Rennell v. Horan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rennell v. Horan

225 A.D.2d 939, 639 N.Y.2d 171, 639 N.Y.S.2d 171, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2261

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 14, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 225 A.D.2d 939 (Rennell v. Horan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rennell v. Horan, 225 A.D.2d 939, 639 N.Y.2d 171, 639 N.Y.S.2d 171, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2261 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

—Peters, J.

On December 30, 1990, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident during which she allegedly sustained injuries to her head, neck and back when her véhicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by defendant. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action contending that she had suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant’s motion was granted and plaintiff now appeals, contending that she has met the requirements of the statute under the "permanent loss of use” and "90/180” claims (see, Insurance Law § 5102 [d]).

We affirm. Initially, contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, we find that defendant presented sufficient evidence to satisfy his initial burden on a summary judgment motion of establishing that plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury as a matter of law (see, Colvin v Maille, 127 AD2d 926, 927, lv denied 69 NY2d 611). Further, as Supreme Court appropriately observed, there is no medical evidence establishing that plaintiff has suffered a permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system (see, King v Johnston, 211 AD2d 907). While there is proof that plaintiff continues to experience some pain and discomfort, there is no objective evidence supporting her claim of permanency in this regard (see, supra).

[940]*940We additionally find that the conclusory statements in the record fail to establish that plaintiff’s injuries prevented her from performing substantially all of her usual and customary daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days immediately following the accident (see, Balshan v Bouck, 206 AD2d 747; Kimball v Baker, 174 AD2d 925). Although plaintiff maintains that she was and is in substantial pain, she acknowledges that her injuries did not prevent her from driving her car and shopping for groceries. Additionally, plaintiff, who was unemployed at the time of the accident, started a new job less than three months after she was injured. In any event, even accepting that plaintiff had to curtail some of her activities and sports, the record fails to show that such restrictions were medically indicated or affected a significant portion of her usual activities (see, Relin v Brotherton, 221 AD2d 840, 841).

Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, Crew III, and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Peters, J.

On December 30, 1990, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident during which she allegedly sustained injuries to her head, neck and back when her véhicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by defendant. Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action contending that she had suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant’s motion was granted and plaintiff now appeals, contending that she has met the requirements of the statute under the "permanent loss of use” and "90/180” claims (see, Insurance Law § 5102 [d]).

We affirm. Initially, contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, we find that defendant presented sufficient evidence to satisfy his initial burden on a summary judgment motion of establishing that plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury as a matter of law (see, Colvin v Maille, 127 AD2d 926, 927, lv denied 69 NY2d 611). Further, as Supreme Court appropriately observed, there is no medical evidence establishing that plaintiff has suffered a permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system (see, King v Johnston, 211 AD2d 907). While there is proof that plaintiff continues to experience some pain and discomfort, there is no objective evidence supporting her claim of permanency in this regard (see, supra).

[940]*940We additionally find that the conclusory statements in the record fail to establish that plaintiff’s injuries prevented her from performing substantially all of her usual and customary daily activities for at least 90 of the 180 days immediately following the accident (see, Balshan v Bouck, 206 AD2d 747; Kimball v Baker, 174 AD2d 925). Although plaintiff maintains that she was and is in substantial pain, she acknowledges that her injuries did not prevent her from driving her car and shopping for groceries. Additionally, plaintiff, who was unemployed at the time of the accident, started a new job less than three months after she was injured. In any event, even accepting that plaintiff had to curtail some of her activities and sports, the record fails to show that such restrictions were medically indicated or affected a significant portion of her usual activities (see, Relin v Brotherton, 221 AD2d 840, 841).

Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, Crew III, and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

225 A.D.2d 939, 639 N.Y.2d 171, 639 N.Y.S.2d 171, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rennell-v-horan-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack