed with the sole power to make the estimate of the value, unless he can show it was fraudulently made, or that the property assessed was not liable to taxation, or the legislature has, in authorizing the tax, disregarded or transcended the principles of equality, or where a tax has been levied when not authorized by law.

Fraud vitiates all acts, and this as well as others. But when the officer acts with a fraudulent purpose, to the injury of the tax payer, the latter may be relieved from the effects of the fraud. And when the officer assesses and values property exempt from taxation he acts without authority, and all of his acts in excéss of his power are void. It was the manifest intention of the people, in ratifying the constitution, to make the action of the assessing officers final; and there are cogent reasons for the provision. If a party were allowed to contest the valuation of the property in the courts, after the books are returned, the tax extended and the warrant issued for its collection, the same thing could be done before the extension of the tax and the issuing of the warrant. And if every tax payer might appeal to the courts, either before or after the warrant comes to the hands of the collector, the greater portion of the revenue could be tied up and delayed for years, and the very existence of the government endangered, as its life depends upon the requisite amount of revenue for its support.

For the purpose of preventing such delays and hazards this provision was, no doubt, inserted. In most governments such delays are not permitted in the laying and collecting their revenue, and such a policy would seem to be imperatively demanded. If or does the fact that taxes are high, and in many instances oppressive, change the principle. An extravagant and wasteful administration of government does not at all change the principle. The taxes are levied and collected .to meet the expenses of general and local government, all of which are under the control of the people.

They elect their officers, who inaugurate the policies of their government, and they know that a lavish expenditure of public money, or the creation of large State or local municipal debts, compels the imposition of heavy taxes to meet the expense. Again, they elect the officers who make these assessments, and it is for them to select men of intelligence, capacity and integrity for the purpose. If the people or their officers create debts, or adopt an extravagant policy in the expenditure of public funds, they must meet the burdens thus self-imposed, as the courts are no more able to relieve them from the consequences of such acts than from their just individual debts.

Governments are created to protect men in their natural rights, and with incidental protection to'their civil or political rights. Ho means has been devised by which government can be maintained without the use of revenue, and that revenue must be directly or indirectly drawn from the governed. In different organizations different modes of acquiring such revenue are adopted. In our State the great central idea in collecting taxes is that every person owning or having property in the State, and having the right to demand the aid of the government in its protection, as well as his own rights, whether of person, liberty, or property, must contribute to the support of the State government in proportion to the value of his property. The rule embraces corporations or intangible persons as well as natural persons. They hold property and require its protection. They transact business and enter into contracts, and require the power of the State to enforce them; and the great principle of natural justice demands that all who have the right to command and employ the sovereign power of the State to protect them in their rights, should contribute to the expense of the government, in arming itself with means and in sustaining the requisite official force to protect them in their rights.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Republic Life Insurance v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292 (Ill. 1874).

75 Ill. 292 (Republic Life Insurance v. Pollak) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

The People v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
32 N.E.2d 902 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1941)
Bachrach v. Nelson
182 N.E. 909 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1932)
Bistor v. McDonough
181 N.E. 417 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1932)
6922 Jeffery Apartment Building Corp. v. Harding
179 N.E. 881 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1932)
Wheeling Fire Insurance v. Board of Equalization & Review
161 S.E. 427 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1931)
State Ex Rel. Tompkins v. Shipman
234 S.W. 60 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1921)
Mohave County v. Stephens
149 P. 670 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1915)
Commonwealth Life Insurance v. City of Louisville
140 S.W. 306 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1911)
Home Fire Insurance v. Lynch
56 P. 681 (Utah Supreme Court, 1899)
Mackin v. Taylor County Court
18 S.E. 632 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1893)
Whatcom County v. Fairhaven Land Co.
34 P. 563 (Washington Supreme Court, 1893)
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Backus
18 L.R.A. 729 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1893)
Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby
25 N.E. 660 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1890)
Territory of Arizona v. Delinquent Tax-List
21 P. 768 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1889)
Coal Run Coal Co. v. Finlen
17 N.E. 11 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1888)
Illinois & St. Louis Railroad & Coal Co. v. Stookey
13 N.E. 516 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1887)
New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exchange v. Gleason
13 N.E. 204 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1887)
P. C. &. St. L. R'y. Co. v. Board of Public Works
28 W. Va. 264 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1886)
City & County of San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works
63 Cal. 524 (California Supreme Court, 1883)