SNEED, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Reno-West Coast Distribution Co. (RWC) appeals from a judgment entered for defendants after a jury trial in its action alleging a conspiracy to impose territorial and price restrictions violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Three issues are presented on appeal; the first two pertain to the adequacy of the district judge’s jury instructions while the third concerns the propriety of the court’s exclusion of certain testimony on damages offered by RWC. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
I.
Facts.
Plaintiff-appellant RWC, an independent paper merchant house located in Reno, Nevada, was engaged in the wholesale distribution of business and commercial papers primarily manufactured by defendant Mead Corporation. Mead manufactures various paper products which it markets through Mead-owned wholesale paper merchant houses and independent wholesale merchant houses, or sells directly to certain large customers. Defendant Noland Paper Company is a Los Angeles-based wholesale paper merchant house which was partially-owned by Mead until 1972. Defendant Seaboard Paper Company is a San Francisco-based, partially-owned subsidiary of Mead.
Plaintiffs and defendants presented dramatically different versions of the facts to the jury. RWC charged that Mead conspired with the other defendants to restrict the resale territory and prices of the plaintiff. Specifically, RWC argued that Mead imposed territorial and price restrictions as a condition of granting RWC a distributorship; that RWC engaged in aggressive price cutting outside its prescribed territory and as a consequence, began to increase its market share at' the expense of various competitors, including defendants Noland and Seaboard; that Mead acted on complaints from various distributors and conspired with its subsidiaries, Seaboard and Noland, to terminate RWC’s business; and that Mead effected the unlawful scheme to end RWC’s business by drastically reducing the credit available to RWC. Defendants countered by arguing that any territorial or price restrictions followed by RWC had been suggested by its own President and later were abandoned with Mead’s implicit approval; that RWC did not act as an independent distributor, but served merely as a Mead broker or agent; that Mead did not terminate RWC, but merely limited its credit due to RWC’s inability to make timely payment of its obligations to Mead; and [724]*724that RWC was, from its inception, a small, thinly capitalized company that never had a profitable year. At the conclusion of a month-long trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants.
II.
Adequacy of the Jury Instructions.
The trial judge refused to charge the jury in accordance with appellant’s proposed instruction concerning antitrust liability.1 Appellant now voices two complaints concerning the instructions given. First, RWC complains that the trial court erred by refusing to give the Sehwinn per se illegality charge concerning territorial restrictions which it offered. Second, RWC complains that the trial court erred by allegedly refusing to give the General Motors per se illegality charge concerning a horizontal conspiracy among the various distributors which it requested. We will consider each of these contentions in order.
The district court’s refusal to give plaintiff’s proffered Schwinn instruction concerning alleged territorial restraints was proper in light of the prevailing precedent in this circuit at the time of trial and its propriety subsequently has been fully vindicated by the- Supreme Court’s decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977). The rule of reason instruction given by the district court comports with the standard set forth in GTE Sylvania. No error exists in this sector.
Appellant’s second complaint is that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on its theory that a horizontal conspiracy existed among its competitors, in which Mead served as the enforcer. The trial court properly refused to give plaintiff’s requested horizontal conspiracy charge because it was comingled with the improper Schwinn per se instruction. The GTE Sylvania decision largely undercut the primary theory of recovery advanced by plaintiff below, i. e., that defendant Mead, acting alone or in concert with the other defendants, conspired to impose vertical territorial and price restrictions on RWC. Faced with this subsequent, unfavorable precedent, appellant now seeks to resurrect its horizontal conspiracy contentions. The charge proffered by appellant, however, did [725]*725not clearly and unambiguously state the law dealing with a General Motors-type horizontal conspiracy. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936, 96 S.Ct. 1667, 48 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 459 F.Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). A literal reading of the proposed instruction suggests that it was intended to encompass only a vertical conspiracy involving defendant Mead, acting either alone or in.concert with the other defendants.2 We are of the opinion that the proffered charge concerning a General Motors conspiracy was not properly presented to the trial court and that plaintiff’s horizontal conspiracy theory was, in any event, adequately covered by the trial court’s instructions taken as a whole. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973).3
Although it is true that a party is entitled to have its theory of the case [726]*726presented to the jury by proper instructions, “the word ‘proper’ deserves emphasis. The burden is upon counsel to present a correct instruction. If what he proposes is incorrect, the court may reject it; the court is not required to recast it, although it may do so.” Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367, 368 n.2 (9th Cir. 1964). In this case the trial court adequately instructed the jury concerning the applicable law. While the charge might have been fashioned so that it expounded plaintiff’s theory more clearly, it does not follow that it was uncertain or inadequate under the circumstances. See Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1004 (10th Cir. 1972).
III.
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SNEED, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Reno-West Coast Distribution Co. (RWC) appeals from a judgment entered for defendants after a jury trial in its action alleging a conspiracy to impose territorial and price restrictions violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Three issues are presented on appeal; the first two pertain to the adequacy of the district judge’s jury instructions while the third concerns the propriety of the court’s exclusion of certain testimony on damages offered by RWC. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
I.
Facts.
Plaintiff-appellant RWC, an independent paper merchant house located in Reno, Nevada, was engaged in the wholesale distribution of business and commercial papers primarily manufactured by defendant Mead Corporation. Mead manufactures various paper products which it markets through Mead-owned wholesale paper merchant houses and independent wholesale merchant houses, or sells directly to certain large customers. Defendant Noland Paper Company is a Los Angeles-based wholesale paper merchant house which was partially-owned by Mead until 1972. Defendant Seaboard Paper Company is a San Francisco-based, partially-owned subsidiary of Mead.
Plaintiffs and defendants presented dramatically different versions of the facts to the jury. RWC charged that Mead conspired with the other defendants to restrict the resale territory and prices of the plaintiff. Specifically, RWC argued that Mead imposed territorial and price restrictions as a condition of granting RWC a distributorship; that RWC engaged in aggressive price cutting outside its prescribed territory and as a consequence, began to increase its market share at' the expense of various competitors, including defendants Noland and Seaboard; that Mead acted on complaints from various distributors and conspired with its subsidiaries, Seaboard and Noland, to terminate RWC’s business; and that Mead effected the unlawful scheme to end RWC’s business by drastically reducing the credit available to RWC. Defendants countered by arguing that any territorial or price restrictions followed by RWC had been suggested by its own President and later were abandoned with Mead’s implicit approval; that RWC did not act as an independent distributor, but served merely as a Mead broker or agent; that Mead did not terminate RWC, but merely limited its credit due to RWC’s inability to make timely payment of its obligations to Mead; and [724]*724that RWC was, from its inception, a small, thinly capitalized company that never had a profitable year. At the conclusion of a month-long trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants.
II.
Adequacy of the Jury Instructions.
The trial judge refused to charge the jury in accordance with appellant’s proposed instruction concerning antitrust liability.1 Appellant now voices two complaints concerning the instructions given. First, RWC complains that the trial court erred by refusing to give the Sehwinn per se illegality charge concerning territorial restrictions which it offered. Second, RWC complains that the trial court erred by allegedly refusing to give the General Motors per se illegality charge concerning a horizontal conspiracy among the various distributors which it requested. We will consider each of these contentions in order.
The district court’s refusal to give plaintiff’s proffered Schwinn instruction concerning alleged territorial restraints was proper in light of the prevailing precedent in this circuit at the time of trial and its propriety subsequently has been fully vindicated by the- Supreme Court’s decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977). The rule of reason instruction given by the district court comports with the standard set forth in GTE Sylvania. No error exists in this sector.
Appellant’s second complaint is that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on its theory that a horizontal conspiracy existed among its competitors, in which Mead served as the enforcer. The trial court properly refused to give plaintiff’s requested horizontal conspiracy charge because it was comingled with the improper Schwinn per se instruction. The GTE Sylvania decision largely undercut the primary theory of recovery advanced by plaintiff below, i. e., that defendant Mead, acting alone or in concert with the other defendants, conspired to impose vertical territorial and price restrictions on RWC. Faced with this subsequent, unfavorable precedent, appellant now seeks to resurrect its horizontal conspiracy contentions. The charge proffered by appellant, however, did [725]*725not clearly and unambiguously state the law dealing with a General Motors-type horizontal conspiracy. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936, 96 S.Ct. 1667, 48 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 459 F.Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). A literal reading of the proposed instruction suggests that it was intended to encompass only a vertical conspiracy involving defendant Mead, acting either alone or in.concert with the other defendants.2 We are of the opinion that the proffered charge concerning a General Motors conspiracy was not properly presented to the trial court and that plaintiff’s horizontal conspiracy theory was, in any event, adequately covered by the trial court’s instructions taken as a whole. Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973).3
Although it is true that a party is entitled to have its theory of the case [726]*726presented to the jury by proper instructions, “the word ‘proper’ deserves emphasis. The burden is upon counsel to present a correct instruction. If what he proposes is incorrect, the court may reject it; the court is not required to recast it, although it may do so.” Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367, 368 n.2 (9th Cir. 1964). In this case the trial court adequately instructed the jury concerning the applicable law. While the charge might have been fashioned so that it expounded plaintiff’s theory more clearly, it does not follow that it was uncertain or inadequate under the circumstances. See Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1004 (10th Cir. 1972).
III.
Exclusion of Testimony Concerning Damages.
Appellant’s final contention • is that the district court erred by refusing to permit RWC’s President, George Stillwagon, to testify as an expert witness concerning the method used to calculate plaintiff’s projected damages. The court permitted Stillwagon to testify to the following issues: the percentage market share possessed by plaintiff in Nevada; the percentage market share plaintiff claimed it could have captured in the areas of alleged exclusion; and the estimated gross receipts and net profits from anticipated sales in the restricted areas. The trial court also permitted one of plaintiff’s witnesses, a Dr. Haessler, to testify as an expert concerning the information plaintiff sought to introduce through Stillwagon. Appellant’s reliance upon Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Assoc, v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959, 96 S.Ct. 1741, 48 L.Ed.2d 204 (1976) is misplaced. In Sunkist the district court found that plaintiff’s expert witnesses were properly qualified as experienced businessmen capable of providing the information sought. In this case the district court concluded that Mr. Stillwagon was not so qualified. The trial court is vested with broad discretion concerning the admissibility or exclusion of expert testimony and the court’s action is to be sustained unless shown to be manifestly erroneous. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962); United States v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045, 97 S.Ct. 751, 50 L.Ed.2d 759 (1977). No such showing has been made in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.