Reppucci v. Nadeau

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: January 8, 2019
• Docket: YORcv-14-182
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-14-182

WENDY REPPUCCI,

Plaintiff

v. ORDER

JAMES P. NADEAU, ESQ. and NADEAU LAW OFFICES, PLLC,

Defendants

This matter was heard on oral argument on October 23, 2018 on the Defendants'

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Defendants' Motion for New Trial. The

Court has had an opportunity to review this well-briefed case and to listen to the helpful

oral arguments, and after careful consideration concludes that both the Motion for

Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial should each be denied.

This case presented difficult legal issues involving applicability of the standard for

legal malpractice as well as the issues associated with causation.

In Niehoff v. Shankman & Assoc. Legal Ctr., P.A., 2000 ME 214, 'l[lO, 763 A.2d 121, the

Law Court has addressed how legal malpractice cases should be evaluated in

circumstances in which the judge, as factfinder, was never presented with issues and

recognized the difficulty associated with attempting to prove what any particular judge

would do on any particular given set of facts. This Court became convinced that in these

circumstances the failure to argue at trial required application of the Niehoff principles in

evaluating the appropriate legal standard. Niehoff does not dispense with the

1 requirement that proximate cause be also proven. The "failure to plead" standard was

particularly appropriate from a legal and policy matter to apply in this case because the

damages suffered by Plaintiff allegedly flowed from Attorney Nadeau's claimed failures

to act.

The Court attempted to delineate in a special verdict form, as well as in

instructions, that various nuances associated with each claim. The Defendants

appropriately and timely objected. However, ultimately the Court believes that the

instructions given, as well as the special verdict form, were appropriate under the law in

this relatively complicated case.

To prove a legal malpractice claim pursuant to the "failure to plead" standard, a

plaintiff must show: "(l) the defendant attorney was negligent in representation of the

plaintiff; and (2) the attorney's negligence caused the plaintiff to lose an opportunity to

achieve a result, favorable to the plaintiff, which (i) the law allows; and (ii) the facts ...

would support."

The spousal support award of $36,400.00 was consistent with Plaintiff's expert

Attorney Ridge's testimony that $100 per week for the statutory presumption period

based on the length of the marriage was supported by the facts and law. The attorney fee

award of $3,077.00 was supported by the Plaintiff's testimony about the bill she paid to

correct the judgment to properly divide the military pay. Attorney Ridge opined that

Attorney Nadeau's negligent failure to submit a judgment that properly divided the asset

caused this loss. The jury was presented with evidence both by experts and the Plaintiff

regarding the value, the debt for Richard Reppucci' s equity in the home, the interest rate

upon that debt, and the availability of equitable division in reconfiguring the division of

the marital real estate.

2 The evidence also supports the jury's $25,445.00 award. Attorney Ridge testified

that the law allowed the divorce court to order Plaintiff designated as a survivor

beneficiary of Richard Reppucci' s pension plan. CPA Eric Purvis' testimony supports the

survivor benefit award of $15,600. The thrift savings plan was discussed at length during

the trial. The jury could have concluded that the account had a balance of between

$15,000 and $20,000. Attorney Ridge testified that had discovery been undertaken and

had the account been pursued by Attorney Nadeau, Plaintiff would have recovered the

50% share to which she was entitled. The jury's award of $8,000 is supported by the

evidence.

Finally, on the issue of whether or not there was appropriate evidence to allow the

jury to conclude that its verdict was justified, the Court recognizes that many of the

defense arguments made in support of these motions were also made to the jury. While

it was certainly difficult for the jury to necessarily conclude how all of these factors were

to be considered ultimately in the equitable distribution of property the Court concludes

that as a result of the plaintiff's experts, admissions made by the defendants, and the

defendants' expert, as well as other expert testimony, and testimony created by the

plaintiff, that there was an adequate factual basis to support the jury's verdict with

respect to each of the claims that were presented.

Accordingly, the Court denies both the Defendants' Motion for a Judgment as a

Matter of Law and the Defendants' Motion for a New Trial.

The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P.79(a).

Dated: January 'is, 2019 John H. O'Neil, Jr. Justice, Superior Court

!3v"if::RED ON THE DOCKET ON: 3