Renu B. Lal v. Department of Health and Human Services

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 22, 2016
StatusUnpublished

This text of Renu B. Lal v. Department of Health and Human Services (Renu B. Lal v. Department of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Renu B. Lal v. Department of Health and Human Services, (Miss. 2016).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RENU B. LAL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-14-0852-M-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: December 22, 2016 HUMAN SERVICES, Agency.

THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL *

George M. Chuzi, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Julie A. Sammons, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman Mark A. Robbins, Member

REMAND ORDER

¶1 This appeal is before the Board on remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit after reversal of the Board’s final order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we REVERSE

* A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the agency’s action and REMAND the case to the Board’s Washington Regional Office for adjudication of the appellant’s affirmative defense . ¶2 The appellant was appointed as a Distinguished Consultant in the excepted service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 209(f). Lal v. Department of Health & Human Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0852-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 10-11. The agency terminated her employment without providing her with notice or a right to respond. Id. at 4, 8-9. The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging the agency’s action and asserting that she was discriminated against based upon her national origin. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge found that appointees under 42 U.S.C. § 209(f) were not “employees” with Board appeal rights and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision. After the appellant filed a petition for review, the Board issued a final order affirming the initial decision. Lal v. Department of Health & Human Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0852-I-1, Final Order (Mar. 25, 2015). ¶3 The appellant appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit. Lal v. Department of Health & Human Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0852-L-1, Litigation File, Tab 1. The Federal Circuit found that the Due Process Amendments of 1990 extended jurisdiction to claims of employees, such as the appellant, who were appointed to the excepted service under 42 U.S.C. § 209(f). Lal v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 821 F.3d 1376, 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (Aug. 17, 1990) (codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 7511)). Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s dismissal and remanded the case. Lal, 821 F.3d at 1381. ¶4 Because of the Federal Circuit’s finding, we reverse the agency’s action as a violation of the appellant’s constitutional right to minimum due process of law. An agency’s failure to provide a tenured public employee with an opportunity to present a response, either in person or in writing, to an appealable agency action that deprives her of her property right in her employment constitutes an 3

abridgement of her constitutional right to minimum due process of law. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). We find that the appellant was an “employee” who was entitled to appeal the agency’s action because: (1) she was a nonpreference eligible appointed to the excepted service; (2) she was not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; and (3) she completed 2 years of current continuous service in her position under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less. IAF, Tab 5 at 7, 11; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). We also find, and the agency does not dispute, that it imposed the removal action without providing the appellant with notice and an opportunity to respond. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, 8-9. Accordingly, the removal action must be reversed. See Schibik v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 10 (2005). ¶5 We nevertheless remand the appeal for further adjudication. The Board has held that, even when the Board already has determined that the action appealed must be reversed on other grounds, the appellant has the right to a decision on a claim of discrimination because the agency’s complete rescission of the adverse action does not afford the appellant all the relief that she could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed. Cowart v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶ 10 (2012); see White v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 244, ¶ 15 (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a). Here, the appellant asserted that she was discriminated against based upon her national origin . IAF, Tab 1. In light of the jurisdictional dismissal, this claim has not yet been adjudicated. Accordingly, we remand this appeal for adjudication of the appellant’s discrimination claim. See Cowart, 117 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶ 10; Schibik, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 11. 4

ORDER ¶6 For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. ¶7 We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s removal and retroactively restore her effective May 28, 2014. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. ¶8 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal Service Regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. ¶9 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it took to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

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Related

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
470 U.S. 532 (Supreme Court, 1985)
John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Lal v. Merit Systems Protection Board
821 F.3d 1376 (Federal Circuit, 2016)

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Renu B. Lal v. Department of Health and Human Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/renu-b-lal-v-department-of-health-and-human-services-mspb-2016.