UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
REO L. COVINGTON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-CV-1605-JPS
v.
ORDER MELISSA WENDT-TROCHINSKI, KELLY PELKY, DR. JOHNSTON, DR. LUKE FRAUNDORF, DR. DANIEL BRUNNER, BRIAN CAHAK, and JOHN/JANE DOE,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reo L. Covington (“Plaintiff”), an inmate confined at Oshkosh Correctional Institution(“OCI”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate dental treatment. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, screens his complaint, and addresses his motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 4. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 17, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.69. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff paid that fee on December 9, 2025. The Court will therefore deny Plaintiffs motion for an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee, ECF No. 9, as moot. The Court will also grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 4. Plaintiff must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Melissa Wendt- Trochinski (“Wendt-Trochinski”), Kelly Pelky (“Pelky”), Dr. Johnston (“Johnston”), Dr. Luke Fraundorf (“Fraundorf”), Dr. Daniel Brunner (“Brunner”), Brian Cahak (“Cahak”), and John/Jane Does (“Does”). ECF No. 1. In September 2023, Plaintiff submitted a DOC-3035 complaining about pain in his right shoulder and hip joints while he was housed in Dodge Correctional Institution. Id. at 3. Plaintiff continued to submit requests for medical care through December. Id. On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred to Oshkosh Correctional Institution. Id. Plaintiff submitted another health request for his pain on the day he transferred. Id. On June 7, 2024, Brunner performed a barbotage procedure on Plaintiff at the request of Fraundorf. Id. at 9. Brunner did not provide Plaintiff with any type of pain medication during this procedure. Id. Fraundorf did not order another MRI for Plaintiff after this procedure. Id. Plaintiff continued to submit requests for medical care through July 2024. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff informed staff that the Naproxen he was given did not alleviate his pain. Id. at 6. Plaintiff requested a low-bunk restriction and medical shoes. Id. In January 2025, Plaintiff complained to Wendt-Trochinski about his pain. Id. at 10. Plaintiff continued to submit requests for help, including a request to Pelky on April 24, 2025. Id. at 11. Cahak conspired with prison staff to deny Plaintiff his pain medications. Id. at 14. Johnston repeatedly denied Plaintiff’s requests for adequate pain medication. Id. Following Plaintiff’s surgery, Fraundorf repeatedly ignored Plaintiff’s requests for adequate pain medication in 2025. Id. at 16. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed against Wendt- Trochinski, Pelky, Johnston, Fraundorf, Brunner, Cahak, and the Does on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for their indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The Eighth Amendment secures an inmate’s right to medical care. Prison officials violate this right when they “display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Deliberate indifference claims contain both an objective and a subjective component: the inmate “must first establish that his medical condition is objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’; and second, that prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ i.e., that they both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.” Lewis v.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
REO L. COVINGTON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-CV-1605-JPS
v.
ORDER MELISSA WENDT-TROCHINSKI, KELLY PELKY, DR. JOHNSTON, DR. LUKE FRAUNDORF, DR. DANIEL BRUNNER, BRIAN CAHAK, and JOHN/JANE DOE,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reo L. Covington (“Plaintiff”), an inmate confined at Oshkosh Correctional Institution(“OCI”), filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate dental treatment. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, screens his complaint, and addresses his motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 4. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 17, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.69. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff paid that fee on December 9, 2025. The Court will therefore deny Plaintiffs motion for an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee, ECF No. 9, as moot. The Court will also grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 4. Plaintiff must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Melissa Wendt- Trochinski (“Wendt-Trochinski”), Kelly Pelky (“Pelky”), Dr. Johnston (“Johnston”), Dr. Luke Fraundorf (“Fraundorf”), Dr. Daniel Brunner (“Brunner”), Brian Cahak (“Cahak”), and John/Jane Does (“Does”). ECF No. 1. In September 2023, Plaintiff submitted a DOC-3035 complaining about pain in his right shoulder and hip joints while he was housed in Dodge Correctional Institution. Id. at 3. Plaintiff continued to submit requests for medical care through December. Id. On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff was transferred to Oshkosh Correctional Institution. Id. Plaintiff submitted another health request for his pain on the day he transferred. Id. On June 7, 2024, Brunner performed a barbotage procedure on Plaintiff at the request of Fraundorf. Id. at 9. Brunner did not provide Plaintiff with any type of pain medication during this procedure. Id. Fraundorf did not order another MRI for Plaintiff after this procedure. Id. Plaintiff continued to submit requests for medical care through July 2024. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff informed staff that the Naproxen he was given did not alleviate his pain. Id. at 6. Plaintiff requested a low-bunk restriction and medical shoes. Id. In January 2025, Plaintiff complained to Wendt-Trochinski about his pain. Id. at 10. Plaintiff continued to submit requests for help, including a request to Pelky on April 24, 2025. Id. at 11. Cahak conspired with prison staff to deny Plaintiff his pain medications. Id. at 14. Johnston repeatedly denied Plaintiff’s requests for adequate pain medication. Id. Following Plaintiff’s surgery, Fraundorf repeatedly ignored Plaintiff’s requests for adequate pain medication in 2025. Id. at 16. 2.3 Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed against Wendt- Trochinski, Pelky, Johnston, Fraundorf, Brunner, Cahak, and the Does on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for their indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The Eighth Amendment secures an inmate’s right to medical care. Prison officials violate this right when they “display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Deliberate indifference claims contain both an objective and a subjective component: the inmate “must first establish that his medical condition is objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’; and second, that prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ i.e., that they both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.” Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 562–63 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citations omitted)). “A delay in treating non- life-threatening but painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010)). The length of delay that is tolerable “‘depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.’” Id. (quoting McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640). At the screening stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed against these defendants. Plaintiff alleges delayed treatment for his pain and that Defendants knowingly failed to either provide adequate pain medication or to timely treat him. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed against Wendt-Trochinski, Pelky, Johnston, Fraundorf, Brunner, Cahak, and the Does on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim for their indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 3. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, whether through a TRO or preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show that: (1) his underlying case has some likelihood of success on the merits, (2) no adequate remedy at law exists, and (3) he will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Wood v. Buss, 496 F.3d 620, 622 (7th Cir. 2007). A preliminary injunction is not appropriate to guard against the “mere possibility of irreparable injury.” Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). If the plaintiff can establish those three factors, the court must balance the harm to each party and to the public interest from granting or denying the injunction. See Wood, 496 F.3d at 622; Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013); Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999). In the context of prisoner litigation, the scope of a court’s authority to issue an injunction (including a TRO) is circumscribed by the PLRA. See Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunctive relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (noting the PLRA “enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging prison conditions: prisons officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Based on the very limited information before the Court, it is unclear if Plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of success on a claim that he is not receiving adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment or that he will be irreparably injured if he is not granted immediate relief while this case is pending. Therefore, the Court will order a response from Defendants before taking further action on the request for a preliminary injunction. The Court will order Defendants to respond to the motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 4, as soon as possible but no later than February 24, 2026. 4. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on the following claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b): Claim One: Eighth Amendment claim against Wendt-Trochinski, Pelky, Johnston, Fraundorf, Brunner, Cahak, and the Does for their deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The Court has enclosed with this Order guides prepared by court staff to address common questions that arise in cases filed by prisoners. These guides are entitled, “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants’ Common Questions.” They contain information that Plaintiff may find useful in prosecuting his case. Defendants should take note that, within forty-five (45) days of service of this Order, they are to file a summary judgment motion that raises all exhaustion-related challenges. The Court will issue a scheduling order at a later date that embodies other relevant deadlines. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 6, be and the same is hereby GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee, ECF No. 9, be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants file and serve a response to the motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 4, as soon as possible but no later than February 24, 2026, with supporting documentation and declarations from staff as necessary, addressing Plaintiff’s access to medical care; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, a copy of the complaint and this Order have been electronically transmitted to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on Defendants Wendt- Trochinski, Pelky, Johnston, Fraundorf, Brunner, and Cahak; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under the informal service agreement, Defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty (60) days; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants raise any exhaustion- related challenges by filing a motion for summary judgment within forty- five (45) days of service; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED if Defendants contemplate a motion to dismiss, the parties must meet and confer before the motion is filed. Defendants should take care to explain the reasons why they intend to move to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff should strongly consider filing an amended complaint. The Court expects this exercise in efficiency will obviate the need to file most motions to dismiss. Indeed, when the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it typically grants leave to amend unless it is “certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Harris v. Meisner, No. 20-2650, 2021 WL 5563942, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021) (quoting Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 524 (7th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, it is in both parties’ interest to discuss the matter prior to motion submissions. Briefs in support of, or opposition to, motions to dismiss should cite no more than ten (10) cases per claim. No string citations will be accepted. If Defendants file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is hereby warned that he must file a response, in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7 (E.D. Wis.), or he may be deemed to have waived any argument against dismissal and face dismissal of this matter with prejudice; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect from his institution trust account the $348.25 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this case. If Plaintiff is transferred to another county, state, or federal institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this Order along with his remaining balance to the receiving institution; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is confined; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office mail Plaintiff a copy of the guides entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants’ Common Questions,” along with this Order. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 3rd day of February, 2026. ee PR J.P. Stat weller U.S. District Judge
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Plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. Prisoner E-Filing is mandatory for all inmates at Columbia Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program Facility. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities, or who have been released from custody, will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to: Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. If mail is received directly to the Court’s chambers, IT WILL BE RETURNED TO SENDER AND WILL NOT BE FILED IN THE CASE. Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely file any brief, motion, response, or reply may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND MAIL IS RETURNED TO THE COURT AS UNDELIVERABLE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE.